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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 20 actorsExploits 9 CVEs

Poison Ivy

Also known asBreutDarkmoon

Poison Ivy is a widely used and long-established remote access trojan (RAT), first identified in 2005 according to the provided content, and commonly referenced as Poison Ivy or PoisonIvy. It provides covert remote administration of compromised Windows systems and has been used extensively in both commodity and advanced persistent threat operations. Reported RAT capabilities in the content include unauthorized remote control, file operations, command execution, screenshot capture, keylogging or credential collection in related campaigns, process and service control, registry modification, network enumeration, database access via ODBC in one observed RAT sample, and local staging of collected data in text files prior to exfiltration. The malware has also been observed establishing persistence by creating a new Windows service, creating a registry subkey to register that service, modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to load a malicious DLL, and in at least one case creating a scheduled task. Infection and delivery vectors mentioned in the content include spear-phishing, socially engineered email campaigns, malicious RTF or Office documents exploiting vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-0798 and CVE-2011-0609, watering-hole attacks, DLL side-loading packages, and trojanized software or update mechanisms in related intrusions. Poison Ivy is repeatedly associated with espionage-focused activity and has been used by or alongside multiple threat clusters and campaigns cited in the content, including GALLIUM, TA428, PKPLUG-related activity, Gaza Cybergang/Molerats-linked reporting, Space Pirates-linked activity, RedFoxtrot-linked infrastructure references, Vatican-targeting campaigns aligned with Chinese strategic interests, the 2011 RSA breach, and the 2011 SK Communications intrusion. Targeting described in the content spans government, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, energy, IT, financial, media, technology, and religious organizations, with geographic references including East Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Vatican-related targets. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include callback domain www.adv138mail.com used in a July 2011 socially engineered email campaign; campaign infrastructure such as 95.179.131.29 and subdomains f1news.vzglagtime[.]net, news.vzglagtime[.]net, and mtanews.vzglagtime[.]net in TA428-related activity; the shared password 3&U<9f*lZ>!MIQ in one Poison Ivy cluster; and, in the SK Communications intrusion, nateon.duamlive.com, winsvcfs.dll, update.alyac.org, and ro.diggfunny.com. The content also notes that GALLIUM used a modified Poison Ivy variant assessed as unique to that group and altered communications to reduce signature-based detection.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

9 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

9 CVES
CVE-2018-0798Microsoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

TA428 threat actors also delivered Poison Ivy malware payloads.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
CVE-2017-0144EternalBlue SMBv1 Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
CVE-2011-0609Remote Code Execution in Adobe Flash Player and Authplay.dllExploited in the wild

The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability (CVE-2011-0609). As a side note, by now Adobe has released a patch for the zero-day, so it can no longer be used to inject malware onto patched machines. | In the case of the RSA attack the assault involved a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan.

via the registertheregister.co.uk
CVE-2010-2883Adobe Reader and Acrobat CoolType.dll SING Table Buffer Overflow

the callback domain 'www.adv138mail.com' was used by a Poison Ivy RAT in a July 2011 socially engineered email campaign

via web archiveweb.archive.org
CVE-2013-1493Oracle Java CMM crafted raster parameters remote code executionExploited in the wild

The second jar file had a MD5 of 3fbb7321d8610c6e2d990bb25ce34bec and exploited CVE-2013-1493. ... The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. ... The exploit site at sunshop[.]com[.]tw previously hosted a different malicious jar file on April 2, 2013. This jar file had a MD5 of 51aff823274e9d12b1a9a4bbbaf8ce00. It exploited CVE-2013-1493 and dropped a Poison Ivy RAT.

via fireeyefireeye.com
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

China-linked actors using the exploit to deploy POISONIVY, dropped as a BAT file that downloads additional payloads.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2015-2545Microsoft Office Malformed EPS File Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

CVE-2015-2545 is a vulnerability discovered in 2015 and corrected with Microsoft’s update MS15-099... enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted EPS image file... exploited in the wild in August 2015... used in targeted attack by the Platinum group.

via securelistsecurelist.com
CVE-2021-40444Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities ... CVE-2021-40444 Microsoft Windows ... YARA Rules ... reference = “... PrintNightmare and MSHTML exploits” ... $cve2 = “CVE-2021-40444”

via cyfirma newscyfirma.com
CVE-2021-1675PrintNightmare / Windows Print Spooler RCE in CVE-2021-1675 contextExploited in the wild

Details on Exploited Vulnerabilities ... CVE-2021-1675 Microsoft Windows ... YARA Rules ... reference = “... PrintNightmare and MSHTML exploits” ... $cve1 = “CVE-2021-1675”

via cyfirma newscyfirma.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

20 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
TA428

彼らはPoison IvyやCotx RATを使ってコンピュータのコントロールを得た後、更に侵害を深めるために横展開を行いました。

via ntt security japaninsight-jp.nttsecurity.com
GALLIUM

"Poison Ivy is a widely shared remote access tool (RAT) first identified in 2005. While Poison Ivy is widely used, the variant GALLIUM has been observed using is a modified version that appears to be unique to GALLIUM."

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
Molerats

Tools include Molerat Loader, XtremeRAT, SharpStage, DropBook, Spark, Pierogi, PoisonIvy, and many others observed uniquely over the years.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
PKPLUG

Other publicly available malware seen in relation to PKPLUG activity includes Poison Ivy and Zupdax.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
APT-C-01

Earlier campaigns used legacy Poison Ivy RAT shellcode variants and ZxShell via spear-phishing and watering hole attacks.

via cyfirma othercyfirma.com
Space Pirates

Злоумышленники также используют и хорошо известное ВПО: PlugX, ShadowPad, Poison Ivy, модифицированный вариант PcShare и публичный шелл ReVBShell.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The actors also appear to have access to legitimate servers that they use to host Bookworm and other related tools for attacks.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Considering all the malware related to PKPLUG that Unit 42 has analyzed, the use of such exploits appears to be less common than a spear-phishing technique making use of social engineering to lure victims into running their malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence6

We determined that the infection vector observed in this campaign was spear phishing, with emails originating from both free email accounts and compromised user accounts. Spear phishing emails included malicious .doc attachments that were actually RTF files saved with .doc file extensions. | Proofpoint researchers initially identified email campaigns with malicious RTF document attachments targeting East Asian government agencies in March 2019.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Unit 42 published research that reported attacks using the 9002 Trojan delivered through Google Drive. The download originated with a spear-phishing email containing a shortened URL that redirected multiple times before downloading a ZIP file hosted on Google Drive.

Execution

9 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit that installs a backdoor... In the case of the RSA attack the assault involved a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content of the website contained encoded VBScript that executed PowerShell commands ... as well as another encoded PowerShell script closely resembling PowerSploit ... that was responsible for decoding and launching a Poison Ivy payload.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The content of the website contained encoded VBScript that executed PowerShell commands to download a Microsoft Word document from the same GeoCities site

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

The malicious RTF attachments exploited vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Equation Editor, specifically CVE-2018-0798, before downloading subsequent payloads.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

PlugX is usually distributed as a package of several files. These files are composed to exploit a phenomenon called DLL search order hijacking (also called sideloading)... The malware thus gets the unwitting help of a trusted executable to run.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Spear phishing emails included malicious .doc attachments that were actually RTF files saved with .doc file extensions.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The contents of the file, assuming a victim clicked on the URL in the spear-phishing email, resembles the structure used in a technique known as AppLocker Bypass whereby trusted Windows executables can be used to execute malicious payloads.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

PlugX is usually distributed as a package of several files. These files are composed to exploit a phenomenon called DLL search order hijacking (also called sideloading)... The malware thus gets the unwitting help of a trusted executable to run.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Ember Bear gathers victim system information such as enumerating the volume of a given device; Frankenstein used Empire to gather various local system information; many malware entries state they collect system information from compromised hosts.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

As part of the second stage, the group deploys customized Gh0st RAT and Poison Ivy malware payloads designed to evade detection... GALLIUM has modified the communication method used by the malware, likely to prevent detection through existing antimalware signatures.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The command and control structure of Cotx RAT is proxy aware. It utilizes wolfSSL for TLS encrypted communication.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Remote Access Trojans are programs that provide the capability to allow covert surveillance or the ability to gain unauthorized access to a victim PC... they provide the capability for an attacker to gain unauthorized remote access to the victim machine via specially configured communication protocols which are set up upon initial infection of the victim computer.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Use of large command and control (C2) infrastructure, which heavily favors dynamic DNS domains for C2 servers.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Use of a large number of Dynamic DNS (DDNS) domains which form part of overlapping infrastructure clusters

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

77 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
56 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
21 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching77

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution20

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities9

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.