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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Azorult

AZORult is an information-stealing Trojan/stealer active in the wild since at least 2016 and sold on underground forums for about $100. It is described as a multifunctional stealer and one of the most widespread Trojan-PSW families, with reporting that it was detected on more than 25% of users who encountered password-stealing malware. The malware is designed to harvest and exfiltrate credentials and other sensitive data from compromised Windows systems. Reported capabilities include stealing credentials from victim browsers; collecting saved passwords, cookies, web form/autofill data, payment card data, and browsing history from more than 30 browsers; stealing credentials and files from applications such as Skype, Telegram, Steam, Outlook, Thunderbird, FileZilla, Pidgin, mail/FTP/instant messaging clients; collecting the username from the victim machine; checking installed software via the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall; stealing cryptocurrency wallet data including wallet.dat and files from more than 30 cryptocurrency programs; taking a broad 'image' of the victim system by collecting host information such as computer name, OS, RAM, installed programs, running processes, desktop files, screenshots, and files matching masks such as documents, images, archives, and text files.

Observed delivery and operational context in the provided content include distribution via malicious email attachments, botnets, malicious websites, and as a second-stage payload downloaded by Chthonic in a PayPal-themed malware campaign. SocGholish/FakeUpdates has also been used to deploy AZORult. The content associates AZORult with multiple threat ecosystems and actors, including TA505, SilverTerrier, and the Nigerian BEC group TMT, which used publicly available stealers such as AZORult to compromise mailboxes and steal credentials. The malware also appeared in infrastructure exposed through BraZZZerS fast-flux/proxy logs, which leaked hidden AZORult admin panel paths. One report states the AZORult project manager abandoned the project at the end of 2018 and left a builder to BraZZZerS administrators.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include a Chthonic-delivered AZORult payload with SHA-256 10d159b0ddb92e9f4b395e90f9cfaa554622c4e77f66f7da176783777db5526a and C2 URL 91.215.154[.]202/AZORult/gate.php. A Trend Micro detection for Trojan.Win32.AZORUIT.A describes related host artifacts including %ProgramData%\localNETService\localNETService.exe, temporary .dat files, persistence via a Windows service named localNETService, scheduled tasks GoogleUpdateTaskMachineUA and GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore, modification of %Program Files%\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe, and registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\localNETService and HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\localNETService. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detection Trojan:Win32/Azorult.RMA!MTB is also referenced.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA505

TA505 has used malware such as Azorult and Cobalt Strike in their operations.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
SilverTerrier

Unit 42 identified ten strains of info-stealers popular with SilverTerrier: AgentTesla, Atmos, AzoRult, ISpySoftware, ISR Stealer, KeyBase, LokiBot, Pony, PredatorPain, and Zeus.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
CrydBrox

In early 2017, CrydBrox offered an updated variant of the AZORult malware that included .bit support... The AZORult sample ... first checks if the C2 domain contains the string ".bit" and ... will query ... hard-coded OpenNIC IP addresses to try to resolve the domain.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Specifically, we observed emails with the subject “You’ve got a money request” that came from PayPal. The sender does not appear to be faked: instead, the spam is generated by registering with PayPal (or using stolen accounts) and then using the portal to “request money.”

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Most often, this is done by sending emails with malicious attachments (for example, office docs with malicious macros that in turn download the Trojan).

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

office docs with malicious macros that in turn download the Trojan

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

By relying on basic social engineering – an attack technique that takes advantage of human traits such as curiosity, trust and greed in order to obtain confidential information or to have the victim perform a certain action – it is suffice to say that certain threat actors (both criminal and nation state) are exploiting these unprecedented times for various nefarious means.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Most often, this is done by sending emails with malicious attachments (for example, office docs with malicious macros that in turn download the Trojan).

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Collect data from browsers: Passwords Autofill data Payment cards Cookies

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

The threat’s called “Stealer Trojans” or Password Stealing Ware (PSW), a type of malware designed to steal passwords, files, and other data from victim computers.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

Collect data from browsers: Passwords Autofill data Payment cards Cookies

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

Full system information (list of installed programs, running processes, user/computer name, system version)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Forward system data: Operating system version User name IP address

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language," and "Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the GetUSerDefaultUILanguage function."

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Copy files: All files from a specific directory (such as Desktop) Files with a specific extension (TXT, DOCX) Files for specific apps (cryptocurrency wallets, messenger session files)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Take screenshots

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Desktop files grabber. Collects files with specified extensions from Desktop. Filter by file size. Recursively searches files in folders.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

the mask %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\ *.txt,*.jpg,*.png,*.zip,*.rar,*.doc means that all files with the specified extensions from the victim’s desktop are to be sent to the malware operator

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This executable is Chthonic, a variant of the Zeus banking Trojan. The command and control (C&C) for this instance is kingstonevikte[.]com.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

In the log we can see that: A client 96.57.xx.xxx Sent a web request “GET tuneappservice.org/l3k42hj56h634gkj2lk14356jk4gh23k5jl6h4/gate.php?ped=RTY3M0E4NjhDQ0I5JE1DLTEwNw” We can see here what looks like a malware callback, it’s in fact Riltok.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

The service is described as a Fast flux but in reality it’s more a simple proxy system. BraZZZers rents a pool of VPSs all around the internet and uses them as proxy IPs in order to hide the real IP of a server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Если пользователь устанавливает такое «обновление», на устройство жертвы загружается малварь

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The domains involved are resolving to a list of IPs, (we observed from 1 up to more than 20 IPs per domain) that are just redirecting the traffic to the real server.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

The story we are writing here will try to explain how, from a simple mistake made by an operator, we managed to collect and exploit a lot of precious information from a “Fast Flux” network called BraZZZerS Fast Flux between end of 2018 and 2022.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

725 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
712 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
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What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching725

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.