Gorgon Group is a Pakistan-linked threat actor associated with spearphishing-led intrusions and commodity-malware-enabled espionage activity. The group is known for sending phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office attachments and relying on user execution of lure documents to initiate compromise. Observed tradecraft includes use of macros and VBScript in phishing attachments, PowerShell- and command-shell-based payload execution, Base64 decoding of staged content, downloading additional files from command-and-control infrastructure, and opening decoy documents to mask malicious activity. The group has demonstrated persistence through Windows autostart mechanisms, including Registry Run keys and shortcut-based startup persistence, and has used process hollowing to inject trojan payloads into other processes. Defense-evasion behavior includes concealing PowerShell execution with hidden window parameters and weakening Microsoft Office security settings through Registry modification. Reporting has also associated the group with use of commodity remote access trojans and downloaders such as Remcos, Quasar, njRAT, and GuLoader, reflecting a pattern of leveraging broadly available malware rather than exclusively bespoke tooling. Aliases include Gorgon, GorgonGroup, and The Gorgon Group. Available evidence supports characterization as a phishing-centric intrusion set with a strong emphasis on initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and follow-on payload delivery. Geographic evidence in the supplied material links the actor to Pakistan and indicates targeting that includes India.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
40 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
9 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
4 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
39 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Listed as an associated threat actor in detection annotations for Ghostscript exploitation; no specific campaign activity is described in this reference.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.