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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 18 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

QuasarRAT

Also known asquasar

Quasar RAT is an open-source remote access trojan/backdoor, also referred to as Quasar, QuasarRAT, and quasar_rat, that has been publicly available on GitHub since 2015. It has been used broadly since at least 2017 across state-sponsored espionage, hacktivist, and financially motivated criminal activity, including reporting that links its use to menuPass/APT10, Gorgon Group, and other intrusion sets. It has also appeared as a post-compromise tool in campaigns such as Bluebottle/OPERA1ER, GitVenom, and a 2025 supply-chain-style campaign targeting blockchain developers via malicious Cursor/Open VSX and related packages.

The malware is a Windows-focused RAT/backdoor in the provided reporting, though later reimplementations such as the Golang-based GOSAR retain compatibility with the original QUASAR protocol. Documented capabilities include webcam viewing; hiding process windows and making web requests invisible to the user; setting file attributes to hidden; enumerating the username and account type; determining the victim host country; and obtaining passwords from common FTP clients. Reporting also describes Quasar as an open-source backdoor used for remote access after initial compromise.

Observed delivery and usage in the content include deployment after GuLoader and .NET downloaders, use as a payload downloaded by VBScript/PowerShell chains, inclusion in fake or backdoored GitHub repositories, and use in trojanized developer tooling and extensions. In one GitVenom campaign, Quasar used C2 address 138.68.81[.]155. In the 2025 blockchain-developer campaign, Quasar was delivered alongside a stealer and communicated with 144.172.112[.]84, which resolved to relay.lmfao[.]su during analysis. Additional reporting notes Quasar backdoor activity using the same C2 server address as another component in one intrusion, though the address was not reproduced in the provided excerpt.

Quasar RAT is also notable as the basis or inspiration for other malware families. VenomRAT is described as essentially a clone of Quasar RAT with added components, and AsyncRAT is assessed to have been influenced by Quasar through similar cryptography code, though not a direct fork.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2025-55182React2Shell RCE in React Server Components Flight Protocol

Threat Details and IOCs Malware: ... Quasar RAT, QuasarRAT ...

via f5 communitycommunity.f5.com
CVE-2024-4577PHP-CGI Argument Injection RCE on WindowsExploited in the wild

The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2024-4577... an argument injection vulnerability in PHP affecting Windows-based systems running in CGI mode

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

18 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
menuPass

For Managed Services, menuPass used a suite of malware including Sigloader, P8RAT, FYAnti, Impacket, and QuasarRat.

via medium mitre engenuitymedium.com
Molerats

01/2017: Downeks and Quasar RAT Used in Recent Targeted Attacks Against Governments – Unit42

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Patchwork

Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
APT33

Quasar RAT (Trojan.Quasar): Commodity RAT that can be used to steal passwords and execute commands on an infected computer.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence2

Attacks that leverage malicious open-source packages are becoming a major and growing threat... We analyzed the code of every version of this extension and confirmed that it was a fake... All it does is download and execute malicious code from the aforementioned web server.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.' | Many entries explicitly state malware 'can create a reverse shell' or 'launch a remote shell,' including 4H RAT, AuditCred, BLACKCOFFEE, Carbanak, DarkComet, Exaramel for Windows, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and ZxShell.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Further analysis revealed that the attackers used ScreenConnect to upload three VBScripts to the compromised machine: Each of these downloaded a PowerShell script from the text-sharing service paste.ee.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Blindly running code from GitHub can be detrimental

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Therefore, using these stolen certificates, threat actors gain the advantage of making their programs look like legitimate NVIDIA programs and allowing malicious drivers to be loaded by Windows.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows. APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Threat actors are using stolen NVIDIA code signing certificates to sign malware to appear trustworthy and allow malicious drivers to be loaded in Windows. | According to samples uploaded to the VirusTotal malware scanning service, the stolen certificates were used to sign various malware and hacking tools, such as Cobalt Strike beacons, Mimikatz, backdoors, and remote access trojans.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

APT39 has used the Smartftp Password Decryptor tool to decrypt FTP passwords... DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials... PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file... Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY. | Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence2

The content notes checks for whether the current user is an administrator or privileged, including 'AsyncRAT can check if the current user of a compromised system is an administrator,' 'Gelsemium has the ability to distinguish between a standard user and an administrator,' and 'Wizard Spider has used whoami to identify the local user and their privileges.'

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames,' and 'APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.'

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The content references repeated use of remote administration and remote execution tools such as PsExec, AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise, RemoteUtilities, SimpleHelp, PcShare, VNC, and commodity remote access tools.

Collection

1 technique
T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video. AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems. Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam. ... ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Both implants communicated with the C2 server 144.172.112[.]84, which resolved to relay.lmfao[.]su at the time of our analysis.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The process for the Internet Explorer Add-on Installer was likely used to download a malicious .NET downloader from URLs such as hxxp://178.73.192[.]15/ca1.exe . Multiple .NET downloaders were found that abused the file transfer service transfer[.]sh to download a file named with an RTF extension.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence5

After GuLoader and the .NET loaders were deployed, various other post-compromise tools were seen on victim networks. These include the publicly available Netwire remote access Trojan (RAT) and the open-source Quasar RAT.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Many entries state malware or actors can upload, transfer, send, or exfiltrate files from compromised hosts to command-and-control servers or attacker infrastructure.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

343 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
161 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
164 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
18 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app13 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app20 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching343

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution18

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.