Rhadamanthys
Rhadamanthys is an information-stealing malware family, also referred to as Rhadamanthys Stealer, written in C++ and active since late 2022. It is widely described as an infostealer offered through malware-as-a-service or subscription-based criminal markets, and has been among the more prevalent infostealer services observed in 2025. It has been used both as a primary stealer and as a final payload delivered by other malware or traffic-distribution ecosystems.
Observed delivery vectors in the provided content include phishing, malspam, fake installers, pirated software, malicious Google Ads, SEO poisoning, malvertising, compromised or decoy software-download sites, and ClickFix-style social engineering chains. Specific lures mentioned include fake AnyDesk installers and malicious ads impersonating software such as Notion and OBS. Rhadamanthys has also been delivered through broader campaigns and loaders including GHOSTPULSE, TA866 activity, ClearFake-related activity, and traffic-team operations advertising loaders, crypters, and stealer builds.
Its core capability is theft and exfiltration of sensitive data from infected Windows systems. Reported targets include credentials, cookies, autofill data, detailed system information, browser data, cryptocurrency wallet data, and application data. The content specifically states that Rhadamanthys targets browsers, KeePass, OpenVPN, Steam, FileZilla, CoreFTP, Discord, Telegram Desktop, Outlook, Foxmail, WinSCP, PuTTY, mail programs, and numerous cryptocurrency wallets and services including Dogecoin, Litecoin, Monero, Qtum, Armory, Bytecoin, Binance, Electron, Solar wallet, Zap, Wasabi, Zcash, Ronin, Avana, and OKX. The malware communicates over encrypted channels to exfiltrate stolen data, and advertised capabilities include theft of digital coins, collection of system information, and execution of additional processes such as PowerShell.
Reverse-engineering details in the content describe a multi-stage infection chain in which a packed 32-bit dropper decrypts shellcode in memory and executes it via the ImmEnumInputContext callback mechanism. A subsequent loader performs extensive anti-analysis and evasion, including virtual-environment and suspicious-user checks, suppression of error dialogs, mutex masquerading, exception-handler manipulation, and restoration of hooked bytes in ntdll.dll, User32.dll, Advapi32.dll, and Ole32.dll. The loader decrypts configuration data, gathers locale information, dynamically resolves networking APIs, downloads a DLL from command-and-control, writes it as nsis_uns[xxxxxx].dll, and launches it with rundll32 using the export name PrintUIEntry. The final stealer also checks or attempts to unhook AVAST- and AMSI-related components including aswhook.dll, aswAMSI.dll, avamsicli.dll, amsi.dll, AmsiScanString, AmsiScanBuffer, and EtwEventWrite.
Threat-actor and ecosystem associations in the content include use by traffers and traffic teams, TA866/Asylum Ambuscade, and the Crazy Evil cryptoscam gang. Rhadamanthys is also referenced as a payload delivered in campaigns involving ClearFake, GHOSTPULSE, and TAG-150-linked activity. Law-enforcement reporting in the content states that Operation Endgame previously disrupted Rhadamanthys infrastructure, including takedowns of more than 1,000 servers associated with Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and Elysium.
High-confidence indicators explicitly mentioned in the content include C2 URL http://185[.]209.160.99/blob/top.mp4 from one analyzed loader; dropper hash 89ec4405e9b2cab987f2e4f7e4b1666e from the reverse-engineered sample; and, from a Notion-themed malvertising campaign, dropper hash 6f4a0cc0fa22b66f75f5798d3b259d470beb776d79de2264c2affc0b5fa924a2, Rhadamanthys hashes e179a9e5d75d56140d11cbd29d92d8137b0a73f964dd3cfd46564ada572a3109 and 679fad2fd86d2fd9e1ec38fa15280c1186f35343583c7e83ab382b8c255f9e18, dropper IP 185[.]172[.]128[.]169, C2 IP 185[.]172[.]128[.]170, download URLs yogapets[.]xyz/@abcmse1.exe and birdarid[.]org/@abcnp.exe, and related domains pantovawy.page[.]link, cerisico[.]net, notione.my-apk[.]com, and alternativebehavioralconcepts[.]org.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Threat Details and IOCs Malware: ... Rhadamanthys ...
Groups observed using it
13 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
It is claimed that the Rhadamanthys Stealer is used and a loader for Traffers is provided.
Rhadamanthys is an information stealer that can be used to collect and exfiltrate a variety of sensitive data from infected systems.
This PowerShell script ran Rhadamanthys malware. Rhadamanthys was then observed to download and run zgRAT.
Deploy advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor for and block the execution of known malware families associated with Crazy Evil, such as Rhadamanthys, Stealc, and AMOS.
It also recently added a commercial infostealer - Rhadamanthys - sold on cybercrime forums to its arsenal, according to Check Point.
Rhadamanthys is a prominent malware observed since 2022, used by multiple cybercriminal threat actors. It is a modular information stealer with multiple pricing plans, and the creators sell it alongside Elysium Proxy Bot and a Crypt Service.
Techniques & procedures
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Sharing malicious code or phishing panels via YouTube : They promote popular apps or cracked versions of apps as free downloads, and include download links or panels in the video description to entice users to download the malicious code.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
We’ve been observing an initial access technique that tricks users into copying, pasting, and executing malicious PowerShell code... users are presented with the typical Verify You Are Human prompt... Clicking the button silently copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and presents the user with “Verification Steps” instructing them to: Press Windows Button + R... Press CTRL + V... Press Enter. | One technique we’ve recently seen lead to LummaC2 involves tricking users into copying a PowerShell script from a pop-up message, pasting it into the Windows Run dialogue box, and executing malicious PowerShell code.
These messages contained URLs leading to a download of a JavaScript file hosted on Microsoft Azure. The JavaScript called PowerShell to run a remote PowerShell script.
The shellcode execution will go as the following: The function sub_405728 is responsible to invoke the API call ImmEnumInputContext... ImmEnumInputContext will get the address of the shellcode in its second argument “lpfn” and will execute it.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
it is just a small shellcode that unpacks and inject into the memory the Rhadamanthys stealer itself. | a call to VirtualAlloc will happen to create a newly allocated memory followed by memcpy to copy the shellcode from the heap to the new memory. Lastly, a VirtualProtect API call will be used to change the permission of the memory segment to RWX. | This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll. This behavior is traditional and happens in many shellcodes. | After having a shellcode with EXECUTE permission, we need a way to execute it, in this case, the authors choose a cool trick in form of a Callback function.
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll... it iterates through the kernel32 export functions... hash the function name... Overall the functions will be “VirtualAlloc, LocalFree, LocalAlloc, VirtualFree”
They promote popular apps or cracked versions of apps as free downloads... Operate fake casinos or gambling sites through phishing panels that replicate the UI of legitimate casino sites.
it is just a small shellcode that unpacks and inject into the memory the Rhadamanthys stealer itself. | a call to VirtualAlloc will happen to create a newly allocated memory followed by memcpy to copy the shellcode from the heap to the new memory. Lastly, a VirtualProtect API call will be used to change the permission of the memory segment to RWX. | This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll. This behavior is traditional and happens in many shellcodes. | After having a shellcode with EXECUTE permission, we need a way to execute it, in this case, the authors choose a cool trick in form of a Callback function.
The config decryption occurs in a function named sub_3DD4... sub_28AA This function is basically just an RC4 algorithm
An encoded PowerShell command then leverages Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to download and execute a malicious payload from a remote resource... Detection opportunity: mshta.exe utility making external network connections.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
The malware collects information from the discord directories, possibly to extract further data.
A stealer is malicious code that steals account information, passwords, financial data, and other sensitive personal information stored on a system.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Other
2 techniques
Other
the loader gets the address of KiUserExceptionDispatcher and starts to iterate on it to search for a specific location where ZwQueryInformationProcess is called... the call was replaced to jump to a function in the loader
the same function appears to aim for the AVAST-related modules aswhook.dll & aswAMSI.dll... More amsi-related functions and DLLs that are being targeted by the stealer are: avamsicli.dll amsi.dll AmsiScanString AmsiScanBuffer EtwEventWrite | the loader gets a handle to ntdll.dll and loads it to virtual memory... They will be compared using memcmp, and if they will found different, the loader will change the protection of the real function of ntdll and will use memcpy to copy the data from the fake to the real one.
IOCs tracked for this family
284 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
172 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The disruption is the latest phase of Operation Endgame, which previously disrupted other malware families, such as DanaBot, Bumblebee, Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, Elysium, and SmokeLoader.
An active infostealer service identified as one of the more prevalent offerings in 2025.
Rhadamanthys is identified as an active infostealer service and one of the most prevalent infostealers in 2025.
Malware operation/infrastructure previously targeted by Operation Endgame.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.