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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 13 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Rhadamanthys

Also known asRhadamanthys Stealer

Rhadamanthys is an information-stealing malware family, also referred to as Rhadamanthys Stealer, written in C++ and active since late 2022. It is widely described as an infostealer offered through malware-as-a-service or subscription-based criminal markets, and has been among the more prevalent infostealer services observed in 2025. It has been used both as a primary stealer and as a final payload delivered by other malware or traffic-distribution ecosystems.

Observed delivery vectors in the provided content include phishing, malspam, fake installers, pirated software, malicious Google Ads, SEO poisoning, malvertising, compromised or decoy software-download sites, and ClickFix-style social engineering chains. Specific lures mentioned include fake AnyDesk installers and malicious ads impersonating software such as Notion and OBS. Rhadamanthys has also been delivered through broader campaigns and loaders including GHOSTPULSE, TA866 activity, ClearFake-related activity, and traffic-team operations advertising loaders, crypters, and stealer builds.

Its core capability is theft and exfiltration of sensitive data from infected Windows systems. Reported targets include credentials, cookies, autofill data, detailed system information, browser data, cryptocurrency wallet data, and application data. The content specifically states that Rhadamanthys targets browsers, KeePass, OpenVPN, Steam, FileZilla, CoreFTP, Discord, Telegram Desktop, Outlook, Foxmail, WinSCP, PuTTY, mail programs, and numerous cryptocurrency wallets and services including Dogecoin, Litecoin, Monero, Qtum, Armory, Bytecoin, Binance, Electron, Solar wallet, Zap, Wasabi, Zcash, Ronin, Avana, and OKX. The malware communicates over encrypted channels to exfiltrate stolen data, and advertised capabilities include theft of digital coins, collection of system information, and execution of additional processes such as PowerShell.

Reverse-engineering details in the content describe a multi-stage infection chain in which a packed 32-bit dropper decrypts shellcode in memory and executes it via the ImmEnumInputContext callback mechanism. A subsequent loader performs extensive anti-analysis and evasion, including virtual-environment and suspicious-user checks, suppression of error dialogs, mutex masquerading, exception-handler manipulation, and restoration of hooked bytes in ntdll.dll, User32.dll, Advapi32.dll, and Ole32.dll. The loader decrypts configuration data, gathers locale information, dynamically resolves networking APIs, downloads a DLL from command-and-control, writes it as nsis_uns[xxxxxx].dll, and launches it with rundll32 using the export name PrintUIEntry. The final stealer also checks or attempts to unhook AVAST- and AMSI-related components including aswhook.dll, aswAMSI.dll, avamsicli.dll, amsi.dll, AmsiScanString, AmsiScanBuffer, and EtwEventWrite.

Threat-actor and ecosystem associations in the content include use by traffers and traffic teams, TA866/Asylum Ambuscade, and the Crazy Evil cryptoscam gang. Rhadamanthys is also referenced as a payload delivered in campaigns involving ClearFake, GHOSTPULSE, and TAG-150-linked activity. Law-enforcement reporting in the content states that Operation Endgame previously disrupted Rhadamanthys infrastructure, including takedowns of more than 1,000 servers associated with Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and Elysium.

High-confidence indicators explicitly mentioned in the content include C2 URL http://185[.]209.160.99/blob/top.mp4 from one analyzed loader; dropper hash 89ec4405e9b2cab987f2e4f7e4b1666e from the reverse-engineered sample; and, from a Notion-themed malvertising campaign, dropper hash 6f4a0cc0fa22b66f75f5798d3b259d470beb776d79de2264c2affc0b5fa924a2, Rhadamanthys hashes e179a9e5d75d56140d11cbd29d92d8137b0a73f964dd3cfd46564ada572a3109 and 679fad2fd86d2fd9e1ec38fa15280c1186f35343583c7e83ab382b8c255f9e18, dropper IP 185[.]172[.]128[.]169, C2 IP 185[.]172[.]128[.]170, download URLs yogapets[.]xyz/@abcmse1.exe and birdarid[.]org/@abcnp.exe, and related domains pantovawy.page[.]link, cerisico[.]net, notione.my-apk[.]com, and alternativebehavioralconcepts[.]org.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-55182React2Shell RCE in React Server Components Flight Protocol

Threat Details and IOCs Malware: ... Rhadamanthys ...

via f5 communitycommunity.f5.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

13 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dungeon Team

It is claimed that the Rhadamanthys Stealer is used and a loader for Traffers is provided.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
TA866

Rhadamanthys is an information stealer that can be used to collect and exfiltrate a variety of sensitive data from infected systems.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Aggah

This PowerShell script ran Rhadamanthys malware. Rhadamanthys was then observed to download and run zgRAT.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
Crazy Evil

Deploy advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor for and block the execution of known malware families associated with Crazy Evil, such as Rhadamanthys, Stealc, and AMOS.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
Handala

It also recently added a commercial infostealer - Rhadamanthys - sold on cybercrime forums to its arsenal, according to Check Point.

via register securitytheregister.com
TA2541

Rhadamanthys is a prominent malware observed since 2022, used by multiple cybercriminal threat actors. It is a modular information stealer with multiple pricing plans, and the creators sell it alongside Elysium Proxy Bot and a Crypt Service.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

This attack – known as ‘malvertising’ – is often aimed at users looking to download popular software applications.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Rhadamanthys is an infostealer distributed via malspam and malvertising. Google searches for popular software such as Notion return malicious ads. Threat actors are using decoy websites to trick users into downloading malware.

T1588Obtain CapabilitiesEvidence1

Commercial evasion framework SHELLTER acquired by threat groups... In mid-June, our research identified multiple financially motivated infostealer campaigns that have been using SHELLTER to package payloads beginning late April 2025.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

Sharing malicious code or phishing panels via YouTube : They promote popular apps or cracked versions of apps as free downloads, and include download links or panels in the video description to entice users to download the malicious code.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

During a wave of attacks occurring in April 2025, users were phished or otherwise lured into downloading a compressed archive... In July 2025, the large archive attached to the phishing lure contained...

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Victims who clicked the ad and visited the site were tricked with a download for NetSupport RAT. In this more recent campaign, the threat actor is pushing Rhadamanthys as the final payload, after an initial dropper.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

We’ve been observing an initial access technique that tricks users into copying, pasting, and executing malicious PowerShell code... users are presented with the typical Verify You Are Human prompt... Clicking the button silently copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and presents the user with “Verification Steps” instructing them to: Press Windows Button + R... Press CTRL + V... Press Enter. | One technique we’ve recently seen lead to LummaC2 involves tricking users into copying a PowerShell script from a pop-up message, pasting it into the Windows Run dialogue box, and executing malicious PowerShell code.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

These messages contained URLs leading to a download of a JavaScript file hosted on Microsoft Azure. The JavaScript called PowerShell to run a remote PowerShell script.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The shellcode execution will go as the following: The function sub_405728 is responsible to invoke the API call ImmEnumInputContext... ImmEnumInputContext will get the address of the shellcode in its second argument “lpfn” and will execute it.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

When a user searches for a related term and clicks through to the malicious site, the attackers check the Referer header to confirm the user has come from a search engine, and then entice them into downloading malware disguised as a legitimate software application.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Web Filtering and Monitoring: Deploy web filtering solutions to block access to known malicious domains linked to Crazy Evil ... as well as suspicious downloads, especially those related to cracked “freemium” software.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the loader will use the API call SetErrorMode with 0x8003 as an argument... the loader doesn't want the system to display any error on the screen

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

it is just a small shellcode that unpacks and inject into the memory the Rhadamanthys stealer itself. | a call to VirtualAlloc will happen to create a newly allocated memory followed by memcpy to copy the shellcode from the heap to the new memory. Lastly, a VirtualProtect API call will be used to change the permission of the memory segment to RWX. | This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll. This behavior is traditional and happens in many shellcodes. | After having a shellcode with EXECUTE permission, we need a way to execute it, in this case, the authors choose a cool trick in form of a Callback function.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll... it iterates through the kernel32 export functions... hash the function name... Overall the functions will be “VirtualAlloc, LocalFree, LocalAlloc, VirtualFree”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

They promote popular apps or cracked versions of apps as free downloads... Operate fake casinos or gambling sites through phishing panels that replicate the UI of legitimate casino sites.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

it is just a small shellcode that unpacks and inject into the memory the Rhadamanthys stealer itself. | a call to VirtualAlloc will happen to create a newly allocated memory followed by memcpy to copy the shellcode from the heap to the new memory. Lastly, a VirtualProtect API call will be used to change the permission of the memory segment to RWX. | This function access the Process Environment Block to get the address of Kernel32.dll. This behavior is traditional and happens in many shellcodes. | After having a shellcode with EXECUTE permission, we need a way to execute it, in this case, the authors choose a cool trick in form of a Callback function.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The config decryption occurs in a function named sub_3DD4... sub_28AA This function is basically just an RC4 algorithm

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

An encoded PowerShell command then leverages Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to download and execute a malicious payload from a remote resource... Detection opportunity: mshta.exe utility making external network connections.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Spawn Rundll32 to execute the DLL with the export function “PrintUIEntry”

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

The loader continues with creating a Mutex with the name that starts with “Global\MSCTF.Asm.{digits}”.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks for specific users that could hint about a lab environment... Check for security-related DLLs | The Rhadamanthys loader contains large anti-analysis checks stolen from the al-khaser project... Some of the checks are checking for a virtual environment

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

the loader will use the API call SetErrorMode with 0x8003 as an argument... the loader doesn't want the system to display any error on the screen

T1553Subvert Trust ControlsEvidence1

The Windows binary is a signed file but its digital signature is not valid... This digital certificate is likely fake or was revoked, but it may evade detection in some cases.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

The malware collects information from the discord directories, possibly to extract further data.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

A stealer is malicious code that steals account information, passwords, financial data, and other sensitive personal information stored on a system.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The malware target the following browsers in their info-stealing activity: ... Opera Chrome ... Firefox Edge

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Through the malware installed by the Traffer, victims’ credentials and other information are stolen, and the stolen data is sold on credential markets or Telegram.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The malware target sensitive registry keys of the WinSCP in order to collect information.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks for specific users that could hint about a lab environment... Check for security-related DLLs | The Rhadamanthys loader contains large anti-analysis checks stolen from the al-khaser project... Some of the checks are checking for a virtual environment

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Rhadamanthys targets a broad range of sensitive information, including credentials from browsers, system information, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and application data.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

In our case, we can see that the C2 will be http://185[.]209.160.99/blob/top.mp4

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

Once a Traffer joins the team, they request a build from the Telegram Bot and receive malicious code samples... user @amdfx6300 sent a file named “build.zip” along with a VirusTotal link and stated that it was “completely clean.”

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Cryptocurrency theft : Generally, a drainer is used to change the coin address to the attacker’s address when the victim transfers coins to another address, thereby stealing the coins.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

the loader gets the address of KiUserExceptionDispatcher and starts to iterate on it to search for a specific location where ZwQueryInformationProcess is called... the call was replaced to jump to a function in the loader

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

the same function appears to aim for the AVAST-related modules aswhook.dll & aswAMSI.dll... More amsi-related functions and DLLs that are being targeted by the stealer are: avamsicli.dll amsi.dll AmsiScanString AmsiScanBuffer EtwEventWrite | the loader gets a handle to ntdll.dll and loads it to virtual memory... They will be compared using memcmp, and if they will found different, the loader will change the protection of the real function of ntdll and will use memcpy to copy the data from the fake to the real one.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

284 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
126 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
31 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
127 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching284

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution13

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping32

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.