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APT27 is a China-based cyberespionage threat actor also known as Threat Group-3390, TG-3390, Emissary Panda, LuckyMouse, Bronze Union, and Iron Tiger. Associated tracking names include Earth Smilodon, Iron Taurus, and DEV-0322. Its targets include government entities, defense-related organizations, information technology companies, higher education institutions, and consulting firms. Its espionage operations have affected government networks in Central Asia and the Middle East, and it was associated with the 2016 compromise of the International Civil Aviation Organization. APT27 combines exploitation of internet-facing services with credential theft, persistent server implants, and lateral movement. It exploited Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerabilities before patches were released in March 2021. Activity tracked as DEV-0322 exploited CVE-2021-40539 in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus and was previously linked to exploitation of a SolarWinds Serv-U zero-day. Within compromised networks, the actor has exploited vulnerabilities addressed by MS17-010 for lateral movement and CVE-2014-6324 for privilege escalation. Its tooling includes the SysUpdate modular backdoor, also known as Soldier, and web shells such as ASPXTool, OwaAuth, and ReGeorg variants. It establishes persistence through Windows services, IIS modules, and Exchange server implants. Credential acquisition includes domain-controller credential dumping, Mimikatz and its modified Wrapikatz variant, and interception of authentication credentials by malicious IIS modules. Stolen accounts and recovered VPN profiles support lateral movement and attempts to regain access after eviction. The actor performs network discovery using Windows enumeration commands and NBTscan, and uses Impacket and other publicly available utilities for post-compromise operations. Its malware employs XOR encoding, Metasploit's shikata_ga_nai encoder, and LZNT1 compression to conceal executable code. Additional tooling includes Zebracon, which receives commands through an actor-controlled mailbox on Zimbra email infrastructure.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
50 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
45 additional families tracked in Mallory.
23 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 23 of them exploited in the wild.
Once these cryptographic secrets are retrieved, they can craft fully valid and signed __VIEWSTATE payloads. | Deserialization of untrusted data in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. Microsoft is aware that an exploit for CVE-2025-53770 exists in the wild.
Microsoft was spurred to release out-of-band patches for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
Microsoft was spurred to release out-of-band patches for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
Microsoft was spurred to release out-of-band patches for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
Microsoft was spurred to release out-of-band patches for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
18 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
488 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Chinese state-sponsored group mentioned as having exploited ToolShell zero-days before public disclosure; it is background context rather than the focus of this report.
Listed in the detection's technique annotations; the content does not attribute ShieldCrash exploitation to this group.
Identified as a group that has deployed Noodle RAT, a cross-platform remote-access trojan. The content does not specify Iron Tiger's individual campaigns, victims, sponsorship or initial-access methods.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.