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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 18 actorsExploits 14 CVEs

Black Basta

Black Basta is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in early 2022, with samples dating to February 2022 and public emergence in April 2022. Reporting in the provided content describes it as a successor or spinoff of Conti, with some assessments linking it to former Conti members and others assessing it is highly likely tied to FIN7. It reportedly breached more than 90 organizations by September 2022 and has targeted sectors including utilities, technology, financial, manufacturing, and construction. The group has also used Linux encryptors, and Black Basta supports both Windows and Linux.

Observed initial access and delivery methods include malicious Excel files, macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents, ISO+LNK droppers, and .docx files exploiting CVE-2022-30190. Multiple sources in the content also associate Black Basta-related activity with social-engineering-heavy intrusion chains involving email bombing, Microsoft Teams impersonation of IT/help desk staff, and remote access via Microsoft Quick Assist or Teams screen control. Black Basta activity is also associated with QakBot/Qakbot as an initial access mechanism.

Post-compromise behavior described in the content includes creation of new Windows services for persistence, scheduled-task persistence via QakBot, use of WMI to execute files over the network, Active Directory and network reconnaissance with a uniquely obfuscated AdFind variant (AF.exe), SharpHound/BloodHound, SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe), and WMI queries against SecurityCenter2 to enumerate security products. Reported privilege-escalation and lateral-movement tradecraft includes exploitation of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287 and CVE-2021-42278), and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527), plus PsExec-driven deployment across endpoints. Black Basta operators have used remote administration tools including NetSupport Manager, Splashtop, GoToAssist, Atera Agent, and SystemBC/Coroxy.

The malware and associated operators have been reported disabling or impairing defenses before encryption. Examples in the content include batch scripts such as SERVI.bat to kill services and processes, delete shadow copies, and disable security solutions; scripts named with the pattern ILUg69ql followed by a digit to disable Windows Defender; and a custom defense-impairment tool, WindefCheck.exe, that displayed a fake Windows Security interface while protections were disabled. Black Basta also uses intermittent encryption; for files larger than 4 KB, it encrypts 64-byte portions while skipping 128 bytes. It operates a double-extortion model and threatens to leak stolen data on its TOR-based Basta News site if victims do not pay.

The content also references operational overlap or collaboration with other ransomware ecosystems. Trend Micro and Cisco Talos reporting cited here describe campaigns using Black Basta and later pivoting to Cactus while retaining similar TTPs, especially against manufacturing and construction organizations. Sophos and Red Canary reporting in the content note that Storm-1811/STAC5777 activity can culminate in attempted or potential Black Basta deployment. Trellix analysis of leaked Black Basta Matrix chats from September 2023 to September 2024 describes the operation as a mature criminal enterprise with Moscow offices, structured teams, use of ChatGPT for phishing and malware-development tasks, and use or rental of tooling including Pikabot, DarkGate, IcedID, LummaC2, and a custom framework called Breaker.

The provided content states that Black Basta’s internal Matrix chat logs, containing more than 200,000 messages, were leaked on Telegram on February 11, 2025 via the 'shopotbasta' channel. Subsequent reporting in the content says Black Basta collapsed in February 2025 after the leak, and S2W lists BlackBasta among groups that ceased operations or had leak sites taken down in H1 2025. The content further notes that former Black Basta affiliates reportedly continued under other banners, including Cactus and later Payouts King.

Notable indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the Basta News leak site; AF.exe; SERVI.bat; WindefCheck.exe; zero22.exe; zero.exe; spider.dll; RunTimeListen.exe; the administrator account 'Crackenn' with password '*aaa111Cracke'; and a BIRDDOG/SocksBot-related command-and-control IP of 45.67.229.148. The content also notes discussion of CVE-2024-3400 in leaked Black Basta chats.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

14 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

14 CVES
CVE-2024-3400Unauthenticated RCE in Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtectExploited in the wild

CVE-2024–3400 is a high severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 10.0 in Palo Alto Networks PAN OS that allows arbitrary file creation and command injection. When chat logs from the Black Basta ransomware gang were leaked, messages sharing details about this vulnerability were actively posted in the leaked logs.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
CVE-2020-1472Zerologon in Microsoft Netlogon Remote ProtocolExploited in the wild

Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527). | Black Basta ransomware emerged in April 2022 and went on a spree breaching over 90 organizations by Sept 2022.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2021-42287NoPac Domain Controller Impersonation in Active Directory Domain ServicesExploited in the wild

Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527). | Black Basta ransomware emerged in April 2022 and went on a spree breaching over 90 organizations by Sept 2022.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2021-34527PrintNightmareExploited in the wild

In one intrusion, we observed the Black Basta operator exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability and dropping spider.dll as the payload. | Black Basta ransomware emerged in April 2022 and went on a spree breaching over 90 organizations by Sept 2022.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2021-42278NoPac sAMAccountName Spoofing in Active Directory Domain ServicesExploited in the wild

Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527). | Black Basta ransomware emerged in April 2022 and went on a spree breaching over 90 organizations by Sept 2022.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2022-30190FollinaExploited in the wild

Black Basta infections began with Qakbot delivered by email and macro-based MS Office documents, ISO+LNK droppers and .docx documents exploiting the MSDTC remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2022-30190.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
CVE-2022-47966Unauthenticated RCE in Zoho ManageEngine SAML SSOExploited in the wild

Of the ransomware that was deployed in the incidents – Royal, Black Basta, and Hive... While some of the behaviors in the Black Basta attack... Initial access, in this case, came from a JSP web shell installed on an internet-facing ManageEngine server that had a vulnerability. | In January 2023, at around the same timeframe in which the attacks took place, ManageEngine’s publisher Zoho released a security advisory detailing CVE-2022-47966 an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability. In January 2023 there were also reports of attacks against this vulnerability.

via sophos threat researchsophos.com
CVE-2024-37085VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration Authentication BypassExploited in the wild

A particularly effective technique CVE-2024–37085 allows any member of a specially named AD group to receive full administrative rights on the hypervisor without additional authentication. Ransomware operators simply create the “ESX Admins” group via net group commands and add their controlled account, granting instant ESXi admin access. | This method was observed in high-tempo operations linked to Medusa affiliates (Storm-1175) and has been adopted by multiple groups deploying Akira and Black Basta payloads.

via detectdetect.fyi
CVE-2024-1709Authentication Bypass in ConnectWise ScreenConnectExploited in the wild

"#StopRansomware: Black Basta" ... "Black Basta, a ransomware variant whose actors have encrypted and stolen data..."

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
CVE-2023-28252Windows CLFS Driver Elevation of PrivilegeExploited in the wild

The threat actor gained initial access to the organization via Qakbot infection, followed by the exploitation of a Windows CLFS vulnerability (CVE-2023-28252) to elevate their privileges on affected devices.

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
CVE-2023-34992FortiSIEM phMonitor Service Command Injection

CVE-2023-34992: phMontior Service Command Injection

via horizon3 bloghorizon3.ai
CVE-2024-23108FortiSIEM phMonitor Second-Order Command Injection

CVE-2024-23108: phMonitor Service Second-Order Command Injection

via horizon3 bloghorizon3.ai
CVE-2025-25256Unauthenticated OS Command Injection in Fortinet FortiSIEM phMonitor

Technical details and a public exploit have been published for a critical vulnerability affecting Fortinet's Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution... The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2025-25256... may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted TCP requests.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2025-68947Improper authorization in NSecsoft NSecKrnl driver allows arbitrary process terminationExploited in the wild

“The NSecKrnl driver is a Windows kernel-mode driver with a known critical security vulnerability (CVE-2025-68947), which means that it fails to verify if a user has sufficient permissions before executing commands. This allows a local, authenticated attacker to terminate processes owned by other users, including SYSTEM and Protected Processes, by issuing crafted Input/Output Control (IOCTL) requests to the driver.”

via symantec blogsecurity.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

18 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN7

Black Basta ransomware emerged in April 2022 and went on a spree breaching over 90 organizations by Sept 2022.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
Storm-1811

Without prompt response, this activity can lead to Black Basta ransomware in your environment.

via red canary blogredcanary.com
Conti

Conti disbanded later that year, but members of the Cyrillic-language group rebranded under three subgroups: Zeon, Black Basta and Quantum, which quickly rebranded to Royal, before rebranding again to BlackSuit in 2024.

via cyberscoopcyberscoop.com
Black Basta

This blog post documents some of the TTPs employed by a threat actor group who were observed deploying Black Basta ransomware during a recent incident response engagement, as well as a breakdown of the executable file which performs the encryption.

via ncc group researchnccgroup.com
DEV-0506

For example, DEV-0506 was deploying BlackBasta part-time before the Conti shutdown and is now deploying it regularly.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
Tramp

Devman declined by 70%, from 82 victims to 25. The ransomware’s operator “Tramp”, a former Conti and Black Basta affiliate, was added to Interpol’s wanted list in January 2026.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598.004Spearphishing VoiceEvidence2

In an observed campaign, users received calls from the adversary posing as IT support and were prompted to initiate a QuickAssist session.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

After a few days, the actors call the victim, usually via Microsoft Teams, and direct them to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist remote access session...

T1566PhishingEvidence1

On 4 November last year, an external user signed into a customer environment under the display name “IT Support”... Within twenty-eight minutes they had opened a Quick Assist screen-share session against a target who believed he was speaking to colleagues.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Attackers leverage a variety of initial infection vectors to deliver Black Basta, such as Qakbot, phishing, vulnerability exploitation, and email attachments.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

YY later inquired if GG's suggestion was to rewrite C# in C#, revealing that Tramp instructed to rewrite the malware from C# to Python using ChatGPT.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. | APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

YY (coder of Black Basta) was instructed to rewrite the tools in Python as some of the gang’s malware got detected by AV/EDR. GG asked YY to use ChatGPT for that... Tramp instructed to rewrite the malware from C# to Python using ChatGPT.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

After a few days, the actors call the victim, usually via Microsoft Teams, and direct them to initiate a Microsoft Quick Assist remote access session...

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Adversaries established persistence by embedding IP addresses in the TitanPlus registry key.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

Black Basta has been observed spreading via Group Policy Objects (GPO).

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

Adversaries established persistence by embedding IP addresses in the TitanPlus registry key.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

the tenants they registered for the operation carried display names so generic that they passed unnoticed: ‘Help Desk’, ‘Help Desk IT’, ‘Help Desk Support’, ‘IT Support’.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

Black Basta has been observed spreading via Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Discovery

4 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The cloud and software giant’s threat intelligence team had already documented the same operators abusing the Quick Assist remote support tool since mid-April that year... Within twenty-eight minutes they had opened a Quick Assist screen-share session against a target

T1021.003Distributed Component Object ModelEvidence1

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments,' 'Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement,' and 'Cinnamon Tempest has used Impacket for lateral movement via WMI.'

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The current version of Qyick does not have data exfiltration capabilities. However, lucrostm has announced that future versions will feature execution of arbitrary executable code, meant primarily for the execution of data exfiltration capabilities.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence12

The Black Basta group discovered that they had not encrypted the Ascension Healthcare data correctly due to a crypt error and decided to share the decryption key to avoid potential political sanctions and retaliation from US law enforcement against their infrastructure.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

These result in the deletion of shadow copies ensuring they cannot be used for recovery purposes. ... modified configurations for the Veeam backup jobs and deleted the backups of the hosted virtual machines.

Other

3 techniques
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Once a Quick Assist session is established, the adversary loads tooling to collect information about the target system and establish persistence... disable endpoint protections... Of note, we also observed the affiliates using HRSword to disable the target’s EDR solution.

T1562.009Safe Mode BootEvidence1

file1.bat : a batch file designed to set up the system with autologon as the newly-created administrative user AdminBac, reboot into Safe Mode ... file2.bat : a second batch file, executed in Safe Mode via a registry key, designed to unpack the ransomware binary from the encrypted archive

T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

In late May 2024, Microsoft watched a financially motivated cybercriminal group it tracks as Storm-1811 do something that traditional perimeter controls were not built to see- it logged into Teams, said hello, and asked for help.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

51 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
20 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
30 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching51

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution18

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities14

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.