Aggah is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor associated with multistage malware-delivery campaigns documented since at least 2019. Its campaigns target businesses across multiple sectors, including manufacturing, with observed victims in Europe and Asia, specifically South Korea and Indonesia. Aggah distributes commodity information stealers and remote access trojans, including Agent Tesla, AZORult, NanoCore, RevengeRAT, njRAT, NetWire, and AveMariaRAT, also known as WarZoneRAT. Later activity includes delivery of Rhadamanthys and zgRAT. Aggah commonly uses malicious email attachments and links with business-themed lures, including purchase orders, payment details, pricing, and negotiations. Campaigns have spoofed legitimate business domains and used malicious PowerPoint attachments containing VBA macros. A distinctive technique involves renaming PowerPoint Add-in files and deliberately triggering an application error so that an Auto_Close macro executes when the presentation closes. Subsequent stages use Mshta, VBScript, JavaScript, and PowerShell to retrieve and execute payloads. The actor abuses legitimate paste services, including Pastebin and paste.ee, to host scripts and encoded payloads, while URL shorteners conceal delivery locations. Its infection chains use multiple layers of encoding and obfuscation, including Base64, hexadecimal encoding, XOR transformations, and compressed .NET assemblies. Observed persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and Run and RunOnce registry entries. Aggah has used a .NET loader known as FreeDom to inject final payloads through process hollowing. In addition to information-stealing malware and remote access trojans, a 2020 campaign deployed a PowerShell cryptocurrency stealer that monitored the clipboard and replaced Bitcoin payment addresses with an attacker-controlled address.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
11 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
6 additional families tracked in Mallory.
105 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A malware delivery campaign using malicious Microsoft Office PowerPoint attachments and macros to deliver AZORult, NanoCore RAT, and previously Revenge RAT. The campaign targeted users in South Korea and Indonesia and used multi-stage loaders, Pastebin-hosted payloads, scheduled tasks, registry persistence, PowerShell, and process hollowing.
Externally tracked threat actor associated with distributing Rhadamanthys as part of broader crimeware activity.
Associated with a tax-themed malware delivery campaign impersonating a tax software solutions organization. The campaign used a JavaScript downloader hosted on Microsoft Azure, which invoked PowerShell to execute Rhadamanthys, followed by download and execution of zgRAT.
Historically observed using NanoCore RAT in campaigns referenced by the content.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.