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FIN11 is a financially motivated cybercrime group associated with Russia and Ukraine that conducts malware distribution, ransomware deployment, and data-theft extortion across multiple industries. Its monetization methods have included point-of-sale malware, CLOP ransomware, and extortion involving stolen organizational data. FIN11 is closely associated with the TA505 ecosystem and the Cl0p extortion operation. Its activity overlaps with Microsoft's Lace Tempest cluster, formerly tracked as DEV-0950; these overlapping designations should not be treated as universally interchangeable aliases. FIN11 has been linked to exploitation of Accellion File Transfer Appliance vulnerabilities and the 2023 MOVEit Transfer zero-day campaign. These operations compromised file-transfer systems to exfiltrate sensitive information, including customer records, personal information, and financial data. FIN11 operators have used Cl0p's leak site to publish stolen information and pressure victims into paying. Its file-transfer campaigns demonstrate an emphasis on encryption-less data-theft extortion alongside its established ransomware activity, with both directly compromised organizations and downstream customers affected. FIN11 uses exploitation frameworks, publicly available tools, living-off-the-land techniques, and tailored malware. Its CLOP-associated tooling has included process-termination lists containing operational-technology-related software. However, FIN11 has no demonstrated specialized OT expertise, and significant OT impacts from those process lists have not been established. FIN11 is a criminal operation rather than an established state-sponsored actor.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
30 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
18 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 18 of them exploited in the wild.
Google Threat Intelligence Group documented that CVE-2025-61882 exploitation combined Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection, authentication bypass, and XSL template injection to achieve remote code execution... Known Exploitation Not confirmed Yes (Cl0p/FIN11, CISA KEV).
Clop ransomware specifically targets the MOVEIT Transfer vulnerability... The threat actors took advantage of a SQL injection vulnerability present in the web application of MOVEIT Transfer. They exploited this vulnerability by installing a webshell known as LEMURLOOT.
“It’s still not clear which Oracle EBS zero-days have been exploited in the campaign claimed by Cl0p, but the main candidates are CVE-2025-61884 and CVE-2025-618842.”
It's suspected that threat actors are exploiting CVE-2026-12569 (CVSS score: 9.3), a critical security flaw in PTC Windmill that was added to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog late last month.
Similarly, in early 2023, threat actors exploited GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) vulnerability CVE-2023-0669.
13 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
87 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The content associates FIN11 with the late-2024 Cleo exploitation campaign. The associated actors exploited unauthenticated remote execution vulnerabilities and deployed GOLDVEIN and GOLDTOMB to steal enterprise data. It does not establish FIN11 as an alias or subgroup of Cl0p.
Activity cluster associated in the content with Cl0p's supply-chain-oriented extortion operations.
Suspected operator linked by researchers to Oracle EBS intrusion activity; associated with tooling similarities between Oracle EBS attacks and prior mass exploitation campaigns.
Suspected FIN11 activity exploiting Oracle E-Business Suite, using the CL0P leak site and GOLDVEIN.JAVA in extortion-focused operations.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.