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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 1 CVE

NanoCore

Also known asnanocore_rat

NanoCore is a commodity remote access trojan (RAT) in use since at least 2013. It is used to open a backdoor on infected Windows systems and enable remote monitoring and control. Reported capabilities in the provided content include keylogging, spying/monitoring, file execution, ingress tool transfer, registry editing/modification, Windows command shell execution, network configuration discovery, mouse control, audio capture, video/webcam capture, and disabling or modifying the system firewall and antivirus settings. The content also notes encrypted communications using symmetric cryptography and persistence via Registry Run keys or the Startup folder.

NanoCore is commonly delivered through phishing and malware delivery chains. The content specifically mentions distribution via email-based campaigns, including ZIP attachments containing PIF executables, OneDrive links, RAR/UUE attachments, ISO files, macro-enabled Excel documents, and VBScript/PowerShell-based loaders. It is also described as a payload delivered by GuLoader and as a secondary payload downloaded by FormBook. A deobfuscated VBS loader example ultimately executed a PowerShell command to run a NanoCore payload.

Threat actor associations directly mentioned in the content include TA2722, which distributed NanoCore alongside Remcos in campaigns impersonating Philippine government and related entities, and SilverTerrier, for which NanoCore was the most frequently seen RAT in 2018, averaging 125 unique samples per month. Elfin/APT33 is also noted as having used NanoCore among other commodity RATs. The malware has been used for information gathering, data theft, monitoring, and control of compromised computers, including business email compromise-related operations.

Targeting described in the content spans organizations in shipping, logistics, manufacturing, business services, pharmaceutical, energy, finance, aerospace, defense contractor, and other sectors, with campaigns observed globally. The content also notes legal action against NanoCore's developer: Taylor Huddleston was sentenced in 2018 for making and selling NanoCore RAT, which was used to spy through webcams and steal passwords.

Indicators and configuration details explicitly mentioned include NanoCore samples used by TA2722/Shahzad73 with PrimaryConnectionHost shahzad73[.]casacam[.]net, BackupConnectionHost shahzad73[.]ddns[.]net, and version 1.2.2.0; a coronavirus-themed NanoCore sample with SHA-256 C57fa2a5d1a65a687f309f23ca3cfc6721d382b06cf894ee5cd01931bbc17a46; and a NanoCore VBS loader sample with SHA-256 c6092b1788722f82280d3dca79784556df6b8203f4d8f271c327582dd9dcf6e1.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2014-4114Sandworm Windows OLE Package Manager Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

"The malware downloaded and executed by the .Net downloader is NanoCore, a well-known RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that enables the remote monitoring of victims via their computers."

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
TA2722

TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs). Remcos and NanoCore are typically used for information gathering, data theft operations, monitoring and control of compromised computers.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
SilverTerrier

With an average of 125 unique samples per month, NanoCore was the most frequently seen RAT employed by SilverTerrier actors in 2018.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
APT33

NanoCore (Trojan.Nancrat): Commodity RAT used to open a backdoor on an infected computer and steal information.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
Group5

"The malware downloaded and executed by the .Net downloader is NanoCore, a well-known RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that enables the remote monitoring of victims via their computers."

via citizenlabcitizenlab.ca
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

TA2722 impersonates Philippine health, labor, and customs organizations... The threat actor generally leverages themes purporting to be entities related to the Philippine government... The phishing emails masqueraded as the Philippines Bureau of Customs CPRS.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

They contained multiple threat distribution mechanisms including: OneDrive URLs linking to RAR files with embedded UUE files... Compressed MS Excel documents containing macros which, if enabled, download malware... Most of these messages contain either UUE or RAR attachments ultimately leading to the installation of Remcos remote access trojan (RAT) or NanoCore RAT.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Compressed MS Excel documents containing macros which, if enabled, download malware

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Examples include 'Cobalt Group has used a JavaScript backdoor that is capable of launching cmd.exe to execute shell commands', 'Orz can execute commands with JavaScript', 'Patchwork used JavaScript code and .SCT files on victim machines', and 'Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution installation via JavaScript will launch follow-on commands via cmd.exe.'

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

...compressed executables (.iso files) that download and run malware... Compressed MS Excel documents containing macros which, if enabled, download malware... which, if executed, leads to Remcos RAT.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to place a .bat file in the Startup Folder. TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder. Storm-1811 has created Windows Registry Run keys that execute various batch scripts to establish persistence on victim devices.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to place a .bat file in the Startup Folder. TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder. Storm-1811 has created Windows Registry Run keys that execute various batch scripts to establish persistence on victim devices.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

the list of features and plugins advertised for this RAT includes functionality that goes significantly beyond what one might see in a traditional remote administration tool, such as DDoS-for-hire capabilities, and the ability to disable the light indicator on webcams so as not to alert the target that the RAT is active.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

These are, of course, on top of the obviously ominous features such as password retrieval and key logging that are normally seen in Remote Access Trojans.

Discovery

1 technique
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

A group of remote access trojans, among them WarZoneRAT, njrat, nanocore, and netwire, overlap on process injection, keylogging-related calls, and command-and-control traffic.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

DarkComet ... Audio Capture ... NanoCore ... Audio Capture

T1125Video CaptureEvidence3

Agent Tesla can access the victim’s webcam and record video. AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems. Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing video from a victim's webcam. ... ZxShell has a command to perform video device spying.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Proofpoint named the first identified cluster Shahzad73 based on the command and control (C2) domains used by the threat actor... The observed Remcos samples included the following example configuration: C2: shahzad73[.]casacam[.]net:2404... Observed NanoCore RAT samples included... PrimaryConnectionHost: shahzad73[.]casacam[.]net

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

First, we see a call to a location in the stack ... that will execute the function InternetOpenUrlA, we also see the C2 it will use... the second shellcode downloads further malware.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

TA2722 distributes Remcos and NanoCore remote access trojans (RATs)... Remcos and NanoCore are typically used for information gathering, data theft operations, monitoring and control of compromised computers.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

NanoCore ... Encrypted Channel ... NETWIRE ... Encrypted Channel

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
12 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
6 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 months ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 months ago
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IOC matching26

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.