FIN7 is a prolific financially motivated cybercrime group known for long-running intrusion activity against businesses worldwide. The group is widely tracked under aliases including Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, FIN_7, Gold Niagara, ITG14, and Sangria Tempest. FIN7 has historically specialized in phishing-led enterprise compromise and has expanded its tooling and operations over time to include broader malware delivery, post-compromise collection, and ransomware deployment. FIN7 commonly gains initial access through spearphishing emails carrying malicious Microsoft Office or RTF attachments and has also used look-alike domains in phishing campaigns. Its execution tradecraft includes extensive abuse of PowerShell, Visual Basic scripting, JavaScript/JScript, Windows command shell activity, and mshta for proxy execution of malicious code. The group has used hidden or obfuscated script delivery methods, including concealing PowerShell commands in text files and launching shellcode that retrieves follow-on payloads. The group is associated with modular, multi-stage intrusion chains in which compromised systems download additional malware for execution. FIN7 has used or been linked to a range of malware and loaders, including information stealers, backdoors, and downloaders, and has developed malware for operational use itself, including infected removable media. It has also been associated with screenshot capture and desktop video recording from victim systems, indicating hands-on collection and operator surveillance during intrusions. For persistence, FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks, Registry Run and RunOnce entries, and Startup folder items. The group has also used reconnaissance tooling such as AdFind for directory and Active Directory enumeration. Reported behaviors further include command execution on victim hosts, collection of files and other sensitive information, and exfiltration of data from compromised networks. Some FIN7 malware families have supported fallback command-and-control mechanisms such as DNS when primary channels fail. FIN7 has broadened its criminal ecosystem relationships over time, including use of malware obtained from or associated with external developers and affiliates. More recent reporting indicates the group added ransomware to its arsenal, reflecting an evolution from intrusion-and-theft operations toward extortion-oriented activity. FIN7 is best understood as a mature, adaptable cybercrime actor with strong malware development capability, durable phishing tradecraft, and broad post-exploitation proficiency.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
51 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
52 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
47 additional families tracked in Mallory.
12 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 12 of them exploited in the wild.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
CVE-2019-0604, a critical vulnerability opening unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers to attack, is being exploited by attackers to install a web shell... A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SharePoint when the software fails to check the source markup of an application package...
7 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
357 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Referenced as another distribution cluster using fake software sites and Google Ads, not the main subject of the report.
Mentioned as one of several groups linked through Cobalt Strike watermark analysis on BitLaunch infrastructure.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.