CVE-2024-23108 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM, affecting the FortiSIEM supervisor/phMonitor attack surface and described as a variant or patch bypass related to CVE-2023-34992. The issue allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via crafted API requests. Available technical reporting describes the flaw as a second-order command injection in the phMonitor service’s storage-handling workflow, where attacker-controlled input is processed through datastore-related logic and ultimately reaches an OS command execution sink in NFS test functionality. The vulnerable path has been described as involving phMonitor request handling, datastore.py, and downstream NFS test code that uses unsafe shell execution, enabling command execution as root.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2024-23108, a command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM appliances. The main file, CVE-2024-23108.py, is a Python script that connects to the Phoenix Monitor service (default port 7900) over SSL and sends a crafted XML payload. The payload injects an arbitrary shell command into the 'mount_point' field, exploiting the vulnerability to execute the command as root on the target system. The script supports targeting a single IP or a list of IPs and provides colored output for success and error messages. The README.md provides usage instructions, background, and references. The exploit is operational as a POC, requiring the attacker to specify the command to execute and the target(s). No hardcoded payloads are present; the exploit is interactive and flexible. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the Phoenix Monitor service on FortiSIEM appliances.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-23108, a 2nd order unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM appliances. The main file, CVE-2024-23108.py, is a Python script that crafts a malicious XML payload containing an attacker-supplied command and sends it over an SSL/TLS connection to the Phoenix Monitor service (default port 7900) on the target system. The exploit allows for blind command execution as root. The script takes command-line arguments for the target IP, port, and the command to execute. The README provides usage instructions and background information. No hardcoded external endpoints are present, but the exploit targets a network service on the victim appliance. The repository is structured simply, with one exploit script and a README.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Unknown
An unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM's phMonitor service (TCP/8014) that enables remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root, leading to full system compromise.
A previously identified maximum-severity FortiSIEM vulnerability associated with the phMonitor attack surface (mentioned as historical context).
A previously disclosed FortiSIEM vulnerability referenced as part of a history of phMonitor service issues; specific impact details are not provided in the content.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.