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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 5 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Lizar

Also known asIcebotTirion

DiceLoader, also known as Lizar and IceBot (with Tirion listed as an alias), is a FIN7-associated minimal backdoor used to establish an encrypted command-and-control channel and load shellcode modules directly in memory. The content describes it as part of FIN7’s arsenal and notes that FIN7 used the POWERTRASH PowerShell-based in-memory loader to deploy payloads such as DiceLoader, including in intrusions supporting exploitation, lateral movement, and persistence. SentinelOne reporting in the content states that DiceLoader version 2.0 emerged in Q1 2021 as an evolution and replacement for FIN7’s historical Carbanak private C2 framework.

Capabilities directly mentioned in the content include collecting the username from the infected system, collecting usernames and passwords stored in browsers, retrieving browser history and browser database files, taking JPEG screenshots, migrating the loader into another process, using PowerShell scripts, and encrypting data before sending it to the server. The malware supports encrypted client-server communications.

The malware is associated primarily with FIN7, a financially motivated threat group. The content also states that Lizar was deployed on compromised devices in activity that enabled threat actors to gain a foothold in targeted networks and move laterally before deploying Clop ransomware. Separately, FBI/CISA reporting cited in the content identified download and execution of DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacon during exploitation of CVE-2023-27350 in PaperCut MF/NG environments, though the stage at which DiceLoader was executed was unclear.

High-confidence infrastructure and delivery details in the content include FIN7 staging URLs observed delivering POWERTRASH loaders for Core Impact and DiceLoader, specifically hxxp://45.87.154[.]208/icsnd3b_64refl.ps1 for DiceLoader, and a FIN7-attributed staging server exposing an open directory hosting POWERTRASH loaders and related tooling.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-27350Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass and RCE in PaperCut MF/NGExploited in the wild

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to the active exploitation of CVE-2023-27350. This vulnerability occurs in certain versions of PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF and enables an unauthenticated actor to execute malicious code remotely without credentials. | The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons, although it is unclear at which stage in the attack these tools were executed.

via cisacisa.gov
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN7

Diceloader, aka Lizar and IceBot, is a minimal backdoor that enables the attacker to establish a C2 channel.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Bl00dy Ransomware Gang

The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons, although it is unclear at which stage in the attack these tools were executed.

via cisacisa.gov
WIZARD SPIDER

...new malware strains such as ... DICELOADER ...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Lace Tempest

...deploy the Lizar post-exploitation tool on compromised devices. This allowed the threat actors to gain a foothold within the targeted network and move laterally to deploy Clop ransomware...

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
FIN11

...deploy the Lizar post-exploitation tool on compromised devices. This allowed the threat actors to gain a foothold within the targeted network and move laterally to deploy Clop ransomware...

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

CVE-2023-27350 allows a remote actor to bypass authentication and conduct remote code execution on the affected installations of PaperCut... malicious actors exploited CVE-2023-27350 beginning in mid-April 2023.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

Insikt Group discovered a custom PowerShell loader named PowerNet, which decompresses and executes NetSupport RAT.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Powertrash, a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script, is designed to reflectively load an embedded PE file in-memory... The payload is not designed to be dropped directly on the disk and is compiled with the ReflectiveLoader implementation to allow in-memory reflective loading.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Multiple actors and tools are described as using Mimikatz/Windows Credential Editor/LaZagne/ProcDump to “dump credentials,” often by targeting LSASS memory (e.g., “used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials,” “dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function,” “injecting itself into lsass.exe”).

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1
T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence2

APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

"AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration."; "APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents..."; "Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data..."; "Cadelspy...compress stolen data into a .cab file."; "Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives."; "FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration."; "Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR...archive specified directories in .zip format"; "XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders..."

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons... Associated with TrueBot C2... Associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The PowerShell droppers employed in these campaigns deliver Powertrash loaders from staging servers... These Powertrash loaders allow the group to gain control over compromised victim systems by loading a backdoor payload.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… MacMa has used TLS encryption… Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications…”

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

81 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
61 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
19 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching81

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.