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APT27 is a China-linked espionage threat actor tracked under numerous aliases including Emissary Panda, LuckyMouse, Iron Tiger, Bronze Union, Circle Typhoon, Linen Typhoon, Earth Smilodon, Red Phoenix, UNC215, and Threat Group-3390. The group is associated with long-running cyber espionage activity and is known for targeting enterprise and government environments, including Microsoft Exchange servers. Observed tradecraft includes extensive use of PowerShell and command-line execution for payload delivery and post-compromise activity; DLL side-loading through legitimate software to launch malicious code; registry-based persistence via autorun locations; network reconnaissance using utilities such as NBTscan to identify vulnerable systems; user and account discovery using commands such as whoami; collection and archiving of files of interest from victim directories; deletion of logs and other artifacts to hinder investigation; and exfiltration of staged data. The group has also deployed credential-logging capability on Exchange servers and used ScanBox for keystroke capture. The actor demonstrates a mature post-exploitation workflow centered on stealthy execution, persistence, reconnaissance, credential collection, and data theft. Reported procedures include regaining access to victim networks and then staging additional tools for credential access and follow-on operations. The overall pattern is consistent with a state-aligned intrusion set focused primarily on intelligence collection rather than disruptive or financially motivated operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
68 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
55 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
50 additional families tracked in Mallory.
30 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 30 of them exploited in the wild.
On March, 4th of 2021, APT27 exploited ProxyLogon vulnerabilities chain affecting Microsoft Exchange server to gain initial access of the targeted organisation’s network... DEVCORE Team discovered both CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065. The exploitation of these two vulnerabilities leads to remote code execution with SYSTEM permissions, allowing attackers to drop webshells, for instance.
On July 19, 2025, security researchers and enterprise defenders began tracking a large-scale exploitation campaign targeting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Servers (CVE-2025-53770). On July 19th, Microsoft confirmed that a zero day vulnerability impacting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Servers, dubbed “ToolShell”. CVE-2025-53770 has been added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on July 20, 2025.
CVE-2025-53771 : Type: Input Validation / Path Traversal Used to overwrite or plant files in sensitive directories, aiding persistence.
In April 2019, a threat actor compromised several SharePoint servers in the customer's environment by exploiting SharePoint remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2019-0604.
DEVCORE Team discovered both CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065. The exploitation of these two vulnerabilities leads to remote code execution with SYSTEM permissions, allowing attackers to drop webshells, for instance.
25 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
479 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the generic installation exploitation analytic, but no campaign-specific activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Mentioned only as historical comparison for a similar exposed-directory toolset.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.