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APT27, also tracked as Group-3390 and Emissary Panda, is a Chinese state-aligned cyber espionage threat actor. It has been associated with long-running intrusion activity focused on intelligence collection and persistent access to victim networks. The actor is widely linked to operations such as Iron Tiger and is known for targeting enterprise infrastructure to obtain credentials, maintain covert access, and support follow-on collection. The supplied reporting links Group-3390 with low-to-moderate confidence to a telecom-focused intrusion cluster active from at least 2017 through 2021 in Southeast Asia and ASEAN environments. In that activity, the actor was associated with a custom Outlook Web Access backdoor deployed on Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers. The backdoor was designed to harvest OWA credentials and also provided webshell-like command execution and data theft functionality, indicating a blend of credential access, persistence, and post-compromise remote control. The code reportedly shared similarities with backdoors previously observed in Iron Tiger operations attributed to APT27. Based on the available facts, this actor’s observed tradecraft in the referenced activity includes initial access through exploitation of exposed enterprise messaging infrastructure, credential theft through server-side credential harvesting, persistence on internet-facing servers, and post-exploitation access enabling command execution and exfiltration. The operational objective in the broader campaign context was cyber espionage against telecommunications providers, including access to sensitive communications-related data and user credentials, consistent with Chinese state interests.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
10 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Likely linked to a credential-harvesting OWA backdoor campaign against Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers at telecom targets, enabling stealthy access, command execution, and data exfiltration for espionage purposes.
Assessed (low-to-moderate confidence) to be linked to a custom OWA/Exchange .NET backdoor used for credential theft and webshell-like post-exploitation, consistent with Iron Tiger-era tooling.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.