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Wizard Spider is a Russia-linked financially motivated cybercrime group best known for operating or closely associating with the TrickBot ecosystem and for large-scale ransomware intrusions. The group has been tracked under numerous aliases including TrickBot Gang, Grim Spider, GOLD BLACKBURN, GOLD ULRICK, ITG23, TEMP.MixMaster, UNC1878, UNC2053, DEV-0193, DEV-0237, FIN12, Periwinkle Tempest, Pistachio Tempest, and Storm-0230. It has been associated with the deployment of Ryuk from 2018 until early 2021 and Conti from early 2020, and later fragmentation of the Conti/ITG23 ecosystem was linked to new criminal relationships and reuse of shared crypter infrastructure across other malware operations. Wizard Spider is characterized by enterprise-scale ransomware operations and broader malware delivery activity. Reported initial access and delivery methods include spearphishing attachments carrying malicious Office documents, PDFs, and macro-enabled lures used to deliver malware such as Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, and Bazar. The group has used PowerShell extensively for payload retrieval, command execution, and lateral movement. Persistence tradecraft includes scheduled tasks as well as Registry Run keys and Startup-folder mechanisms. Credential access activity includes enabling WDigest plaintext credential caching to facilitate credential theft. Post-compromise, Wizard Spider has conducted host and network reconnaissance using native commands and utilities. Observed behaviors include collecting system configuration details, identifying the current user and privileges, enumerating mapped or shared network resources, and gathering local network configuration. The group has also used AdFind for directory reconnaissance. Additional tradecraft associated with Wizard Spider includes malicious DLL injection into memory and use of HTTP for command-and-control or other network communications. The actor's operations are primarily criminal and profit-driven, with ransomware and related intrusion activity forming the core of its known behavior.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
53 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
24 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
19 additional families tracked in Mallory.
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
To quickly gain Windows domain admin credentials, Carmakal told BleepingComputer that the group had been seen using the Windows ZeroLogon vulnerability. For this reason, users must install necessary patches on all Windows servers.
DEV-0193 infrastructure has also been implicated in attacks deploying novel techniques, including exploitation of CVE-2021-40444.
De plus, grâce à des liens d’infrastructure, l’ANSSI a pu rattacher au même MOA plusieurs exploitations de la vulnérabilité ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41080 et CVE-2022-41082) ayant mené au déploiement de Play.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as Eternal Blue, during operations.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
611 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cybercrime group observed using Conti and Ryuk ransomware, with a noted focus on healthcare targets.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Named cybercriminal group linked in the article to Vitaly Kovalev.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the generic discovery technique of running the Linux id command.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.