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CVE-2026-59310 is a directory traversal vulnerability in the Syslog server component of VMware vCenter Server. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an affected vCenter instance can exploit path traversal to execute arbitrary code without user interaction. Unauthorized reading or writing of files outside the permitted Syslog directory is also reported, although the precise file-access mechanism is less firmly established. Affected release branches include vCenter 8.0, 9.0, and 9.1, including related VMware platform deployments incorporating vulnerable vCenter instances.
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3 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
VC-Strike is a 31-file, standard-library-only Python 3.8+ VMware vCenter penetration-testing suite with CLI and Tkinter GUI entry points (`vc-strike.py`, `vc-strike-gui.py`, and `python -m vcstrike`). It implements two network exploits: CVE-2026-59310, which abuses RFC5424 syslog fields and unsafe rsyslog dynamic path templates to write files as root and inject a root cron job; and CVE-2026-59309, which exploits missing SRP public-value validation in vmdird's Cyrus SASL SRP implementation by submitting A=N and forging authentication evidence. The former supports non-destructive write checks, arbitrary file writes, VAMI readback-based RCE, reverse shells, and a ProcessBuilder JSP webshell. The latter supports rootDSE/SRP discovery, post-bypass LDAP search/add/modify operations, user and administrator-group enumeration, SSO administrator creation, and password resets. Core implementation is in `syslog59310.py`, `srp59309.py`, `berldap.py`, `c2.py`, `recon.py`, and `postex.py`; it includes pure-Python AES-128-OFB and BER/LDAP implementations, offline self-tests, and unit tests. C2 functionality manages multiport listeners and reverse-shell sessions, interactive command execution, and base64-based file transfers. Documentation and `data.py` also provide cleanup instructions, IOCs, version checks, network restrictions, and rsyslog hardening guidance. No hard-coded victim infrastructure is present; target hosts and reverse-shell listener addresses are operator supplied.
This three-file repository contains one standalone Python 3 exploit (`cve-2026-59310.py`) and English/Chinese documentation. It is not a Metasploit, Nuclei, or other framework module. The script delivers crafted RFC5424 syslog records to a vCenter syslog service, exploiting traversal in a dynamic rsyslog APP-NAME log-path template. It supports `check`, `exec`, `shell`, and `cleanup` subcommands. Check writes a marker under /tmp; exec writes a one-shot /etc/cron.d job to execute an operator-provided command as root and capture output; shell plants a root reverse shell with PTY support; cleanup removes identified or prefix-matched artifacts. UDP/514 is the default delivery mechanism, TCP/514 is optional, and shell mode listens locally on 0.0.0.0:4444 by default. Documentation identifies vulnerable VMware vCenter branches and explains that successful exploitation depends on RFC5424 acceptance, unsafe APP-NAME path interpolation, disabled control-character escaping, and cron availability.
The repository consists of a Chinese-language README and one Python 3 exploit script, exploit_cve_2026_59310.py. It is a standalone, standard-library-only network exploit rather than a Metasploit or other framework module. The script constructs RFC5424 syslog messages with a fixed timestamp and priority, placing a traversal sequence in APP-NAME. It sends the payload over UDP by default or TCP on request. The claimed vulnerable rsyslog template uses APP-NAME in both a directory and filename, allowing the payload to escape /var/log/vmware/ and write files with the syslog service's stated root privileges. For RCE, plant_cron() targets /etc/cron.d and injects a newline-delimited cron entry, relying on disabled control-character escaping; cron then invokes an attacker-selected command as root. The script supports a low-impact write check, root command execution with output redirected to a predictable /tmp file, cleanup guidance, and an interactive callback shell using Bash or a Python fallback. The README also documents vulnerable versions, configuration preconditions, detection queries, and mitigations. It references additional PoC files, but those files are not present in the supplied two-file repository.
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269 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A pre-authentication VMware vCenter vulnerability described as a syslog path-traversal flaw that can lead to remote code execution, with a 9.8 severity rating.
Critical unauthenticated remote-code-execution vulnerability in the VMware vCenter Server Syslog service, caused by directory traversal. Compromise of vCenter can provide control-plane access to managed ESXi hosts and virtual machines.
A critical, unauthenticated VMware vCenter directory-traversal vulnerability. It moved from patch release to confirmed exploitation in roughly five days and was subsequently used by ransomware operators to deploy Babuk-derived payloads against ESXi virtual-machine environments.
A VMware vCenter vulnerability mentioned only as contextual background; the content states it was actively exploited and attributes activity to an unnamed China-nexus APT group.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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