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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 23 actorsExploits 3 CVEs

Babuk

Also known asBabykVasa Locker

Babuk is a ransomware family and ransomware operation that emerged in early 2021 and is also referred to as Babyk, Babuk Locker, Babak, and Vasa Locker. It is a double-extortion ransomware family that has targeted enterprise environments and has variants for Windows, VMware ESXi, and NAS/Linux systems. The Babuk source code and builders were leaked in September 2021, including a C++ ELF ESXi locker, a Go-based NAS locker, and Windows tooling. That leak significantly lowered the barrier to entry for other actors and led to widespread reuse of Babuk code in later ransomware families and campaigns, especially ESXi-targeting lockers, complicating attribution.

Documented Babuk capabilities in the provided content include stopping antivirus services, deleting shadow copies via "vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet", and use of DLL sideloading. One reported technique involved abusing the legitimate NTSD.exe debugger for DLL sideloading to deliver ransomware. Babuk-derived ESXi implementations use the Sosemanuk stream cipher, while Babuk Windows uses HC-128; both use Curve25519-Donna for key generation according to the cited research. Babuk-based ESXi lockers commonly target VMware-centric files and are used to encrypt hypervisor-hosted virtual machine data.

The malware and/or its codebase has been associated in the content with multiple threat actors and campaigns. Babuk was cited as used alongside LockBit 3.0 by groups targeting Russian organizations, including Crypt Ghouls and Head Mare/Twelve-linked activity, with Babuk used on Linux, ESXi, NAS, or other non-Windows systems while LockBit was used on Windows. F.A.C.C.T. reporting also described the Shadow/Comet/DARKSTAR group using Babuk for file encryption. Cisco Talos reported observing Babuk files in a Storm-2603-linked intrusion, although in that case the Babuk component failed to encrypt and only renamed files. U.S. authorities also named Babuk in charges against Mikhail Pavlovich Matveev for alleged participation in conspiracies involving LockBit, Babuk, and Hive.

The content highlights Babuk’s broader ecosystem impact. SentinelLABS identified numerous VMware ESXi ransomware families derived from leaked Babuk code, including variants linked to Play, Mario/Ransom House, Conti POC/Conti ESXi, and additional families such as Cylance ransomware, Dataf Locker, Rorschach/BabLock, Lock4, RTM Locker, and XVGV. Other malware discussed as Babuk-derived or Babuk-based include Astralocker-derived tooling, SEXi’s Linux variant, and EndPoint/Midnight. The leak also influenced later groups such as The Gentlemen, whose developers reportedly reverse engineered Babuk samples along with Qilin, LockBit, and Medusa.

Historically, Babuk attacked the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department in April 2021. The content states that after increased law-enforcement pressure, Babuk claimed to shut down, after which members splintered into other efforts including the RAMP forum and Babuk V2. High-confidence aliases present in the content are Babuk, Babyk, and Vasa Locker.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

3 CVES
CVE-2025-6264Privilege Escalation in Rapid7 Velociraptor Admin.Client.UpdateClientConfig ArtifactExploited in the wild

The version of Velociraptor observed in this incident was outdated (version 0.73.4.0) and exposed to a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2025-6264), which may have been leveraged for persistence as this vulnerability can lead to arbitrary command execution and endpoint takeover.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
CVE-2024-37085VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication Bypass

"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
CVE-2020-1472Zerologon in Microsoft Netlogon Remote ProtocolExploited in the wild

...threat actors have been observed weaponizing a vulnerable version of Bitrix for initial access, followed by using the Zerologon flaw to escalate privileges.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

23 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DARKSTAR

...для шифрования файлов — LockBit 3 (Black) и Babuk...

via anti malwareanti-malware.ru
Shadow

...для шифрования файлов — LockBit 3 (Black) и Babuk...

via anti malwareanti-malware.ru
COMET

...для шифрования файлов — LockBit 3 (Black) и Babuk...

via anti malwareanti-malware.ru
Storm-2603

Talos IR responded to Warlock, Babuk and Kraken ransomware variants for the first time... Notably, we also observed evidence of Babuk ransomware files on the customer’s network in this engagement, which has not been previously deployed by Storm-2603 according to public reporting, though it failed to encrypt and only renamed files.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Head Mare

As in previous attacks, they encrypted data using variants of LockBit 3.0 (for Windows systems) and Babuk (for NAS devices).

via securelistsecurelist.com
Crypt Ghouls

As the final payload, the group used the well-known ransomware LockBit 3.0 and Babuk.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Threat actors predominately exploited public-facing applications for initial access this quarter... Almost 40 percent of all engagements involved ToolShell activity... attackers began actively exploiting two path traversal vulnerabilities affecting on-premises SharePoint servers... resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

... разработчики The Gentlemen систематически реверсят семплы Babuk, Qilin, LockBit 5.0 и Medusa, вытаскивая ... техники обфускации (T1027) ...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The deception is deliberate, designed to mislead victims and possibly even seasoned investigators into misidentifying the actual threat actor behind the attack.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...create Linux encryptors targeting VMware ESXi servers.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...create Linux encryptors targeting VMware ESXi servers.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Additionally, attackers targeted ESXi servers with the Babuk ransomware. They would connect to the ESXi server via SSH, upload Babuk, and initiate the encryption process.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The police documents were stolen and published by the ransomware attack group Babuk...

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence2

The hackers from the Babuk group subsequently published those documents online, and transparency group Distributed Denial of Secrets redistributed them to news outlets including the Guardian.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The Babuk (aka Babyk and Babuk Locker) ransomware operation surfaced at the beginning of 2021 by targeting businesses in double-extortion attacks.

Impact

5 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence22

running its ransomware payload there to directly encrypt the virtual disk images on the nodes

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Examples include Babuk 'can stop anti-virus services', BOLDMOVE disabling daemons, Conficker terminating services, Lazarus malware disabling Windows services, and SolarWinds Compromise where APT29 'used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products.'

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

These groups focus on ESXi before other Linux variants, leveraging built-in tools for the ESXi hypervisor to kill guest machines, then encrypt crucial hypervisor files.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence3

The group claimed to have stolen over 250 GB of data from police servers and threatened to expose the information if the department didn’t pay a ransom.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution23

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities3

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping19

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.