DragonForce ransomware is a ransomware family operated in a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and used to infiltrate victim networks, encrypt data, and demand ransom; reporting also describes associated data exfiltration and multi-extortion via a leak site (“RansomBay”). It has been reported as deployed by the cybercriminal group Scattered Spider (aka UNC3944/Octo Tempest/Storm-0875/Muddled Libra, among other aliases) in activity covered by a July 29, 2025 joint FBI/CISA/RCMP/ASD-ACSC/AFP/CCCS/NCSC-UK advisory, where Scattered Spider commonly uses sophisticated social engineering (helpdesk/IT impersonation, MFA fatigue/push bombing, SIM swapping) and legitimate remote access/tunneling tools to gain and maintain access before theft/extortion and potential encryption.
Separately, DragonForce is described in vendor reporting (e.g., SentinelOne; Acronis referenced) as having evolved from a LockBit 3.0/Black-style clone into a bespoke encryptor derived from the Conti v3 codebase, using AES and increasingly ChaCha8 for encryption. The operation is described as supporting multiple platforms (Windows, Linux, ESXi, and NAS-focused variants) and offering affiliate customization via a web panel (e.g., file extensions, execution delays, encryption scope/behavior). DragonForce has been reported targeting a wide range of sectors and geographies, including major UK retailers (e.g., Harrods, Marks & Spencer, Co-Op) and other organizations; one account of UK retail intrusions emphasizes initial access via vishing/helpdesk password resets, followed by privilege escalation, defense evasion (disabling EDR/AV), ransomware deployment across endpoints, and exfiltration causing significant operational disruption. Possible links to “The Com” collective are mentioned but described as unconfirmed/inconclusive in the provided content. No specific file hashes, domains, or other concrete IOCs for the ransomware binary itself are provided in the content.
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11 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Researchers said the attackers used a new tool called Havoc Process Terminator to exploit a Huawei audio driver, tracked as HWAudioOs2Ec.sys. They also exploited three documented driver vulnerabilities CVE-2023-52271 in Topaz Antifraud, CVE-2025-61155 in Tower of Fantasy, and CVE-2025-1055 in K7 Security Anti-Malware.
Researchers said the attackers used a new tool called Havoc Process Terminator to exploit a Huawei audio driver, tracked as HWAudioOs2Ec.sys. They also exploited three documented driver vulnerabilities CVE-2023-52271 in Topaz Antifraud, CVE-2025-61155 in Tower of Fantasy, and CVE-2025-1055 in K7 Security Anti-Malware.
Researchers said the attackers used a new tool called Havoc Process Terminator to exploit a Huawei audio driver, tracked as HWAudioOs2Ec.sys. They also exploited three documented driver vulnerabilities CVE-2023-52271 in Topaz Antifraud, CVE-2025-61155 in Tower of Fantasy, and CVE-2025-1055 in K7 Security Anti-Malware.
Sophos MDR investigators believe the attackers exploited a chain of three critical vulnerabilities disclosed in January 2025: CVE-2024-57727 (multiple path traversal vulnerabilities), CVE-2024-57728 (arbitrary file upload vulnerability), and CVE-2024-57726 (privilege escalation vulnerability). ... CVE-2024-57726 enables low-privilege technicians to escalate to administrator roles with excessive permissions.
Sophos MDR investigators believe the attackers exploited a chain of three critical vulnerabilities disclosed in January 2025: CVE-2024-57727 (multiple path traversal vulnerabilities), CVE-2024-57728 (arbitrary file upload vulnerability), and CVE-2024-57726 (privilege escalation vulnerability). ... CVE-2024-57727 allows unauthenticated attackers to download arbitrary files from SimpleHelp hosts, including server configuration files containing secrets and hashed passwords. ... The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2024-57727 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, acknowledging active exploitation and requiring federal agencies to patch by March 6, 2025.
Sophos MDR investigators believe the attackers exploited a chain of three critical vulnerabilities disclosed in January 2025: CVE-2024-57727 (multiple path traversal vulnerabilities), CVE-2024-57728 (arbitrary file upload vulnerability), and CVE-2024-57726 (privilege escalation vulnerability). ... CVE-2024-57728 permits authenticated administrators to upload malicious files anywhere on the system, potentially leading to remote code execution.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities table lists: CVE-2024-21887 – Command Injection Vulnerability – Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure – CVSS 9.1.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities table lists: CVE-2024-21412 – Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability – Microsoft Windows Internet Shortcut Files – CVSS 8.1.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities table lists: CVE-2023-46805 – Authentication Bypass Vulnerability – Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure – CVSS 8.5.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities table lists: CVE-2021-44228 – RCE Vulnerability – Apache Log4j Java Library – CVSS 10.
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities table lists: CVE-2024-21893 – Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Vulnerability – Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons – CVSS 9.1.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Update July 29, 2025: Malware DragonForce Ransomware Use Infiltrates networks, encrypts data, and demands ransom.
33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The Scattered Spider case provides a practical example of the evolution of the cartel model. In multiple high-profile incidents ... intrusion activity attributed to Scattered Spider, characterized by advanced social engineering, helpdesk impersonation, and credential compromise, was followed by the deployment of DragonForce ransomware.
DragonForce’s partnership with such actors is likely driven by Scattered Spider’s known strong capabilities in vishing and social engineering, which enable reliable initial access into targeted organizations, complementing DragonForce’s focus on the downstream stages of the attack lifecycle.
DragonForce’s affiliate panel no longer exposes the vulnerable driver selection option related to BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) techniques ... However, analysis of the generated ransomware binaries shows that the BYOVD-based process termination functionality remains integrated into the binary and continues to operate as part of the default implementation.
CVE-2024-57727 allows unauthenticated attackers to download arbitrary files from SimpleHelp hosts, including server configuration files containing secrets and hashed passwords.
the ransomware compresses some data using the Zlib module and decompresses this specific data during runtime... it conceals some data within the binary inside the overlay
During the ransomware’s initial execution, the ransomware uses dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities.
DragonForce ransomware exists in versions for Windows and Linux (ESXi, NAS, RHEL).
DragonForce incorporates several defense evasion techniques, including anti-forensics parameters like kill_defender , delete_eventlogs , and self_destruct
it calls OpenProcessToken and GetTokenInformation to extract the security details about the running process. Additionally, it calls LookupAccountSidW to resolve the account name associated with the SID
The attacker also used their access through the MSP’s RMM instance to gather information on multiple customer estates managed by the MSP, including collecting device names and configuration, users, and network connections
After the ransomware configures the kill processes list, it looks for processes that are running on the victim’s system and compares them to the list.
The ransomware might determine whether it is executing under a privileged user... used to extract information about privilege levels, user group details, or integrity levels.
The ESXi version additionally implements virtual machine shutdown handling and collects ESXi environment and user information.
Upon execution, it parses command-line arguments and runs as a background daemon when invoked with the “-d” option. It then performs logging, delayed execution, and system information collection before initiating file encryption.
The attacker also used their access through the MSP’s RMM instance to gather information on multiple customer estates managed by the MSP, including collecting device names and configuration, users, and network connections
The ransomware scans the victim’s system for logical drives using GetLogicalDriveStringsW .
The ransomware employs the NetShareEnum function to facilitate lateral movement, expanding its encryption capabilities to network shares and NetBIOS.
Sophos MDR was first alerted when suspicious SimpleHelp installer files were detected being pushed through the legitimate RMM platform.
Following access acquisition, affiliates leverage credential abuse techniques, likely including NTLM and Kerberos-based mechanisms to perform privilege escalation and lateral movement within Active Directory environments, enabling efficient propagation across enterprise networks.
DragonForce employs double extortion tactics to exert maximum pressure on its victims. The ransom note is carefully structured, threatening both the encryption of data and public exposure... In addition, the ransomware encrypts the victim’s files using the symmetric ChaCha20 encryption method
It uses OpenProcess to access the notepad.exe process and then terminates it using TerminateProcess .
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
DragonForce is a ransomware family that evolved from the Conti ransomware-as-a-service model and has formed alliances with other cybercriminal groups.
Custom ransomware variant deployed by the DragonForce group, used to encrypt files and disrupt operations of UK retailers. The ransomware is distributed after initial access is gained through social engineering and privilege escalation, and is believed to be operated under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model.
DragonForce Ransomware is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that began as a LockBit 3.0/Black clone and has since evolved into a bespoke ransomware based on the Conti v3 codebase. It employs multi-extortion tactics, including data leaks and reputational threats, and allows affiliates to customize payloads for various platforms. The group operates the RansomBay leak site and targets a wide range of industries globally.
Ransomware used to encrypt victim data (including VMware ESXi in some incidents) and demand payment; used alongside data theft/extortion tactics.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.