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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Code analysis of this backdoor showed considerable similarities with previously documented backdoors dubbed “Dllshellexc2007” and “Dllshellexc2010”, which were discovered by TrendMicro in their Operation Iron Tiger report.
Code analysis of this backdoor showed considerable similarities with previously documented backdoors dubbed “Dllshellexc2007” and “Dllshellexc2010”, which were discovered by TrendMicro in their Operation Iron Tiger report.
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A custom .NET OWA backdoor family referenced for similarity. It harvests OWA credentials and supports web-shell-like functions such as command execution and file operations.
Custom .NET OWA/Exchange backdoor family referenced for code/functional similarity; supports credential theft from OWA logins and web-shell-like command execution and file transfer.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.