Ramsay

All the frameworks used USB drives as the physical transmission medium to transfer data in and out of the targeted air-gapped networks.

Propagation to network shares using scheduled jobs and Windows Management Instrumentation.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.

APT-C-36 has embedded a VBScript within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.

Malicious LNK files are usually used as the exploit to trigger a vulnerability in old components of Windows, such as the Windows Shell, that allow the malware to get remote code execution with no user action required other than viewing the LNK file in Windows Explorer.

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

Cobalt Group has sent Word OLE compound documents with malicious obfuscated VBA macros that will run upon user execution.

APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti for Windows. Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load exe, dll, and dat files into memory. Astaroth can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking.

Phantom DLL Hijacking of Windows services: Windows Search hijacking msfte.dll, Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator hijacking an Oracle dependency oci.dll.

Propagation to network shares using scheduled jobs and Windows Management Instrumentation.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.

Windows operating systems have the functionality to allow nearly all application processes to load custom DLLs into their address space. This allows for the possibility of persistence, as any DLL may be loaded and executed when application processes are created on the system.

ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.

Propagation to network shares using scheduled jobs and Windows Management Instrumentation.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors creating, modifying, or invoking Windows scheduled tasks via Task Scheduler or schtasks for persistence, execution, and lateral movement.

Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.

Windows operating systems have the functionality to allow nearly all application processes to load custom DLLs into their address space. This allows for the possibility of persistence, as any DLL may be loaded and executed when application processes are created on the system.

ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key... APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence... FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that 'bypass UAC,' 'perform UAC bypass,' or use specific Windows components such as fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, sdclt.exe, CMSTPLUA COM interface, SilentCleanup, and registry hijacks to gain elevated privileges.

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

Aria-body has the ability to inject itself into another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe... BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe... ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe... Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.

APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti for Windows. Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load exe, dll, and dat files into memory. Astaroth can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking.

Phantom DLL Hijacking of Windows services: Windows Search hijacking msfte.dll, Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator hijacking an Oracle dependency oci.dll.

Cobalt Strike has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection... Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection... Matryoshka uses reflective DLL injection... Netwalker DLL has been injected reflectively into the memory of a legitimate running process.

AdFind can extract subnet information from Active Directory; actors used ipconfig /all after exploiting a machine; numerous malware and groups used ipconfig, ifconfig, arp, route, netsh, nbtstat, NBTscan, and related APIs to gather IP, MAC, DNS, DHCP, gateway, proxy, domain, ARP cache, routing, and adapter details.

Ramsay used a much more aggressive approach by automatically scanning all IP addresses in the local subnet and testing the discovered hosts to determine whether they are vulnerable to CVE-2017-0144, also known as EternalBlue.

Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system. Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as listing running processes, collecting PIDs, checking for specific process names, or enumerating loaded modules.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of groups and malware that can 'list files and directories,' 'search for files,' 'enumerate drives,' 'gather file metadata,' or 'browse file systems' on compromised hosts.

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

APT1 listed connected network shares. APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$. APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.

All the frameworks used USB drives as the physical transmission medium to transfer data in and out of the targeted air-gapped networks.

Andariel has collected large numbers of files from compromised network systems for later extraction... APT28 has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments... BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents... many listed groups and malware collect files, documents, credentials, payment card data, or other information from compromised hosts.

collects information that is staged on the USB drive for exfiltration.

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that "can capture screenshots," "take screenshots," "perform screen captures," or "watch the victim's screen." It ends with references to "CopyFromScreen" and "xwd."

The files were grouped and archived in a password-protected RAR file

it abused WinRAR to create a compressed archive of everything in its local storage folders.

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.

the attacker sends commands to the malware placed on the air-gapped network; this is done via a covert communication channel often placed on a USB drive

ADVSTORESHELL C2 traffic is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding. APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server. APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

used USB drives as the physical transmission medium to transfer information across air gaps.