Ryuk

the group has continued to host a significant proportion of the C&C infrastructure in the networks of Choopa, a U.S.-based VPS hosting provider

The U.S. and German government’s action today addresses the abuse of virtual currency to launder ransom payments.

Authorities accused him of identifying exploitable vulnerabilities in potential victims' networks. "The data obtained by the hacker was used by his accomplices to plan and carry out cyberattacks," police said.

Batch script that uses WMIC to execute a BITSAdmin transfer of a payload ransomware to each targeted machine in the comps<##>.txt files.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Batch script that uses WMIC to execute a BITSAdmin transfer of a payload ransomware to each targeted machine in the comps<##>.txt files.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Batch script that uses WMIC to execute a BITSAdmin transfer of a payload ransomware to each targeted machine in the comps<##>.txt files.

Examples include 'adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence', 'creates a shortcut in the Startup folder', and 'RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.'

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread. Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.

In at least one incident, FIN12 used GPOs, scheduled tasks, and WebDAV to execute a RYUK payload hosted on a network file share.

Examples include 'adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence', 'creates a shortcut in the Startup folder', and 'RunOnce Registry key to run itself on safe mode.'

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

Since at least February 2020, FIN12 has leveraged a series of in-memory droppers including, MALTSHAKE, ICECANDLE, WHITEDAGGER, WEIRDLOOP, and templates associated with Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit to deploy various malware payloads.

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.

ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe. Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread. Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.

Batch script that uses WMIC to execute a BITSAdmin transfer of a payload ransomware to each targeted machine in the comps<##>.txt files.

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

In at least one incident, FIN12 used GPOs, scheduled tasks, and WebDAV to execute a RYUK payload hosted on a network file share.

FIN12 has frequently leveraged code-signed payloads in their operations.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

title: Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE ... Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE ... tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002

selection_accounts_root: CommandLine|contains: ' accounts ' ... selection_accounts_flags: CommandLine|contains: ' /do' # short for domain ... tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002

Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.

FIN12 has deployed RYUK manually via RDP in multiple intrusions.

FIN12 has most commonly moved laterally across victim environments using valid credentials in combination with BEACON, EMPIRE, RDP, and SMB.

FIN12 stages a ZIP archive with the filename share$.zip in the C:\PerfLogs directory on a domain controller.

What made EMOTET so dangerous is that the malware was offered for hire to other cybercriminals to install other types of malware, such as banking Trojans or ransomwares, onto a victim’s computer.

Techniques → T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact), T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery)

Techniques → T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact), T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery)

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.