BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy is a modular Windows malware family first identified in 2007 that evolved from an HTTP-based DDoS botnet and crimeware toolkit into a backdoor platform used for espionage, credential theft, persistence, and destructive operations. The content describes multiple generations, including BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. BlackEnergy 2 spread mainly through targeted phishing emails and included a plug-in that used WMI to gather victim host details. BlackEnergy 3 was delivered through phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office VBA macros; the macro reconstructed and executed a dropper, which installed the core DLL, persisted via a Startup LNK invoking rundll32.exe, injected into svchost.exe, and periodically spawned iexplore.exe instances that acted as a backdoor. BlackEnergy communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, including HTTP POST requests, and in the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack Sandworm used it to communicate between compromised hosts and C2 servers.
The malware supports multiple post-compromise capabilities through plugins. Reported capabilities include credential theft from web browsers such as Firefox, Google Chrome, and Internet Explorer; theft of credentials stored in files or application stores including The Bat! email client, Outlook, and Windows Credential Store; gathering detailed information about attached USB devices including device instance ID and drive geometry; host reconnaissance; and port scanning. One variant creates a new Windows service using either a hard-coded or randomly generated name. The content also notes anti-forensic behavior, including removal of the TESTSIGNING watermark by modifying strings in user32.dll.mui.
BlackEnergy is strongly associated in the provided content with Sandworm, the Russian GRU-linked threat group also referred to in some reporting as BlackEnergy. It is repeatedly tied to attacks on Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure, especially the energy sector. In the December 2015 Ukraine power grid attack, attackers used spear-phishing against IT environments, harvested credentials, moved via VPN into SCADA environments, and used BlackEnergy alongside the destructive KillDisk component and a telephone denial-of-service attack on the call center; the attack caused the first widely recognized blackout caused by a cyberattack and affected roughly 225,000 customers. The content also states that BlackEnergy was used in destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service from December 2015 through December 2016. Additional reporting in the content links BlackEnergy-based botnets to DDoS activity during the Russo-Georgian war and notes overlap between BlackEnergy activity and later Sandworm-linked operations such as GreyEnergy and Industroyer.
High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include persistence via a Startup shortcut executing rundll32.exe against %APPDATA%\FONTCACHE.DAT, injection into svchost.exe, iexplore.exe launched for C2/backdoor activity, HTTP C2 traffic including POST requests, and use of plugins such as Dropbear SSH backdoor delivery and KillDisk. The malware has been particularly associated with OT and critical infrastructure targeting, especially energy providers in Ukraine.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Analysis of victim system artifacts has determined that the actors have been exploiting a vulnerability in GE’s Cimplicity HMI product since at least January 2012. The vulnerability, CVE-2014-0751, was published in ICS‑CERT advisory ICSA-14-023-01 on January 23, 2014.
...a BlackEnergy-based campaign against a variety of overseas targets leveraging vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 (affecting Microsoft Windows and Windows Server 2008 and 2012). ICS-CERT has not observed the use of this vulnerability to target control system environments.
Groups observed using it
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests.
This group has been behind several cyber-attacks aimed at Ukraine in the past, such as the NotPetya ransomware outbreak, and the BlackEnergy attacks on Ukraine's power grid in 2015 and 2016.
"The malware, known as BlackEnergy, appears to have been used in cyberattacks against Georgia during the Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008 too, but has also been operated by criminals as a means to steal credit card data."
"ICS-CERT has identified a sophisticated malware campaign that has compromised numerous industrial control systems (ICSs) environments using a variant of the BlackEnergy malware... can confirm that a BlackEnergy 3 variant was present in the system."
Techniques & procedures
31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access to victim computers (hacking).
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
The malware can infect a system by exploiting a standard feature in Windows that elevates the user privilege of a system file, allowing execution of the command executable with administrative privilege...
One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish persistence.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access to victim computers (hacking).
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders.
The content repeatedly notes creation of '.lnk shortcut' files in the Startup folder, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut in CSIDL_STARTUP, DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder, and Operation Dream Job placing LNK files into victims' startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
6 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
The malware can infect a system by exploiting a standard feature in Windows that elevates the user privilege of a system file, allowing execution of the command executable with administrative privilege—even if the user is not a member of the administrator group.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders.
The content repeatedly notes creation of '.lnk shortcut' files in the Startup folder, such as BACKSPACE creating a shortcut in CSIDL_STARTUP, DarkGate creating an LNK object in the victim startup folder, and Operation Dream Job placing LNK files into victims' startup folder.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
BlackEnergy has removed the watermark associated with enabling the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.
Malware families such as CrashOverride and BlackEnergy, among others, demonstrate the ability to disrupt physical processes, while living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques allow attackers to blend into normal operations.
One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish persistence.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine. Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from configuration or support files. APT3 has a tool that can locate credentials in files on the file system such as those from Firefox or Chrome.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
BlackEnergy has gathered information about network IP configurations using ipconfig.exe and about routing tables using route.exe.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware performing network scanning, port scanning, service enumeration, OS fingerprinting, and identifying open ports/services across victim environments.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
BlackEnergy has the capability to communicate over a backup channel via plus.google.com.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
According to the indictment, beginning in or around November 2015 and continuing until at least in or around October 2019, the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions ... Their computer attacks used some of the world’s most destructive malware to date, including: KillDisk and Industroyer ... NotPetya ... and Olympic Destroyer
According to a study by Arbor Networks titled “Politically Motivated Distributed Denial of Service Attacks,” the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi was allegedly involved in a DDoS attack against Estonia... The study also found that during the brief Russo-Georgian war, a DDoS attack was launched in sync with Russian tanks from various BlackEnergy-based botnets.
Recent activity
109 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Used in the Ukraine 2015 intrusion chain for initial compromise and credential theft leading to VPN access into SCADA environments and subsequent hands-on-keyboard operations.
Malware associated in the content with the 2015 Ukraine power grid attack that caused a cyber-induced blackout.
Malware family cited as capable of disrupting physical processes in OT environments.
ICS-targeting malware cited as demonstrating the ability to disrupt operations, cause outages, and inflict physical damage.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.