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Granite Typhoon, also widely tracked as GALLIUM, Alloy Taurus, Phantom Panda, and Softcell, is a Chinese state-linked advanced persistent threat group active since at least 2012 and primarily associated with cyberespionage. The group has historically focused on telecommunications providers and has also targeted financial institutions and government entities across multiple regions, including Europe, Asia, and Africa. Reporting also links the actor to activity affecting European Union businesses and government organizations. Granite Typhoon is known for establishing persistent access and conducting information theft from strategically relevant networks. Observed tradecraft includes exploitation of public-facing applications for initial access, use of web shells for persistence and command and control, PowerShell-based execution, Windows command shell activity, credential dumping, user and network discovery, lateral movement, DLL side-loading, and exfiltration over existing command-and-control channels. The group has used scheduled tasks for persistence, collected password hashes from compromised systems, and leveraged utilities such as HTRAN to tunnel traffic and support exfiltration. Reconnaissance behavior has included discovery of local network configuration, NetBIOS-related enumeration, and user/session discovery through commands such as whoami and query user. Granite Typhoon has operated malware and tooling including PoisonIvy, PingPull, and Sword2033, and has demonstrated capability to target both Windows and Linux environments using remote access tooling. Infrastructure tradecraft has included the use of dedicated servers, including Taiwan-based infrastructure assessed as exclusive to the group. Recent reporting has tied the actor to Linux variants of PingPull and related backdoors, reinforcing its continued operational development and cross-platform capability. The actor's dominant objective is espionage and information theft rather than disruption or financially motivated extortion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
23 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
18 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
98 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
China-linked state-sponsored group named as actively targeting the UK.
Mentioned only in metadata as associated with T1190.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the generic discovery technique of running the Linux id command.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.