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Mallory
20 malware families

SilverTerrier

Also known asSilverTerrier

SilverTerrier is the codename used by researchers and law enforcement for a Nigerian-based cybercrime syndicate and broader ecosystem involved primarily in business email compromise (BEC) fraud. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracks Nigerian BEC actors under this name, and reporting in the content describes SilverTerrier as a collective label for more than 400 unique actors or groups. The group or ecosystem has been accused of targeting thousands of organizations worldwide and harming thousands of companies globally through BEC scams. The content describes SilverTerrier as a financially motivated threat actor cluster originating from Nigeria, including references from INTERPOL’s Global Financial Crime Taskforce and Nigerian law enforcement. Law enforcement actions tied to SilverTerrier include Operation Falcon II, in which 11 alleged members of a cybercrime network believed to be tied to SilverTerrier were arrested in Nigeria, and a later May 2022 arrest of a 37-year-old Nigerian man suspected to be the leader of a SilverTerrier-linked BEC group. SilverTerrier activity is centered on BEC, including monitoring business conversations and diverting funds when transactions are about to occur. The content states that Unit 42 observed roughly 1.1 million SilverTerrier attacks over four years, with a monthly average of 28,227 attacks in one reporting period, and later reporting cited monthly BEC attack volume rising to 245,637 in 2019. Targeted sectors mentioned in the content include high-tech, wholesale, and manufacturing. The content also states that SilverTerrier commonly augments BEC with malware to steal data and improve targeting. Information stealers were described as the preferred malware type, with a later shift toward remote access trojans. Malware families explicitly associated with SilverTerrier in the content include AgentTesla, Atmos, AzoRult, ISpySoftware, ISR Stealer, KeyBase, LokiBot, Pony, PredatorPain, Zeus, NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, njRAT, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm. NanoCore is specifically described as the RAT of choice for SilverTerrier, and the content also notes SilverTerrier use of njRAT. Nigerian actors in this ecosystem used crypters to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware to evade antivirus detection. A campaign linked behaviorally to the SilverTerrier ecosystem involved Remcos RAT delivered through Thai-language phishing emails themed as financial payment slips. That activity used a WinRAR self-extracting archive with deceptive double extensions such as .pdf.scr, a Visual Basic script that temporarily disrupted connectivity using ipconfig to hinder online detection, a renamed AutoIt3 interpreter for decryption, RC4-decrypted Remcos configuration data, and dynamic DNS command-and-control infrastructure. Investigators tracked that operational cluster as BlackToad and linked it to elements of the SilverTerrier ecosystem; recent telemetry also connected it to the BoredFluff campaign. For command and control, the content explicitly states that SilverTerrier uses HTTP for C2 communications. ATT&CK-style annotations in the content also associate SilverTerrier with web protocols, mail protocols, and remote access tools. Known aliases and related names directly mentioned in the content include SilverTerrier, BlackToad, and BoredFluff, with SilverTerrier described as an ecosystem or collective name rather than a single tightly bounded group.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

23 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

12 of 15 tactics35 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1595
Active Scanning
TA0042
Resource Development
3 techniques
T1586
Compromise Accounts
T1586.002×2
Email Accounts
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.002
Code Signing Certificates
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.004
Digital Certificates
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1078×3
Valid Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×2
Keylogging
T1114×3
Email Collection
T1123
Audio Capture
T1125
Video Capture
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×11
Web Protocols
T1071.002×2
File Transfer Protocols
T1071.003×3
Mail Protocols
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×4
Remote Access Tools
T1573
Encrypted Channel
T1573.002×2
Asymmetric Cryptography
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1657×2
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping23

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal20

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables4

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.