Black Basta
Black Basta is a financially motivated ransomware operation active since at least 2022. The group is referenced as part of the ransomware ecosystem and has been linked in reporting to initial access obtained by brokers such as Woodgnat/KongTuke, which has been publicly associated with attacks involving Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta. Reporting cited here states that in November 2022 Black Basta used the QakBot loader for initial access by hijacking legitimate email threads and sending phishing emails. Black Basta has also been observed exploiting or discussing vulnerabilities and remote access tooling: leaked Black Basta chat logs included active discussion of CVE-2024-3400 in Palo Alto PAN-OS, and the group has been seen exploiting Microsoft Quick Assist for initial access and persistence. CISA #StopRansomware advisories cited in the content state that Black Basta uses PsExec as a primary ransomware propagation tool. Additional reporting in the provided content describes Black Basta operational TTPs in detail, including use of EDR impairment tooling such as AvNeutralizer/AuKill, which telemetry indicated was used exclusively by the group for six months before later spreading to other ransomware actors. SentinelLABS assessed it is highly likely the Black Basta ransomware operation has ties to FIN7. Leaked Black Basta Matrix chat logs from 2025, covering September 2023 to September 2024, portray the group as a mature criminal enterprise with structured operations, two offices in Moscow, collaboration with other ransomware and malware actors, and use of ChatGPT for phishing pretexts, malware rewriting, debugging, and victim intelligence collection. Analysis of those leaks cited in the content reported potential connections to Russian authorities and identified alleged continuity with Conti-era personnel and tradecraft, including references linking leader GG/AA to Conti’s Tramp. The same reporting states Black Basta collaborated with or maintained relationships involving former Conti/Trickbot, BlackSuit/Royal, Rhysida, and Cactus-linked actors, and used or rented malware families and loaders including Pikabot, DarkGate, IcedID, and LummaC2 while developing a custom post-exploitation framework called Breaker. The content also notes Black Basta’s use of Linux/ESXi-focused ransomware is discussed alongside other major ransomware groups, although one cited report found no obvious similarity between Black Basta’s ESXi lockers and Babuk-derived families. Known alias mentioned in the content: Storm-1811.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Tradecraft
61 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
↑のプロセスを脆弱なNsecSoft NSecKrnlドライバで止める CVE-2025-68947に関連するNsecSoft NSecKrnlドライバでサービス作成を試みて、そのサービスで脆弱性悪用によりカーネルレベルからプロセスキルや検知機能阻害を行う感じ。
Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527).
In one intrusion, we observed the Black Basta operator exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability and dropping spider.dll as the payload.
Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527).
Beyond the reconnaissance stage, Black Basta attempts local and domain level privilege escalation through a variety of exploits. We have seen the use of ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472), NoPac (CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2021-42278) and PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527).
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
50 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a downstream ransomware operation that may purchase access from Woodgnat.
Named as a ransomware crew that purchases or uses access brokered by KongTuke/Woodgnat.
Named as a ransomware crew previously linked to attacks involving KongTuke-provided access.
Referenced as one of the ransomware groups whose attacks have involved ModeloRAT.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.