Loading threat actor…
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based threat group associated with TrickBot and the Conti/Ryuk threat ecosystem. Tracking names include TrickBot Gang, GOLD BLACKBURN, GOLD ULRICK, ITG23, Periwinkle Tempest, DEV-0193, Storm-0230, TEMP.MixMaster, UNC1878, UNC2053, Grim Spider, and Conti Team 1; its MITRE ATT&CK designation is G0102. Its operations have affected organizations across North America, Europe, Asia, and Oceania. The group gains initial access through stolen credentials used to authenticate to corporate VPNs and through phishing. Delivery mechanisms include links to attacker-controlled documents hosted on Google Drive or other free file-hosting services, macro-enabled Microsoft Office attachments, and PDFs containing malicious links. These campaigns have delivered Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, and Bazar. Wizard Spider establishes persistence using Windows services and scheduled tasks, including service-based installation of TrickBot. Within compromised environments, Wizard Spider enumerates domain computers and domain controllers using AdFind, Nltest, and network-discovery components, and searches for financial and point-of-sale indicators. It steals credentials from exported Active Directory databases and performs Kerberoasting using Rubeus, Mimikatz, and Invoke-Kerberoast. Privileged accounts support access to domain controllers, internal tool transfer, and lateral movement through RDP. The group has exploited or attempted to exploit Zerologon, CVE-2020-1472, and EternalBlue vulnerabilities addressed by MS17-010. Its post-exploitation toolkit includes Metasploit, Empire, and Mimikatz. Execution and defense-evasion techniques include Windows command-shell use, Base64-obfuscated PowerShell commands and Empire services, and malicious DLL injection into executable memory.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
64 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
27 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
22 additional families tracked in Mallory.
17 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 17 of them exploited in the wild.
Dragonfly has exploited a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers. Earth Lusca, FIN7, menuPass, MuddyWater, and Wizard Spider are also associated with its exploitation or attempted exploitation.
InvisiMole can spread within a network via EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144). Emotet, Lucifer, NotPetya, PoshC2, TrickBot, Tonto Team, and Wizard Spider are also explicitly linked to EternalBlue; Threat Group-3390 exploited MS17-010.
DEV-0193 infrastructure has also been implicated in attacks deploying novel techniques, including exploitation of CVE-2021-40444.
De plus, grâce à des liens d’infrastructure, l’ANSSI a pu rattacher au même MOA plusieurs exploitations de la vulnérabilité ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41080 et CVE-2022-41082) ayant mené au déploiement de Play.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
12 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
615 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Wizard Spider is listed in the Annotations section of the Windows AD Computer SPN Modified By User Account detection.
Operated the Ryuk ransomware-as-a-service operation, which compromised organizations including hospitals, encrypted victim data for Bitcoin ransoms, and generated substantial ransom revenue before shutting down in 2020.
The cybercrime gang behind the Ryuk ransomware operation; after Ryuk shut down in 2020, it transitioned to Conti ransomware.
Listed only in technique annotations. The content does not attribute ResetNightmare exploitation or a specific campaign to this group.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.