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FIN11 is a financially motivated cybercrime threat actor widely associated with the TA505 ecosystem and closely linked in reporting to Clop/Cl0p extortion operations. The group has been connected to long-running ransomware distribution and data-theft extortion activity across multiple industries, and some reporting treats FIN11, TA505, Lace Tempest, DEV-0950, and related clusters as overlapping or partially overlapping activity rather than fully distinct entities. FIN11 has also been tracked in connection with suspected sub-clusters such as UNC5936 in Oracle E-Business Suite-related extortion activity. FIN11 is known for monetizing intrusions through ransomware deployment, traditional extortion, and earlier financially motivated malware operations including use of information-stealing and crimeware tooling. The actor has been linked to Clop ransomware deployment as well as exfiltration-only campaigns in which stolen data is used for coercion without encryption. High-profile activity attributed or linked to FIN11 includes exploitation of managed file transfer and enterprise application vulnerabilities, notably Accellion FTA, Progress MOVEit Transfer, Cleo managed file transfer products, and Oracle E-Business Suite. In several campaigns, FIN11 or suspected FIN11 clusters exploited zero-day vulnerabilities to obtain broad access and steal data at scale for extortion. Tradecraft associated with FIN11 includes exploitation of public-facing applications, phishing-based intrusion activity, use of compromised accounts in mass extortion campaigns, deployment of malware downloaders and post-compromise tooling, and operation within affiliate-style ransomware ecosystems. Reporting links the actor to Clop payload deployment, use of GOLDVEIN.JAVA in Oracle EBS-related activity, and overlap with intrusion chains involving Raspberry Robin, IcedID, Bumblebee, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike. FIN11 has also been associated with credential theft and broader post-exploitation activity, including persistence, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. FIN11 has targeted organizations globally, with repeated victimization observed in North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. Confirmed victim sectors and affected environments include financial services, healthcare, education, engineering, government and public sector entities, and operational technology-adjacent enterprise environments. Mandiant has assessed that FIN11’s techniques can reach OT-connected environments even without evidence of specialized OT expertise, and historical Clop-linked process kill lists attributed to FIN11 included OT-related processes, raising concern about potential disruptive impact beyond standard enterprise ransomware operations. The actor’s dominant motivation is financial gain. Its operations are characterized by opportunistic but technically capable intrusion activity, frequent use of extortion pressure, and repeated participation in large-scale exploitation waves tied to high-value enterprise software vulnerabilities.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
20 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
15 additional families tracked in Mallory.
18 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 18 of them exploited in the wild.
Google Threat Intelligence Group documented that CVE-2025-61882 exploitation combined Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection, authentication bypass, and XSL template injection to achieve remote code execution... Known Exploitation Not confirmed Yes (Cl0p/FIN11, CISA KEV).
Clop ransomware specifically targets the MOVEIT Transfer vulnerability... The threat actors took advantage of a SQL injection vulnerability present in the web application of MOVEIT Transfer. They exploited this vulnerability by installing a webshell known as LEMURLOOT.
“It’s still not clear which Oracle EBS zero-days have been exploited in the campaign claimed by Cl0p, but the main candidates are CVE-2025-61884 and CVE-2025-618842.”
It's suspected that threat actors are exploiting CVE-2026-12569 (CVSS score: 9.3), a critical security flaw in PTC Windmill that was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog late last month.
Similarly, in early 2023, threat actors exploited GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) vulnerability CVE-2023-0669.
13 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
77 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Activity cluster associated in the content with Cl0p's supply-chain-oriented extortion operations.
Suspected operator linked by researchers to Oracle EBS intrusion activity; associated with tooling similarities between Oracle EBS attacks and prior mass exploitation campaigns.
Suspected FIN11 activity exploiting Oracle E-Business Suite, using the CL0P leak site and GOLDVEIN.JAVA in extortion-focused operations.
Referenced as a financially motivated threat actor associated with increased use of zero-day exploits in ransomware operations during 2025.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.