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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

LODEINFO

LODEINFO is a sophisticated fileless backdoor malware family first publicly named by JPCERT/CC in February 2020 and tracked by Kaspersky since 2019. It is used for cyber-espionage and is strongly associated with the China-aligned MirrorFace / Earth Kasha activity cluster, which is often linked to APT10; multiple sources describe it as unique or exclusive to MirrorFace/Earth Kasha and as that actor’s primary backdoor since 2019. Reported targeting has focused primarily on Japanese organizations, including media, diplomatic, governmental, public sector organizations, think tanks, political entities, academic institutes, and later advanced technology and government sectors in Japan, Taiwan, and India.

Observed delivery and execution methods include DLL sideloading with legitimate signed executables, malicious Word documents with VBA macros, self-extracting RAR archives, and downloader shellcode. Documented examples include use of K7Security Suite binaries such as NRTOLF.exe and K7SysMon.exe to sideload a malicious K7SysMn1.dll loader; a March 2022 macro-enabled Word infection that created C:\Users\Public\TMWJPA\ and dropped GFIUFR.zip; June 2022 SFX archives that dropped 1.docx, K7SysMn1.dll, and K7SysMon.exe into %TEMP%; and the DOWNIISSA downloader, which downloaded XOR-encrypted payloads from http://172.104.112[.]218/11554.htm and http://www.dvdsesso[.]com/11554.htm, then injected LODEINFO v0.6.5 into msiexec.exe. Since version 0.4.x, JPCERT/CC reported a shift to LOLBAS-based launch methods.

LODEINFO supports backdoor functionality including command execution, file transfer, shellcode or in-memory payload execution, and network discovery. It can run net view and net view /domain for remote system discovery. Kaspersky documented versions with commands including command, send, recv, memory, kill, cd, ver, print, ransom, comc, and config; earlier versions also included ls, rm, mv, cp, cat, mkdir, keylog, ps, pkill, and autorun. The malware beaconed host information including current time, ANSI code page, MAC address, and hostname. It also collected stolen web cookies locally in the %TEMP% folder.

The malware has undergone frequent updates. Kaspersky analyzed shellcode versions including v0.5.9, v0.6.2, v0.6.3, and v0.6.5 in 2022, and noted later v0.6.6 and v0.6.7. Reported technical changes include obfuscated command identifiers, a custom API hashing algorithm with sample-specific XOR, support for 64-bit shellcode injection, and anti-analysis logic that halts execution on systems using the en_US locale. LODEINFO used layered C2 protection involving SHA512, XOR, AES-CBC, Base64 with modified padding, and the Vigenere cipher, and appended random junk data to beacon traffic. It also generated Chrome-like user-agent strings, attempting to read the installed Chrome version and falling back to 98.0.4758.102 if unavailable.

Known process injection behavior includes use of VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread for 32-bit shellcode injection, and NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, and RtlCreateUserThread for 64-bit injection. In some campaigns, loaders reconstructed encrypted payload blobs from multiple export functions or external .db files before decoding and launching the backdoor.

LODEINFO has also appeared in multi-stage intrusions where it precedes deployment of other MirrorFace malware. ESET reported that in an August 2023 intrusion at a Japanese research institute, attackers exploited a FortiOS/FortiProxy vulnerability, deployed LODEINFO first, and then deployed HiddenFace/NOOPDOOR. Trend Micro likewise reported Earth Kasha using LODEINFO alongside Cobalt Strike and NOOPDOOR in campaigns from early 2023 to early 2024.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include the paths C:\Users\Public\TMWJPA, %TEMP%, and the local staging of stolen web cookies in %TEMP%; filenames GFIUFR.zip, NRTOLF.exe, K7SysMn1.dll, K7SysMon.exe, K7SysMon.exe.db, and 1.docx; downloader-related URLs 172.104.112[.]218/11554.htm and www.dvdsesso[.]com/11554.htm; and additional related files 3390.htm, 5246.htm, and 16412.htm observed on the same infrastructure.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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menuPass

The APT10 group employed DLL sideloading to deliver the LODEINFO backdoor to the target device for cyber-espionage purposes.

via encyclopedia kasperskyencyclopedia.kaspersky.com
MirrorFace

MirrorFace focuses on espionage and exfiltration of files of interest; it is the only group known to use the LODEINFO and HiddenFace backdoors.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

MirrorFace has created and continued to develop custom strains of malware including LODEINFO.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

August 2023 ... Japanese research institute ... Exploited a vulnerability in FortiOS/FortiProxy → NOT via spearphishing

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

During our investigation of the attacks in March 2022, we observed a spear-phishing email with a malicious attachment installing malware persistence modules...

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

comc Execute command using WMI.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Once opened, the doc file shows a Japanese message to enable the following VBA code... the malicious macro code injects and loads an embedded shellcode in the memory of the WINWORD.exe process directly.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

comc Execute command using WMI.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The embedded VBA code creates the folder C:\Users\Public\TMWJPA\ and drops a zip file named GFIUFR.zip...

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or batch files in the Windows Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

During the memory injection process... the malware checks the first byte of the second stage shellcode to determine the shellcode architecture... it uses the basic Windows APIs such as VirtualAllocEx(), WriteProcessMemory() and CreateRemoteThread() for memory injection of the 32-bit shellcode and NtAllocateVirtualMemory(), NtWriteVirtualMemory() and RtlCreateUserThread() for supporting the memory injection of the 64-bit shellcode.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or batch files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

This LODEINFO v0.5.6 shellcode extracted from a loader module demonstrates several enhanced evasion techniques... The beacon also contains a hardcoded key... randomly generated junk data is appended to the end of the data, possibly to evade beaconing detection based on packet size.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attackers exploited the name of a well-known Japanese politician... The file name and the decoy document suggest the target was the Japanese ruling party or a related organization.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

During the memory injection process... the malware checks the first byte of the second stage shellcode to determine the shellcode architecture... it uses the basic Windows APIs such as VirtualAllocEx(), WriteProcessMemory() and CreateRemoteThread() for memory injection of the 32-bit shellcode and NtAllocateVirtualMemory(), NtWriteVirtualMemory() and RtlCreateUserThread() for supporting the memory injection of the 64-bit shellcode.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

rm Delete a file.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

For the final stage of the infection, DOWNIISSA creates an instance of msiexec.exe and injects the LODEINFO backdoor shellcode in the memory of the process.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

In LODEINFO v0.6.2 and later versions, the shellcode has a new feature that looks for the “en_US” locale on the victim’s machine in a recursive function and halts execution if that locale is found.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware checks the OS architecture of the infected machine and handles the appropriate loading scheme according to OS architecture and shellcode architecture.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

mv Move a file.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

keylog Check for Japanese keyboard layout. Save keystrokes, datetime and active window name. Uses 1-byte XOR encryption and a file %temp%\%hostname%.tmp.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

ps Show process list.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

After infecting the target machine, the LODEINFO backdoor beacons out machine information to the C2, such as current time, ANSI code page (ACP) identifier, MAC address and hostname.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

ls Get a file list.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

In LODEINFO v0.6.2 and later versions, the shellcode has a new feature that looks for the “en_US” locale on the victim’s machine in a recursive function and halts execution if that locale is found.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware checks the OS architecture of the infected machine and handles the appropriate loading scheme according to OS architecture and shellcode architecture.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

cp Copy a file.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

keylog Check for Japanese keyboard layout. Save keystrokes, datetime and active window name. Uses 1-byte XOR encryption and a file %temp%\%hostname%.tmp.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

print Make a screenshot.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

LODEINFO v0.6.2: generating user agent for C2 communications... The malware generates the user agent string using the following hardcoded formatted string... Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/%s Safari/537.36.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

send Download a file from C2.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

recv Upload a file to C2.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

ransom Encrypt files by a generated AES key, which is also encrypted with RSA using the hardcoded RSA key.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
13 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
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hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching17

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.