Attackers widely exploited CVE-2003-0352, a critical buffer overflow in the Windows RPC DCOM interface that allows remote code execution through malformed messages. The flaw affects Windows NT 4.0, 2000, XP, and Server 2003. SANS Internet Storm Center reported that more than one-quarter of its sensors had detected scanning for the vulnerability in August 2003, with multiple easy-to-use exploits attacking systems. An in-the-wild Trojan/IRC bot identified as Backdoor.IRC.Cirebot also exploited the flaw to recruit compromised machines; Check Point subsequently documented exploitation by worms including Blaster/MSblast/LovSAN and Nachi/Welchia.
Microsoft released a patch on July 16, 2003, under bulletin MS03-026. SANS urged prompt patching, supplementary firewall restrictions, and disabling DCOM where feasible, and supplied four Snort detection rules. Check Point classified the vulnerability as critical and documented a Blaster Attacks IPS protection that blocks DCE-RPC requests matching specified operation numbers and byte patterns, with activation guidance and attack-blocking logs for several Security Gateway versions. Organizations retaining affected legacy systems should prioritize remediation or isolation and use network detection and blocking as supplementary controls, not substitutes for patching.

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6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On July 16, 2003, Microsoft made a patch available for CAN-2003-0352, now CVE-2003-0352, addressed by security bulletin MS03-026. The vulnerability allows remote code execution through malformed RPC messages.
On September 7, 2007, Check Point published an advisory classifying CVE-2003-0352 as critical and describing its Blaster Attacks IPS protection. The advisory detailed DCE-RPC request-matching conditions used to block attacks and provided protection activation instructions.
Check Point identified Blaster, also listed as MSblast and LovSAN, and Nachi, also known as Welchia, as worms that exploited the RPC DCOM vulnerability.
An update to the SANS advisory reported an in-the-wild Trojan/IRC bot exploiting the vulnerability to recruit systems. The update linked to Symantec's Backdoor.IRC.Cirebot entry as its reference.
The Internet Storm Center reported that more than one-quarter of its participating sensors had detected scanning for the vulnerability. Its advisory also supplied four Snort rules for detecting suspicious DCERPC bind attempts on TCP ports 135 and 445.
Attackers refined and released multiple exploits during the two weeks preceding the SANS advisory. The advisory described the exploits as easy to use and already deployed against numerous systems.
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