BlackTech is a China-linked cyberespionage group active since at least 2011, primarily targeting organizations in Taiwan, with additional operations against Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States. Its targets include technology companies, government agencies, financial institutions, and healthcare organizations. Known aliases include Canary Typhoon, Circuit Panda, Palmerworm, Huapi, Temp.Overboard, Radio Panda, and T-APT-03. Its operations focus on stealing sensitive organizational and government information. BlackTech gains access through spearphishing attachments, links to cloud-hosted malware, and exploitation of public-facing applications. Document-based attacks have exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-0802 and CVE-2017-11882. The group has also exploited CVE-2017-7269 in Microsoft IIS 6.0 to establish command-and-control infrastructure and CVE-2020-1938 during an intrusion into a Taiwanese academic institution. It scans for vulnerable routers and abuses compromised network devices and servers for malware delivery and command-and-control relays. Its malware portfolio includes PLEAD, TSCookie, Gh0stTimes, and Linux or Unix variants of its backdoors. PLEAD supports system reconnaissance, saved-credential theft, remote command execution, and file transfer. The associated DRIGO tool collects documents and exfiltrates them through cloud storage. Gh0stTimes adds proxying and relay capabilities to a customized Gh0st RAT foundation. BlackTech has also been associated with the Waterbear and Shrouded Crossbow campaigns. Waterbear supports modular payload deployment, persistent access, and lateral movement. Defense-evasion techniques include DLL side-loading, encrypted payloads and communications, in-memory shellcode execution, process injection, misleading document presentation, and frequently modified malware wrappers. The group maintains tooling for both Windows and Linux environments.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
58 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
34 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
29 additional families tracked in Mallory.
19 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 19 of them exploited in the wild.
BlackTech has exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0, CVE-2017-7269, in order to establish a new HTTP or command and control (C2) server.
We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: CVE-2015-5119, patched by Adobe last July, 2015 ... PLEAD also dabbled with a short-lived, fileless version of their malware when it obtained an exploit for a Flash vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) that was leaked during the Hacking Team breach
We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2012-0158, patched by Microsoft last April, 2012
We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2014-6352, patched by Microsoft last October, 2014
We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities: ... CVE-2017-0199, patched by Microsoft last April, 2017
14 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
555 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
BlackTech is listed in the detection's threat-actor annotations.
Listed in the detection's APT annotations.
Conducting cyberespionage-focused post-compromise operations against organizations in Japan using a Linux variant of BlueShell for remote command execution, file transfer, shell access, SOCKS5 proxying, and stealthy persistence/evasion after SSH-based lateral movement.
Listed incidentally in detection metadata for ATT&CK T1190.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.