Arbitrary PPL Process Termination in Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys
Topaz Antifraud's signed kernel driver wsftprm.sys version 2.0.0.0 contains a local vulnerability that allows a low-privileged attacker to send a crafted IOCTL to the driver and terminate arbitrary processes, including Protected Process Light (PPL) processes. Based on the provided content, the flaw is exposed through the driver's device control interface and results in privileged kernel-mediated process termination without proper authorization checks. The issue has been described publicly as enabling low-privileged users to kill any PPL process, making it suitable for bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) abuse.
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
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Impact
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Mitigation
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Remediation
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Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small Windows C++ proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2023-52271 targeting the Warsaw driver wsftprm.sys (noted in README as version 2.0.0.0). Structure is minimal: README.md (description/links) and main.cpp (the exploit). main.cpp implements a local, driver-based process-killing tool: it enumerates running processes via Toolhelp32 APIs, matches against a hardcoded list of Microsoft Defender/Windows security process names, and for each match opens the device \\.\Warsaw_PM and sends DeviceIoControl with IOCTL 0x22201C. The input buffer is 1036 bytes with the target PID placed in the first 4 bytes, which is intended to trigger the vulnerable driver behavior to terminate even PPL-protected processes. The program loops once per second until interrupted (CTRL+C), making it suitable for repeatedly killing respawning security services. No network communication is present; the key fingerprintable artifacts are the driver device path (\\.\Warsaw_PM), the IOCTL code (0x22201C), and the targeted process name list.
Affected products & vendors
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Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A specific vulnerable driver referenced as being used in BYOVD activity to help silence security software and support post-compromise operations.
A documented driver vulnerability in Topaz Antifraud that DragonForce attackers exploited as part of BYOVD-based defense evasion to disable security tools.
A specific vulnerable driver issue referenced as being abused in a BYOVD defense-evasion chain to disable security tools at the kernel level during the intrusion.
A vulnerable driver flaw in Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys that was abused as part of BYOVD tactics to gain kernel-level privileges and disable security tools.
The version that knows your environment.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.