Darkhotel
DarkHotel is an advanced persistent threat group publicly disclosed in 2014, with reported activity dating back to at least 2010 and some reporting stating activity since at least 2007. It is also tracked as Tapaoux and has aliases including APT-C-06, APT-C-60, Dark Hotel, Dark_Hotel, Dubnium, Egobot, Fallout Team, Nemim, Paladin, Purple Pygmy, Shadow Crane, Tapaoux, Templar, Tieonjoe, and Zigzag Hail. The group is assessed in the provided content as having a Korean Peninsula government background. DarkHotel originally became known for targeting business executives and state dignitaries staying in luxury hotels, including through compromises of hotel Wi-Fi networks that delivered fake Adobe updates to selected guests. The content states that the group uploaded malware to hotel servers before a target arrived and deleted it after the victim departed. Reported targeting spans China, North Korea, Japan, Myanmar, India, several European countries, and in other reporting includes executives, government agencies, NGOs, research institutions, foreign trade, military industries, and the U.S. defense industrial base. The group has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including RAR and LNK files, to lure victims into execution. Reported malware behaviors include searching for files with specific patterns; collecting IP address, network adapter information, hostname, OS version, service pack version, processor architecture, and running process lists; and disguising malware as a Secure Shell tool. DarkHotel has established persistence via Windows Run Registry keys and has dropped an mspaint.lnk shortcut that launches a shell script to download and execute a file. The content attributes to DarkHotel repeated use of obfuscation and encryption, including RC4, XOR, and RSA, as well as just-in-time string decryption to evade sandbox detection. It also notes use of forged or stolen code-signing certificates to sign malware, backdoors, and downloaders. A recent intrusion described in the content was attributed to DarkHotel with high confidence by Knownsec 404. In that activity, Microsoft-signed system binaries were used to side-load malicious DLLs, which decrypted and loaded additional components. Knownsec assessed the framework as an upgraded version of the 2023 InitPlugins framework based on shared XOR-based encryption, similar decryption-and-loading architecture, and identical loaded components. The campaign used MFC localization resource-loading abuse to load a malicious LOC.dll, modular loading, disguised encrypted module files including .pem files timestamped to match kernel32.dll, local RPC for component execution, and separate scheduled tasks for persistence. The malware supported multiple loading modes including shellcode execution via thread creation, reflective loading, injection execution, and LoadLibraryW-based loading. The attack also used dual-stage process injection and separated the remote-control component, identified as Meterpreter, from functional modules including keylogging, screen capture, and USB theft.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Commercial & Professional Services
- Government & Administration
- Academia & Research
- Military
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇨🇳 China
- 🇰🇵 North Korea
- 🇯🇵 Japan
- 🇲🇲 Myanmar (Burma)
- 🇮🇳 India
Tradecraft
44 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
8 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.
Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
May 2018: a new wave of targeted attacks abusing CVE-2018-8174 (this exploit has been associated with the DarkHotel APT group, as described on Securelist), with diplomatic, defense, manufacturing, military and government targets in Asia and Eastern Europe;
At the end of June 2020, the operators stepped up their game by using a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2020-0968, which had been patched in April 2020. Instead of delivering an archive with a LNK file, the C&C server was delivering an RTF file that, once opened, downloaded an HTML file exploiting the aforementioned vulnerability.
Public reporting indicates the group exploited a remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows version of a productivity suite (CVE-2024-7262) to drop SpyGlace.
Observables
105 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as part of the era of sophisticated malware campaigns that received deep public technical analysis.
Exploited CVE-2019-1367 in the wild and was later linked to the 'Double Star' attacks using Internet Explorer and Firefox 0-days against targets connected to North Korea and Japanese infrastructure.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the malicious file execution technique detected by this analytic.
Listed as a threat actor associated with Windows Command Shell execution behavior relevant to this detection.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.