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ToddyCat is an advanced persistent threat group engaged primarily in cyber-espionage. The group has been active since at least 2020 and has targeted organizations in Asia and Europe, with confirmed activity against government and government-linked entities and broader interest in cloud-hosted enterprise communications. Known aliases include Storm-0247 and Websiic. ToddyCat is associated with exploitation of public-facing applications for initial access and with stealth-focused post-compromise tradecraft on Windows networks. Observed techniques include PowerShell-based execution, hidden or concealed script execution, security software discovery, extensive host and document discovery, SMB-based lateral movement, remote scheduled task creation, remote service creation, PsExec and WMI-based remote execution, and DLL side-loading to launch custom implants. The group has also used process hollowing and other defense-evasion measures, including masquerading as legitimate security software. For persistence, ToddyCat has used malicious Windows services and scheduled tasks, and it developed a notable persistence technique named Shadow Token via Remote Debug (STRD). STRD abuses OAuth 2.0 authorization flows to obtain durable access to Google Workspace resources by launching a hidden Chromium-based browser with a copied user profile, controlling it through the DevTools remote debugging interface, and silently authorizing a high-privilege OAuth application. This technique enables long-term access to victim mailboxes and other cloud resources without continued dependence on the compromised endpoint and may survive password resets depending on tenant configuration. ToddyCat has deployed custom malware and tooling including a RAT used to download additional tools, the Umbrij malware used to compromise Gmail and broader Google Workspace access through Google APIs, and tooling for collection and exfiltration. Umbrij targets Chrome and Edge profiles, reuses authenticated browser sessions, automates OAuth consent with Puppeteer, and enables covert access to email correspondence and other cloud data. The group has also been linked to theft of Microsoft Outlook email data. Collection and exfiltration behavior includes enumerating recently modified office documents and PDFs, gathering drive metadata, archiving collected data, and exfiltrating material through HTTPS command and control and cloud services such as Dropbox. Overall, ToddyCat is characterized by long-term stealthy espionage, strong operational emphasis on persistence and cloud account access, and continued development of bespoke tooling to bypass endpoint and identity protections.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
53 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
22 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
17 additional families tracked in Mallory.
15 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 15 of them exploited in the wild.
APT41 leveraged vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon exploitation... APT41 exploited CVE-2021-26855 against a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server... Threat Group-3390 ... exploited ... CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server. ToddyCat has exploited the ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855)...
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
Previously, Eset reported that about five APT groups has been exploiting the four Exchange vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
10 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
63 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as one of many threat actors associated with the detection's ATT&CK-style annotations for PowerShell and DNS TXT command-and-control behavior; no specific campaign or activity is described in this reference.
Espionage-focused threat actor using the Shadow Token via Remote Debug (STRD) technique to obtain persistent OAuth 2.0 access to victims’ Google Workspace mailboxes and other resources. The group previously exploited known server-side vulnerabilities and delivered malicious loaders via messengers; in the described attack it used the Umbrij malware to clone browser profiles, launch Chrome/Edge in headless remote-debug mode, automate OAuth consent flows, and steal authorization codes for long-term mailbox access.
Espionage-focused operations using the Shadow Token via Remote Debug (STRD) technique to establish persistent access to victims’ Google Workspace mailboxes via OAuth 2.0 tokens, enabling long-term access that can survive password resets.
Mentioned only as an ATT&CK-associated actor in the annotation list.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.