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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 9 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

njRAT

Also known asBladabindiLVNjw0rm

njRAT, also known as Bladabindi, LV, and njw0rm, is a commodity remote access trojan that has been active since at least 2012 and remains widely used. The content describes it as a RAT with capabilities including keylogging, remote desktop access, webcam access, microphone activation, browser password theft, registry value reading, current-user enumeration during initial infection, camera detection, removable-drive detection, and exfiltration of the title of the current user window. It has been observed using HTTP for command-and-control and receipt of stolen information, with Base64-encoded C2 traffic, and it has executed PowerShell commands via auto-run registry key persistence. One reported variant also included the ability to overwrite the Windows Master Boot Record. The content notes behavioral overlap with other commodity RATs such as WarZoneRAT, NanoCore, and NetWire in areas including process injection, keylogging-related calls, and C2 traffic.

njRAT has been used or distributed by multiple threat actors and campaigns. MITRE ATT&CK content states Aquatic Panda acquired and used njRAT, and Operation Spalax actors obtained malware including njRAT. Proofpoint reporting on Operation Transparent Tribe states actor-controlled lure infrastructure targeting Indian diplomatic and military personnel delivered njRAT alongside MSIL/Crimson, DarkComet, and Luminosity Link RAT; one lure tied an njRAT sample to C2 5.189.145[.]248:10032. Proofpoint also states TA558 distributes njRAT in addition to VenomRAT, Remcos RAT, XWorm, and PDQ Connect. Unit 42 reporting cited in the content lists NJRat among the top RAT families used in Nigerian BEC scams by SilverTerrier. The content also notes njRAT prevalence in the Middle East and inclusion among the most prevalent malware uploaded to the ANY.RUN public sandbox.

Targeting reflected in the content includes Indian embassy officials, Indian military and diplomatic personnel, and victims in malware-assisted BEC activity; broader reporting also places njRAT among malware used against activists and opposition-linked targets in Syria and the UAE. High-confidence indicators and technical details directly mentioned in the content include aliases Bladabindi, LV, and njw0rm; Base64-encoded C2 traffic; HTTP-based data transfer; PowerShell execution via auto-run registry persistence; and the Operation Transparent Tribe-associated C2 5.189.145[.]248:10032.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2012-0158MSCOMCTL.OCX ActiveX Controls Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

the attachment was a weaponized RTF document utilizing CVE-2012-0158 to drop an embedded, encoded portable executable (PE)... In multiple lure documents, Type: Exploit, CVE-2012-0158, Embedded Payload. | This site is likely operated by the same actor(s) that carried out the previously discussed attacks on Indian embassy officials based on shared C&C infrastructure... lure Indian military officials into becoming infected with MSIL/Crimson, njRAT, and possibly other malicious tools.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

9 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
APT41

Aquatic Panda has acquired and used njRAT in its operations.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Transparent Tribe

This site is likely operated by the same actor(s) that carried out the previously discussed attacks on Indian embassy officials based on shared C&C infrastructure... lure Indian military officials into becoming infected with MSIL/Crimson, njRAT, and possibly other malicious tools.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
TA558

While the actor favors VenomRAT, TA558 also distributes other commodity malware including njRAT, Remcos RAT, and recently XWorm and PDQ Connect.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
APT-C-36

TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
TAG-144

TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Proofpoint researchers discovered a malicious blogspot.com site... set up to lure Indian military officials into becoming infected with MSIL/Crimson, njRAT, and possibly other malicious tools.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Additionally, the branding of trusted organizations (for example the World Health Organization (WHO)) is abused in order to build credibility and trust in order to have people, for example, open malicious attachments or web pages.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

In this incident, the attachment was a weaponized RTF document utilizing CVE-2012-0158 to drop an embedded, encoded portable executable (PE).

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

By relying on basic social engineering – an attack technique that takes advantage of human traits such as curiosity, trust and greed in order to obtain confidential information or to have the victim perform a certain action – it is suffice to say that certain threat actors (both criminal and nation state) are exploiting these unprecedented times for various nefarious means.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

This iframe causes visitors to be prompted to download the document immediately upon visiting...

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

They started distributing malware under the guise of restriction bypass programs and injecting malicious code into existing programs.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots...

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video. AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems. Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam. ... ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

C2 Tracker is a free-to-use-community-driven IOC feed that uses Shodan and Censys searches to collect IP addresses of known malware/botnet/C2 infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence4

we have observed the usage of Luminosity Link RAT, njRAT, Bezigate, Meterpreter, and several custom downloaders.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

123 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
52 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
69 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

147 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching123

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution9

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping33

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.