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FIN7 is a financially motivated cybercrime group active since at least 2012, also tracked as Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14, Sangria Tempest, and MITRE ATT&CK G0046. It has targeted financial services, retail, hospitality, technology, consulting, transportation, medical equipment, media, food and beverage, and utilities organizations. Its historical operations focused on stealing payment-card data from point-of-sale systems and account information from network databases for fraud. The group subsequently expanded into ransomware-based extortion, including deployment of DarkSide against VMware ESXi virtual disks and Clop ransomware. FIN7 is associated with Carbanak malware, but that malware is not exclusive to the group, and the Carbanak label is not a reliable one-to-one actor identifier. FIN7 conducts sophisticated spearphishing using malicious Office and RTF attachments and malicious links. Operators have impersonated dissatisfied customers, sustained conversations with customer-service personnel, and escalated fabricated complaints to supervisors to induce malware execution. The group uses publicly available business information for target selection and tracking pixels to identify recipients who open documents. Its tooling includes Griffon, SQLRat, DNSBot, Bateleur, Carbanak, JSSLoader, and Lizar, also known as DICELOADER or Tirion. POWERTRASH has been used to load Lizar during ransomware operations. Post-compromise techniques include administrative credential harvesting, Kerberoasting, exploitation of Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472), process injection, and lateral movement through RDP, OpenSSH, and Impacket. FIN7 establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, Windows services, and startup mechanisms. It obscures commands using fragmented strings, environment variables, standard input, and native character replacement. The group has used fake security companies, including Combi Security and Bastion Secure, as recruitment and operational fronts, and has received compromised-system access from Storm-0324 for subsequent ransomware attacks.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
67 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
55 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
50 additional families tracked in Mallory.
14 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 14 of them exploited in the wild.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
A recently patched, high-severity vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2019-0604) that allows remote code-execution is being increasingly exploited in the wild, according to researchers – possibly by the FIN7 group, among others.
Dragonfly has exploited a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers. Earth Lusca, FIN7, menuPass, MuddyWater, and Wizard Spider are also associated with its exploitation or attempted exploitation.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.
9 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
393 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
FIN7 is listed in the Annotations section of the Windows AD Computer SPN Modified By User Account detection.
Annotation-only mention; no actor-specific operation or behavior is described.
FIN7 is listed in the detection's annotations.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.