QuasarRAT
Quasar RAT is an open-source remote access trojan/backdoor, also referred to as Quasar, QuasarRAT, and quasar_rat, that has been publicly available on GitHub since 2015. It has been used broadly since at least 2017 across state-sponsored espionage, hacktivist, and financially motivated criminal activity, including reporting that links its use to menuPass/APT10, Gorgon Group, and other intrusion sets. It has also appeared as a post-compromise tool in campaigns such as Bluebottle/OPERA1ER, GitVenom, and a 2025 supply-chain-style campaign targeting blockchain developers via malicious Cursor/Open VSX and related packages.
The malware is a Windows-focused RAT/backdoor in the provided reporting, though later reimplementations such as the Golang-based GOSAR retain compatibility with the original QUASAR protocol. Documented capabilities include webcam viewing; hiding process windows and making web requests invisible to the user; setting file attributes to hidden; enumerating the username and account type; determining the victim host country; and obtaining passwords from common FTP clients. Reporting also describes Quasar as an open-source backdoor used for remote access after initial compromise.
Observed delivery and usage in the content include deployment after GuLoader and .NET downloaders, use as a payload downloaded by VBScript/PowerShell chains, inclusion in fake or backdoored GitHub repositories, and use in trojanized developer tooling and extensions. In one GitVenom campaign, Quasar used C2 address 138.68.81[.]155. In the 2025 blockchain-developer campaign, Quasar was delivered alongside a stealer and communicated with 144.172.112[.]84, which resolved to relay.lmfao[.]su during analysis. Additional reporting notes Quasar backdoor activity using the same C2 server address as another component in one intrusion, though the address was not reproduced in the provided excerpt.
Quasar RAT is also notable as the basis or inspiration for other malware families. VenomRAT is described as essentially a clone of Quasar RAT with added components, and AsyncRAT is assessed to have been influenced by Quasar through similar cryptography code, though not a direct fork.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Threat Details and IOCs Malware: ... Quasar RAT, QuasarRAT ...
The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2024-4577... an argument injection vulnerability in PHP affecting Windows-based systems running in CGI mode
Groups observed using it
18 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
For Managed Services, menuPass used a suite of malware including Sigloader, P8RAT, FYAnti, Impacket, and QuasarRat.
01/2017: Downeks and Quasar RAT Used in Recent Targeted Attacks Against Governments – Unit42
Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.
Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.
The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.
Quasar RAT (Trojan.Quasar): Commodity RAT that can be used to steal passwords and execute commands on an infected computer.
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Attacks that leverage malicious open-source packages are becoming a major and growing threat... We analyzed the code of every version of this extension and confirmed that it was a fake... All it does is download and execute malicious code from the aforementioned web server.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.
DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.
Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
Threat actors are using stolen NVIDIA code signing certificates to sign malware to appear trustworthy and allow malicious drivers to be loaded in Windows. | According to samples uploaded to the VirusTotal malware scanning service, the stolen certificates were used to sign various malware and hacking tools, such as Cobalt Strike beacons, Mimikatz, backdoors, and remote access trojans.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
APT39 has used the Smartftp Password Decryptor tool to decrypt FTP passwords... DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials... PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file... Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY. | Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The content notes checks for whether the current user is an administrator or privileged, including 'AsyncRAT can check if the current user of a compromised system is an administrator,' 'Gelsemium has the ability to distinguish between a standard user and an administrator,' and 'Wizard Spider has used whoami to identify the local user and their privileges.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames,' and 'APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.'
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Both implants communicated with the C2 server 144.172.112[.]84, which resolved to relay.lmfao[.]su at the time of our analysis.
The process for the Internet Explorer Add-on Installer was likely used to download a malicious .NET downloader from URLs such as hxxp://178.73.192[.]15/ca1.exe . Multiple .NET downloaders were found that abused the file transfer service transfer[.]sh to download a file named with an RTF extension.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
IOCs tracked for this family
343 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
177 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as a malware family that uses the resource section to hide payloads.
Gremlin stealer uses the resource section to mirror the tactics of several high-profile malware families that frequently use this area for payload obfuscation, including: Agent Tesla, GuLoader, LokiBot, Quasar RAT.
Remote access trojan referenced as a payload type supported by the crypter service for obfuscation/encryption.
Remote access trojan family observed using the same bulletproof hosting network.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.