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🇷🇺 🇺🇦 RU4 malware families

Trickbot

Also known asTrickBot

TrickBot is a Russia-based cybercrime group and malware syndicate centered on the TrickBot malware family. The content links TrickBot to a broader criminal network behind TrickBot, Conti, and Ryuk, and associates it with additional malware and tooling including BazarLoader, SystemBC, IcedID, Diavol, and Latrodectus. German authorities named Russian national Vitaly Nikolaevich Kovalev as the founder and leader of the TrickBot gang in June 2025; he is also described as a senior TrickBot figure known as “Bentley” and “Ben.” The group is also referred to as Wizard Spider/WIZARD SPIDER in the provided content. The group has been tied closely to the Conti ransomware operation. The content states that Conti was developed by members of the TrickBot gang, emerged from the Ryuk group, and remained interlinked with TrickBot personnel and infrastructure. Multiple TrickBot or Conti-linked members were added to most-wanted lists and sanctioned by the United States and United Kingdom. Authorities assessed that current or key TrickBot members maintain links to Russian intelligence services, and some reporting in the content describes alleged ties between TrickBot-linked figures and the FSB. The group is described as having systematically attacked Ukraine, and some targeting was assessed as aligning with Russian state objectives. Operationally, TrickBot began as a modular banking trojan and evolved into a malware delivery and access platform used in multi-stage intrusions. The content states it has been used to deploy Ryuk and Conti ransomware and to support lateral movement, data theft, and enterprise-wide compromise. TrickBot operators also used an Android malware application, TrickMo, to bypass banking two-factor authentication by intercepting OTP, mTAN, and pushTAN codes, abusing Android accessibility services, deleting forwarded SMS messages, resisting uninstallation, and persisting across reboot. The content also directly associates TrickBot with reconnaissance tradecraft including System Network Configuration Discovery and Domain Trust Discovery. Examples cited include use of ipconfig /all, net config workstation, net view /all /domain, and nltest /domain_trusts. Microsoft obtained an emergency court order in 2020 to disable TrickBot command-and-control IP addresses. The group has collaborated with or been linked to other criminal actors and services. The content states TA551 partnered with TrickBot/Wizard Spider in phishing campaigns that deployed Conti ransomware. BazarCall campaigns initially delivered BazarLoader and later also distributed TrickBot. WithSecure found connections between GREYVIBE tooling and the TrickBot gang, and also noted possible access to an ISO builder with suspected ties to TrickBot and UAC-0098. The content further notes that Blender.io was cited by the U.S. Treasury as being used by ransomware gangs including Conti and TrickBot.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
  • UA
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics47 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.007
JavaScript
TA0003
Persistence
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1112
Modify Registry
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1548
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
T1548.002
Bypass User Account Control
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1564
Hide Artifacts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.004
Credential API Hooking
T1111
Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.004
Credential API Hooking
T1185
Browser Session Hijacking
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1071.004
DNS
T1105×3
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1486×4
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
T1657
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

8 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping31

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal4

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables8

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.