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Gamaredon is a Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage group associated with Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), active since at least 2013. It is also tracked as Actinium, APT-C-53, Aqua Blizzard, Armageddon, BlueAlpha, DEV-0157, Iron Tilden, Primitive Bear, SectorC08, Shuckworm, Trident Ursa, UAC-0010, and UNC530. Its operations primarily target Ukraine, particularly government departments, intelligence and security services, border-security agencies, and military personnel. Other targets include opposition members, journalists, activists, and dissidents. Intelligence theft is its principal documented objective. Gamaredon relies heavily on spearphishing with impersonated senders and government, military, legal, and other topical lures. Delivery mechanisms include malicious Office documents, remote template injection, VBA macros, Windows shortcuts, compressed attachments, and self-extracting archives. Its campaigns have exploited CVE-2017-0199. Multistage infection chains use VBScript, batch scripts, and legitimate Windows utilities to retrieve and execute additional payloads and establish command-and-control access. Scripts and downloaded payloads employ obfuscation, encryption, and Base64 encoding to hinder detection and analysis. The group establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, registry autorun mechanisms, and startup-folder scripts or shortcuts. Its malware collects host identifiers, checks for analysis tools, and modifies Office security settings to enable macros without warnings. Gamaredon has injected malicious macros into Word and Excel documents on mapped network drives to facilitate lateral movement and has abused Outlook macros to mass-mail malicious documents. Its infrastructure practices include frequently changing Dynamic DNS locations and separating template-delivery infrastructure from subsequent-stage delivery systems.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
70 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
49 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
44 additional families tracked in Mallory.
5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.
Gamaredon and UAC-0226 are actively exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a CVSS 8.8 WinRAR path traversal flaw, to place malicious payloads outside the intended RAR extraction directory, including in the Windows Startup folder.
The attachments exploit CVE-2017-0199, a Microsoft Office remote code execution vulnerability in Windows.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):- ... CVE-2025-6218 WinRAR vulnerability used by Gamaredon/Sandworm/RomCom
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
Interestingly, the SSU documented Gamaredon leveraging this same TTP as early as 2018 exploiting CVE-2018-20250.
853 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced only as an annotated actor associated with the detection technique.
Listed in the detection annotation metadata.
Listed only as an annotation associated with the detection.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.