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Three phishing-as-a-service platforms—Sneaky 2FA, EvilTokens, and EvilProxy—are targeting U.S. organizations to steal Microsoft 365 credentials and authenticated access by capturing session cookies or OAuth tokens after users complete legitimate sign-ins. The kits use different methods, including adversary-in-the-middle session hijacking, abuse of Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow, and reverse-proxy credential relay, allowing attackers to gain access without breaking MFA cryptographically. Researchers said EvilTokens, which emerged in 2026, has already been linked to compromises at more than 340 Microsoft 365 organizations across at least seven countries, while EvilProxy has been used in campaigns against executives and managers at more than 100 organizations.
The campaigns show that standard MFA does not stop phishing when attackers steal the resulting authenticated session artifact instead of the password alone. Sneaky 2FA reportedly uses CAPTCHA gates, IP filtering, and cloned Microsoft login pages to evade detection, while the broader activity has created detection opportunities around impossible device-shift patterns, anomalous token use, and suspicious device-code prompts. Defenders are being urged to deploy phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2/WebAuthn, restrict or disable unnecessary device-code authentication in Entra ID, and closely monitor Microsoft 365 environments for unexpected MFA prompts and token abuse.
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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
EvilTokens emerged around mid-February 2026, abusing Microsoft's OAuth device authorization flow to obtain access and refresh tokens from victims who complete legitimate sign-in and MFA.
Push Security and Sekoia reportedly observed a sharp increase in device-code phishing during 2026 and linked multiple EvilTokens backend IPs used for token replay to Railway-hosted infrastructure.
Okta's Threat Intelligence team said an EvilProxy campaign active since at least March 2025 is tracked as threat actor O-TA-041.
Sekoia's Threat Detection & Research team first identified the Sneaky 2FA phishing-as-a-service kit in December 2024.
Campaign activity associated with the Sneaky 2FA phishing kit was traced back to October 2024, indicating the platform was in use before its public identification.
In August 2023, Proofpoint and Menlo Security tracked an EvilProxy campaign targeting C-level executives and managers at more than 100 organizations globally.
EvilProxy has operated since May 2022 as a long-running commercial adversary-in-the-middle phishing service, marketed on dark-web forums.
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A wave of sophisticated phishing campaigns is targeting organizations globally to steal Microsoft 365 credentials by bypassing traditional email security gateways and multi-factor authentication (MFA) protections. Attackers are employing advanced techniques such as multi-stage payload delivery using nested PDF attachments, legitimate content delivery networks, and mouse tracking to evade detection. Once victims interact with these emails and enter their credentials on a credential harvesting site, attackers leverage legitimate Microsoft infrastructure to bypass MFA and gain immediate access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment. These campaigns are engineered to filter out security analysts and block standard security tools, making detection and response more challenging. In parallel, threat actors are increasingly using attacker-in-the-middle toolkits like Evilginx and hybrid phishing-as-a-service kits such as Salty2FA and Tycoon2FA to capture both user credentials and session cookies. By stealing session cookies, attackers can impersonate users and maintain access without triggering additional MFA prompts, even after successful authentication. The blending of different phishing kits into hybrid strains is making detection harder, as traditional security rules tuned to individual kits are now being evaded. Security researchers warn that static indicators are no longer sufficient, and behavioral analysis is required to spot these evolving threats.
Jun 29, 2026
Active phishing campaigns are using the **Jalisco** and **OmegaLord** kits to compromise Microsoft 365 accounts with techniques designed to bypass or weaken multi-factor authentication. According to ReliaQuest, Jalisco abuses the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow by generating fresh Microsoft device codes in real time and tricking victims into authorizing attacker-controlled devices, allowing attackers to obtain OAuth tokens without directly stealing passwords. OmegaLord uses a fake PDF reader login page to harvest credentials and victims’ phone numbers, which may help attackers intercept or manipulate MFA challenges. After gaining access, attackers have been observed moving quickly through SharePoint and other SaaS platforms to locate and exfiltrate sensitive data, sometimes within minutes, and may follow with extortion threats. ReliaQuest also reported that threat actors register multiple devices to compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to preserve access and refresh tokens even after password resets, reflecting a broader surge in phishing-as-a-service activity tied to platforms including **EvilTokens**, **Kali365**, **Tycoon2FA**, **Venom**, and **Darcula**. Defenders are being urged to reduce Entra ID device-registration limits, disable or restrict device code authentication through Conditional Access or Okta where not needed, and audit unnecessary app registrations.
Jul 23, 2026
Adversary-in-the-middle (**AiTM**) phishing continues to undermine traditional MFA by proxying legitimate Microsoft sign-in flows in real time, allowing attackers to capture not only passwords but also **session tokens** and MFA responses. One investigation described how sophisticated redirect infrastructure (e.g., unusually deep redirect chains) can place the final phishing content beyond the reach of many email security scanners, and how **one-time URL tokens** can prevent defenders from reproducing the full chain after the fact—making *in-the-moment* evidence collection critical. The same analysis emphasized that **phishing-resistant MFA** (e.g., **FIDO2/passkeys**) is a more effective control because hardware-bound credentials cannot be relayed through a proxy. Operationally, defenders are being pushed to treat modern phishing as an infrastructure and workflow problem, not just a user-awareness issue: attackers increasingly use HTTPS, branded lookalike pages/domains, redirects, and short-lived links to evade detection, including **QR phishing** (codes embedded in PDFs that bypass URL scanning). Additional pressure tactics like **MFA fatigue** (push-spam) remain effective against push-based MFA, with mitigations including number matching, contextual prompts (e.g., location), and monitoring for abnormal push rates. For earlier detection of AiTM activity, one proposed tripwire is embedding **Canary Tokens** in Microsoft Entra ID tenant branding (e.g., custom CSS) to alert when an AiTM proxy loads the login page, while noting this is not universally reliable across all kits.
Jun 29, 2026