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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 19 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

TrickBot

Also known asTotbrickTSPY_TRICKLOAD

TrickBot is a high-profile banking trojan that also functions as a modular malware loader and post-compromise platform. The provided content describes it as using HTTPS for command-and-control to retrieve updates, modules, and configuration files, and as establishing persistence by creating an autostart Windows service; one observed service name was ControlServiceA. Reported capabilities include hidden VNC (hVNC) for stealthy victim monitoring, user and group discovery on compromised hosts, and use of TLS callbacks together with Process Hollowing for process injection. The malware has been delivered through user-executed malicious documents and is also commonly referenced as a second-stage payload dropped by Emotet. The content further notes that TrickBot has been associated with Wizard Spider and with the Conti/TrickBot ecosystem, and has links in reporting to related malware families and operations including BazarLoader, SystemBC, IcedID, Ryuk, and Diavol. A Linux port of its DNS-based Anchor tool, Anchor_linux, is described as a lightweight backdoor/dropper that persists via cron, discovers the victim public IP through external lookup services, and communicates through encoded DNS queries under biillpi.com; it can download payloads to /tmp/<random_15_chars> and execute them via sh, and also contains functionality to propagate to Windows systems over SMB and IPC by deploying an embedded Windows payload as a service. Mentioned indicators and artifacts include the malicious domain pattern *.biillpi.com, related IP 23.95.97.59, and a fixed DLL filename templ.dll observed in TrickBot-related contexts. The content also references historical law-enforcement disruption activity targeting TrickBot infrastructure under Operation Endgame.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2017-0147SMBv1 Information Disclosure in Microsoft Windows (CVE-2017-0147)Exploited in the wild

TabDll – Uses the EternalRomance exploit (CVE-2017-0147) to spread via SMBv1. | TrickBot is a modular banking trojan that targets sensitive information and acts as a dropper for other malware. Since June 2019, the MS-ISAC is observing an increasingly close relationship between initial TrickBot infections and eventual Ryuk ransomware attacks.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
CVE-2021-40444Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

In August, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) identified a small number of attacks (less than 10) that attempted to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML using specially crafted Microsoft Office documents. These attacks used the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2021-40444, as part of an initial access campaign that distributed custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loaders. | Additionally, some of the infrastructure that hosted the oleObjects utilized in the August 2021 attacks abusing CVE-2021-40444 were also involved in the delivery of BazaLoader and Trickbot payloads — activity that overlaps with a group Microsoft tracks as DEV-0193.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
CVE-2017-0144EternalBlue SMBv1 Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

TrickBot utilizes EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits for lateral movement in the modules wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll, tabDll.

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

19 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
WIZARD SPIDER

TrickBot establishes persistence by creating an autostart service that allows it to run whenever the machine boots. Wizard Spider has installed TrickBot as a service named ControlServiceA in order to establish persistence.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
UNC2686

The threat cluster relies heavily on Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, unlike UNC2686 which deployed BAZARLOADER variants as well as TRICKBOT, URSNIF, and SILENTNIGHT.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
GREYVIBE

WithSecure found connections between GREYVIBE’s tooling and both the TrickBot gang and UAC-0098, a group previously linked to Russian cybercriminal networks.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
TA505

The most notorious among these are campaigns involving banking Trojans such as Dridex and TrickBot, ransomware such as Clop/Cryptomix and MINEBRIDGE...

via security intelligenceweb.archive.org
Indrik Spider

...sanctions against the Russian hackers allegedly connected to a single network behind the Conti and Ryuk ransomware variants, as well as the infamous Trickbot banking trojan...

via techcrunch com securitytechcrunch.com
Trickbot

Threat actors use BazarLoader and Trickbot to deploy the Ryuk or Conti ransomware, while IcedID has been used in the past to deploy the now-defunct Maze and Egregor ransomware infections.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

37 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

Variations include malware traps to safely ingest and sequester potential malware files or sinkholes to redirect traffic from malicious domains to defender-controlled servers, severing the connection between compromised machines and attacker command-and-control infrastructure.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Trickbot was a sophisticated, modular, multi-functional suite of malware tools which ... (d) used the captured login credentials to fraudulently gain unauthorized access to victims’ online bank accounts at financial institutions

T1566PhishingEvidence1

TrickBot-infected Windows computers will ask for the victims' online banking mobile phone numbers and device types to prompt them to install a bogus security app.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

Upon execution it installs itself as a cron job, determines the public ip for the host and then begins to beacon via DNS queries to its C2 server.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Several entries explicitly mention malicious macros embedded in Office files, including 'FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments ... with embedded malicious macros,' 'FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros,' and 'TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware.'

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

Upon execution it installs itself as a cron job, determines the public ip for the host and then begins to beacon via DNS queries to its C2 server.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Trickbot was a sophisticated, modular, multi-functional suite of malware tools which ... (d) used the captured login credentials to fraudulently gain unauthorized access to victims’ online bank accounts at financial institutions

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Stuxnet uses a driver registered as a boot start service as the main load-point.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.' | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders.

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

Upon execution it installs itself as a cron job, determines the public ip for the host and then begins to beacon via DNS queries to its C2 server.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1055.005Thread Local StorageEvidence1

Thread Local Storage (TLS) callback injection is a technique that entails manipulating pointers within a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before it reaches the code’s legitimate entry point.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Trickbot was a sophisticated, modular, multi-functional suite of malware tools which ... (d) used the captured login credentials to fraudulently gain unauthorized access to victims’ online bank accounts at financial institutions

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Stuxnet uses a driver registered as a boot start service as the main load-point.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.' | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1055.005Thread Local StorageEvidence1

Thread Local Storage (TLS) callback injection is a technique that entails manipulating pointers within a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before it reaches the code’s legitimate entry point.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Trickbot was a sophisticated, modular, multi-functional suite of malware tools which ... (d) used the captured login credentials to fraudulently gain unauthorized access to victims’ online bank accounts at financial institutions

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Agent Tesla has used ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden to hide windows. APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Given that the trickbot family has a history of harvesting putty credentials ... we see how this can be used to further propagate with in the victims network.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

The content notes checks for whether the current user is an administrator or privileged, including 'AsyncRAT can check if the current user of a compromised system is an administrator,' 'Gelsemium has the ability to distinguish between a standard user and an administrator,' and 'Wizard Spider has used whoami to identify the local user and their privileges.'

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

anchor_dns is instead replaced with anchor_linux and the uname command is utilized to determine the hostname and linux version.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'DRATzarus can obtain a list of users from an infected machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine,' and 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.'

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Trickbot was a sophisticated, modular, multi-functional suite of malware tools which ... (c) infected other computers connected to the victim computer

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

it also contains support for windows execution via smb shares and IPC. The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The malware is also especially dangerous as it can propagate throughout enterprise networks

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

What may be more helpful, though, is the BazarBackdoor APIs and TrickBot command and control server source code that was released, as there is no way to access that info without having access to the threat actor's infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

Upon execution it installs itself as a cron job, determines the public ip for the host and then begins to beacon via DNS queries to its C2 server.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

Currently, this Emotet sample receives three commands from the C&C server: Command ID 01: Downloads an executable file and executes it ... Command ID 03: Downloads a module/plugin, loads it and calls to its main function

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

While active, Trickbot malware, which acted as an initial intrusion vector into victim computer systems, was used to support various ransomware variants, including Conti.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

181 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
160 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
10 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
11 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
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What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching181

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution19

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping37

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.