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GALLIUM, also known as Granite Typhoon, Alloy Taurus, and Phantom Panda, is a China-based threat actor targeting telecommunications, government, and financial organizations. Its targeting includes Belgium, the United Kingdom, Nepal, and South Africa. The group uses publicly available tools, sometimes modified to add functionality or evade antimalware detection, alongside backdoors including PingPull and PoisonIvy. GALLIUM gains initial access by exploiting public-facing servers, including WildFly/JBoss deployments, and uses VPN services such as SoftEther VPN to access compromised environments and maintain persistence. Additional persistence mechanisms include web shells, valid accounts, newly created highly privileged domain accounts, and scheduled tasks used to launch PoisonIvy. It conducts internal network discovery using modified NBTscan and ping, dumps credentials using modified and PowerShell-based implementations of Mimikatz, and moves laterally through PsExec and pass-the-hash authentication. The group uses command shells for execution and web shells for persistence, execution, and exfiltration. It compresses and encrypts stolen data with WinRAR before exfiltration and obfuscates strings in modified HTRAN tooling to evade detection. Its PingPull backdoor supports command-and-control communications over ICMP or TCP.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
43 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
25 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
20 additional families tracked in Mallory.
9 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 9 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
This analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts of ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082) vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server.
The following analytic detects attempts to exploit CVE-2022-26134, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Confluence... This activity is significant as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the Confluence server without authentication, potentially leading to full system compromise.
4 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
117 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as an actor associated with the detection's technique annotation; no specific GALLIUM campaign or activity is described.
Annotation-only mention; no actor-specific operation or behavior is described.
Listed as an annotation to a renamed-Python-binary detection; no actor-specific campaign or behavior is described.
Associated in the detection annotations with renaming legitimate utilities. No specific campaign, victims, or malware are described.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.