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APT10, also known as menuPass, Stone Panda, Cicada, Red Apollo, CVNX, Potassium, Bronze Riverside, Purple Typhoon, and several other aliases, is a China-linked espionage threat actor active since at least 2009. The group has long conducted targeted intrusions against organizations in Asia and beyond, with sustained operations against Japan since at least 2014. Reported targeting includes academics, pharmaceutical organizations, manufacturing, media, diplomatic entities, public institutions, think tanks, and defense-related organizations. Earlier reporting also associated the actor with targeting U.S. and other overseas defense contractors. APT10 is known for socially engineered spearphishing campaigns that deliver malicious Office documents or executables disguised as documents. In documented operations, the group used malware families including PlugX, Poison Ivy, ChChes, RedLeaves, and activity clusters associated with LODEINFO; some reporting also assesses MirrorFace as a subgroup or subordinate cluster linked to APT10. Tradecraft attributed to the actor includes malicious macros, PowerShell-based execution, use of certutil to decode staged payloads, DLL side-loading, process hollowing, scheduled-task execution, reverse shells and command execution, and deployment of credential-dumping tools such as Mimikatz and PwDump6. The group has demonstrated modular post-compromise capability. ChChes has been used as an initial foothold malware that profiles infected hosts, communicates over HTTP using custom encoding, and loads follow-on modules. Public analysis of related LODEINFO campaigns describes fileless execution, in-memory shellcode loading, remote template injection, anti-analysis obfuscation, keylogging, screenshot capture, file operations, WMI-based execution, persistence control, and encrypted command-and-control communications. APT10 operators have also conducted reconnaissance on compromised systems, searched for business-relevant folders and documents, scanned for NetBIOS resources, collected files for exfiltration, and installed updated malware during ongoing intrusions. APT10 is widely assessed as a state-aligned Chinese cyber-espionage actor whose primary objective is intelligence collection.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
39 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
34 additional families tracked in Mallory.
11 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 11 of them exploited in the wild.
The Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) reuses a known, static, zero-value initialization vector... A nation-state APT group has been observed exploiting this vulnerability.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
The title of the lure was “2016年台灣總統選舉觀戰團 行程20160105.xls” which translates to “2016 Taiwan president election watching group schedule”. Once the spreadsheet is opened, CVE-2012-0158 is exploited and a file called 6EC5.tmp is dropped in the %TEMP% folder.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
6 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
486 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
APT10 is mentioned only as part of related article metadata, not as part of the main incident or analysis.
Mentioned only in the detection annotation actor list; no specific activity described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.