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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 14 actors

ProcDump

ProcDump is a legitimate Microsoft Sysinternals memory-dump utility that is widely abused by threat actors for credential access and related post-exploitation activity. Across the provided reporting, its most common malicious use is dumping the memory of lsass.exe to obtain credentials, hashes, tickets, and other secrets for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and follow-on compromise. Reported command lines include variants such as "procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp", "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\p.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\ProgramData\xxx.zip", and "procdump64.exe -ma lsass.exe". Actors frequently rename the binary to evade detection, with observed names including pr.exe, pr64.exe, mpms.exe, and p.exe, and one report cited placement as c:\windows\system32\prc64.exe.

The content also documents ProcDump being used beyond LSASS dumping. In one ToddyCat case, attackers used Sysinternals ProcDump to dump the running Outlook process to extract Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens after browser-based token theft was blocked. The tool is repeatedly described as part of broader hands-on-keyboard intrusions and ransomware or espionage operations.

Threat actors and groups explicitly associated with ProcDump use in the content include Kimsuky, APT33, APT39, FIN13, Elephant Beetle, PARINACOTA, Lazarus/Andariel-related activity, ToddyCat, FamousSparrow, and operators in Everest and other ransomware-linked intrusions. Additional reporting references its use in campaigns involving compromised IIS servers, VMware Horizon exploitation, phishing-led domain compromise, and exploitation of public-facing applications.

Observed victim environments and targets include Windows systems generally, domain controllers, backup servers, IIS web servers in South Korea, finance and commerce organizations in Latin America, telecommunications and travel organizations, energy providers, hotels, government and military networks, and enterprise Microsoft Exchange or Microsoft 365 environments.

Detection-relevant indicators in the content focus on LSASS access and dump creation rather than the tool name alone. Reported telemetry includes Windows Security Event ID 4656 handle requests to \Windows\System32\lsass.exe with suspicious access masks such as 0x1fffff, 0x1010, 0x120089, and 0x1F3FFF; Sysmon Event ID 10 for LSASS access; Sysmon Event ID 11 for creation of lsass*.dmp files; and call traces involving dbghelp. Because ProcDump is a legitimate administrative tool, defenders should expect adversaries to abuse renamed copies and blend usage into normal administration.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

14 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN13

The threat group was observed harvesting credentials on Windows machines by using renamed versions of the ProcDump executable (pr.exe, pr64.exe and more) for dumping the LSASS.exe process memory.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
ToddyCat

„… wechselten die Angreifer zu einem Memory-Dump-Tool (ProcDump von Sysinternals), um die Tokens direkt aus dem laufenden Outlook-Prozess zu extrahieren.“

via cso onlinecsoonline.com
Salt Typhoon

"A small utility that drops ProcDump on disk and uses it to dump the lsass process..."

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
APT33

APT33 has used... ProcDump to dump credentials... FIN13 has obtained memory dumps with ProcDump to parse and extract credentials from a victim's LSASS process memory...

via mitre attackattack.mitre.org
Andariel

...use of ... Mimikatz, Dumpert, and ProcDump...

via cisa alertscisa.gov
Kimsuky

"Kimsuky uses ProcDump... inclusion of ProcDump in the BabyShark malware."

via cisa certus-cert.cisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1588.002ToolEvidence2

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

T1608.002Upload ToolEvidence1

Due to mistakes on the attacker’s side, we managed to retrieve multiple files from Earth Krahang’s servers, including samples, configuration files, and log files from its attack tools.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The JavaScript code pulled down an obfuscated PowerShell script that was run in memory. The PowerShell script was responsible for deploying NetSupport onto the system...

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

the attackers used a fake ChatGPT client application as bait... However, it had no user functionality – when launched, it simply displayed a blank screen.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence16

Among those activities were: Credential harvesting using Procdump, SAM hive dumps and comsvcs MiniDump.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence22

The attackers use this utility to dump the LSASS process memory into the file specified as the last argument... Later, having the LSASS process memory dump, attackers can extract credentials from the compromised device

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

There are several different ways to dump LSASS... Another option is to dump the LSASS process with Task Manager Sekurlsa::minidump can open the dump file.

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actor executed a command to identify the PID of the lsass.exe process. This allowed them to target the correct process to dump lsass.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Next, the threat actor transferred Sysinternals tool Procdump over SMB, to the ProgramData folders on multiple hosts in the environment.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The threat actors also transferred ProcDump from the beachhead to multiple workstations.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Bumblebee dropped a Cobalt Strike beacon named wab.exe on the beachhead host.

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The threat actor checked on the status of Microsoft Defender and then proceeded to disable it.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago
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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution14

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.