Clop, also written CL0P, is a ransomware family and associated extortion operation first observed in 2019 and widely linked to the TA505/FIN11 cybercrime ecosystem and later affiliate-driven ransomware activity. It is historically described as a CryptoMix-derived ransomware strain that encrypts files, but in later years it became especially notable for large-scale data-theft and extortion campaigns that often emphasized exfiltration over encryption. The operation has repeatedly targeted enterprise software and managed file transfer platforms through zero-day and n-day exploitation, including campaigns involving Accellion FTA, GoAnywhere MFT, MOVEit Transfer, Cleo, Oracle EBS, and PTC Windchill and FlexPLM. These campaigns have affected organizations across multiple sectors, including government, manufacturing, aerospace, defense, retail, healthcare, energy, and technology.
Clop intrusions have been associated with mass exploitation of internet-exposed enterprise applications to obtain initial access and steal data at scale. In some campaigns, the operators claimed they limited activity to theft from the exposed application rather than deploying encryption broadly inside victim environments. In other cases, Clop attacks included a longer hands-on intrusion phase with manual propagation, privilege escalation, and preparation before ransomware deployment. Reporting has linked some Clop activity to phishing-based delivery in earlier operations, while later campaigns prominently relied on exploitation of vulnerable public-facing systems.
The malware and associated tooling support typical ransomware and extortion tradecraft, including process discovery, network share enumeration, security-tool awareness, registry modification, and use of native Windows APIs. Documented behaviors include enumerating running processes, searching for antivirus and antimalware-related processes, enumerating network shares, modifying registry keys, dynamically resolving APIs, allocating memory, and using simple string deobfuscation routines. Clop operators have also been observed using web shells in server-side exploitation campaigns to facilitate collection and exfiltration of sensitive files.
Clop is strongly associated with double-extortion and related coercive tactics. Victims are commonly threatened with publication of stolen data on a leak site, and the operation has used direct pressure against victims by contacting customers, partners, employees, or executives. Reporting also describes targeted theft from executive and managerial workstations to obtain especially sensitive material for leverage during negotiations. In recent years, Clop has often been characterized as an extortion-focused operation that may prioritize data theft even when encryption is absent or secondary.
Clop activity is primarily associated with Windows environments, both for ransomware execution and for post-compromise host actions, though some of its most consequential campaigns have centered on compromise of internet-facing enterprise server applications. The operation remains one of the most prominent examples of ransomware actors shifting from selective intrusions to opportunistic, high-volume exploitation of widely deployed business software.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
17 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
the Clop gang has listed them on its leak site as part of a batch of 43 new victims likely targeted in data theft attacks exploiting a critical improper input validation vulnerability (tracked as CVE-2026-12569) against Internet-exposed PTC Windchill and PTC FlexPLM instances.
Для CVE-2024-50623 (unrestricted file upload в Cleo Harmony/VLTrader/LexiCom, CVSS 9.8, CWE-434) - обратная история: на Exploit-DB записи нет до сих пор, зато на GitHub с декабря 2024 лежит PoC от watchtowrlabs... CVE-2024-50623 сидит в CISA KEV с 13 декабря 2024... Та же CVE-2024-50623, через которую Clop атаковала файловые трансферы Cleo, имела EPSS 0.9861...
事例1:ファイル転送製品「MOVEit」(2023年/CVSS 9.8・CRITICAL) 社外とファイルをやりとりする製品「MOVEit Transfer」の脆弱性です。 深刻度はCVSS 9.8のCRITICALで、外部からログインなしで悪用できるタイプでした。 FBIとCISAの共同勧告により、Cl0p(クロップ)が2023年5月下旬から悪用し、製品内に保管されていたデータを盗み出したことが明らかとなっています | FBIとCISAの共同勧告により、Cl0p(クロップ) が2023年5月下旬から悪用し、製品内に保管されていたデータを盗み出したことが明らかとなっています。
Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in an FTA product (CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, and CVE-2021-27104) | Having defined the phases, we now home in on the three ransomware families in question: REvil, Clop, and Conti.
Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in an FTA product (CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, and CVE-2021-27104) | Having defined the phases, we now home in on the three ransomware families in question: REvil, Clop, and Conti.
Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in an FTA product (CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, and CVE-2021-27104) | Having defined the phases, we now home in on the three ransomware families in question: REvil, Clop, and Conti.
Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in an FTA product (CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, and CVE-2021-27104) | Having defined the phases, we now home in on the three ransomware families in question: REvil, Clop, and Conti.
In a Clop data theft extortion engagement this quarter, the adversaries gained initial access by exploiting a zero-day remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Fortra GoAnywhere managed file transfer (MFT) application, tracked as CVE-2023-0669.
Netwrix vulnerability (CVE-2022-31199) based delivery ... we believe with high confidence that these events are the result of the exploitation of a vulnerability in Netwrix Auditor (CVE-2022-31199) ... “Netwrix Auditor is vulnerable to an insecure object deserialization issue that is caused by an unsecured .NET remoting service. An attacker can submit arbitrary objects to the application through this service to achieve remote code execution on Netwrix Auditor servers.”
Indian conglomerate Indiabulls Group has allegedly been hit with a cyberattack from the CLOP Ransomware operators who have leaked screenshots of stolen data.
@TLP_R3D ... relates that ransomware attack to the exploitation of SysAid vulnerability (0day on November 8, 2023, and tracked as CVE-2023-47246). | LAYER7-NETWORKS AS35042 also hosted payloads from Clop group ...
November 2021: Security researchers discovered Clop ransomware exploiting the SolarWinds vulnerability, breaching several organizations. CVEs list exploited by the Clop ransomware: ... CVE-2021-35211 | The infamous Clop ransomware, mainly known as Cl0p, targets various industries and organizations, extorting data for a considerable ransom.
CVEs list exploited by the Clop ransomware: CVE-2023-34362 CVE-2023-35036 CVE-2023-0669... | The infamous Clop ransomware, mainly known as Cl0p, targets various industries and organizations, extorting data for a considerable ransom.
The Clop ransomware group is targeting internet-exposed PTC Windchill and FlexPLM instances in a new data theft extortion campaign. Clop has reportedly been exploiting a critical improper input validation vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-12569.
Spoločnosť Oracle vydala bezpečnostnú aktualizáciu na svoj produkt E-Business Suite, ktorá opravuje vysoko závažnú zraniteľnosť. CVE-2025-61884 by vzdialený neautentifikovaný útočník zaslaním špeciálne vytvorených HTTP požiadaviek mohol zneužiť na kompromitáciu Oracle Configurator a získanie neoprávneného prístupu k citlivým údajom. [aktualizácia 21.10.2025] zraniteľnosť CVE-2025-61884 bola pridaná do zoznamu aktívne zneužívaných
Zraniteľnosť CVE-2024-55956 možno zneužiť na získanie neoprávneného prístupu k citlivým údajom, vykonanie neoprávnených zmien v systéme a vzdialené vykonanie kódu... V súčasnosti je dostupný Proof of Concept (PoC)... Zraniteľnosť aktívne zneužívajú útočníci minimálne od 3. decembra 2024. Ransomvérová skupina CLOP ju v rámci útokov zneužíva na krádež citlivých údajov.
The timing of the intrusion coincides with a broader hacking campaign that targeted Oracle E-Business Suite systems through a vulnerability tracked as CVE-2025-61882. Google and Mandiant researchers reported in October 2025 that the Cl0p extortion group had exploited that flaw, along with other Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities, to steal data from multiple organizations in August 2025. The vulnerability allowed attackers without valid credentials to execute code remotely over HTTP on systems running Oracle E-Business Suite versions 12.2.3 through 12.2.14. Oracle issued a patch addressing CVE-2025-61882 on October 4, 2025.
12 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Payments to ransomware gangs such as Bitpaymer, DopplePaymer, WastedLocker, and Clop carried a sanction violations risk in 2020... Clop: Disputed but speculated to be associated with Evil Corp.
Until November 21 when they gained admin rights on an unpatched machine, the attackers moved through UM's network compromising servers left and right until it finally deployed the Clop ransomware payload on 267 Windows systems.
We found connections between ShadowSyndicate infrastructure and Cl0p/Truebot substantiating previous findings of GroupIB
Cl0p ransomware affiliates are actively exploiting this vulnerability against manufacturing, automotive, aerospace, and retail organizations.
36 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
L’objectif des attaquants est d’acquérir des droits d’administration réseau afin de faciliter le déploiement du code de chiffrement sur l’ensemble du système d’information à partir de serveurs centraux.
CL0Pなどのランサムウェア攻撃グループによって、PaperCut社の印刷管理サービス「PaperCut NG/MF」の脆弱性を悪用した攻撃が行われている
The syndicate previously executed zero-day supply chain attacks against managed file transfer platforms, including MOVEit Transfer and Accellion FTA, compromising hundreds of organizations worldwide.
Once sufficient data had been collected, the attackers created scheduled tasks on a large number of systems to simultaneously start executing the Clop ransomware
TinyMet can be used to connect the reverse shell to the C&C server.
Once sufficient data had been collected, the attackers created scheduled tasks on a large number of systems to simultaneously start executing the Clop ransomware
TA505 utilise un code de compression... appelé Minedoor... pour rendre ces codes malveillants plus difficiles à analyser.
TA505 uses a compression code... called Minedoor... used to compress both early stage malwares such as FlawedGrace, and final codes deployed by TA505 such as Clop or DeactivateDefender.
le rançongiciel est souvent déployé en début ou veille de week-end et comporte une fonction de suppression des copies cachés Windows (Volume Shadow copies).
Backups were either encrypted or deleted or backup disks were formatted. Shadow copies also removed
L’objectif des attaquants est d’acquérir des droits d’administration réseau afin de faciliter le déploiement du code de chiffrement sur l’ensemble du système d’information à partir de serveurs centraux.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values. Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries. APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of groups and malware that can 'list files and directories,' 'search for files,' 'enumerate drives,' 'gather file metadata,' or 'browse file systems' on compromised hosts.
Cuba has used several built-in API functions for discovery like GetIpNetTable and NetShareEnum.
Check local language via GetKeyboardLayout against hardcoded list: Georgian, Russian, Azerbaijan
Cette tendance est également intéressante car elle indique que le mode opératoire est obligé d’exfiltrer des données du SI de sa victime.
This is why, in recent intrusions, a group that has often used the Clop ransomware strain has been specifically searching for workstations inside a breached company that are used by its top managers. The group sifts through a manager's files and emails, and exfiltrates data that they think might be useful in threatening, embarrassing, or putting pressure on a company's management
launch ransomware that encrypts files and servers | CLOP is one of several ransomware groups that hack into organizations, launch ransomware that encrypts files and servers, and then demand an extortion payment in return for a digital key needed to unlock access.
470 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
200 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Clop is described as an extortion-focused ransomware group conducting data theft attacks against enterprise platforms. In this campaign, it exploited vulnerable Internet-exposed PTC Windchill and FlexPLM instances, deployed JSP webshells, and stole sensitive data from compromised systems.
Cl0p is described as an extortion-focused ransomware group that steals sensitive corporate data and pressures victims via dark web leak-site postings, often relying on data exfiltration rather than file encryption.
Ransomware/extortion group described as running a mass-exploitation campaign using a single zero-day to compromise many organizations at scale.
Ransomware/extortion group described as running a mass exploitation campaign via a single zero-day affecting hundreds of organizations.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.