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MalwareUsed by 10 actors

BeaverTail

BeaverTail is a JavaScript-based malware family, with reported native C++/Qt variants, used primarily as an infostealer and downloader in North Korea-linked developer-targeting campaigns. Reporting in the provided content consistently links it to DPRK activity clusters and aliases including DeceptiveDevelopment, Contagious Interview, PurpleBravo, Void Dokkaebi/Famous Chollima, DEV#POPPER, and WageMole. It is commonly paired with later-stage malware such as InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, and in some reporting Tropidoor or TsunamiKit.

Initial access is primarily via social engineering. Observed lures include fake job interviews, coding challenges, malicious JavaScript projects or trojanized repositories on GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and npm-style ecosystems, as well as trojanized conferencing or chat software such as fake MiroTalk/MicroTalk/FreeConference-style applications. Victims are predominantly software developers, especially freelancers and individuals involved in cryptocurrency, Web3, blockchain, and decentralized finance, though broader software engineering and DevOps audiences are also mentioned. The malware has been observed on Windows, Linux, and macOS, including macOS activity in 2025 delivered through job-interview and programming-task lures distributed via gig work sites.

Capabilities described in the content include theft of browser credentials and saved logins, browser extension data, cryptocurrency wallet data, Firefox login databases, macOS Keychain data, Linux keyring data, and Solana keys from .config/solana/id.json. Reported targeted wallet extensions include MetaMask, BNB Chain Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, TronLink, Phantom, Ronin Wallet, Coin98 Wallet, Crypto.com Wallet, Kaia Wallet, Rabby Wallet, Argent X, and Exodus Web3 Wallet. Newer reporting also states that updated variants harvest credentials, private master keys, and seed phrases, and may install trojanized browser extensions targeting MetaMask, Coinbase Wallet, and Phantom.

Operationally, BeaverTail is described as staging collected data in the system temporary directory, exfiltrating stolen data to command-and-control servers, and downloading second-stage payloads. In ESET reporting cited in the content, BeaverTail commonly communicates over ports 1224 or 1244, uploads stolen data to a /uploads endpoint, downloads a Python environment archive named p2.zip, and retrieves the next stage from /client/<campaign_ID>, saving it as .npl in the user home directory. Other reporting notes use of curl, filenames such as p.zi and p2.zip, and likely FTP exfiltration observed between BeaverTail C2 infrastructure and victims. One campaign used BeaverTail disguised as tailwind.config.js alongside a downloader named car.dll; another report describes BeaverTail as a hidden JavaScript loader in malicious repositories that ultimately led to BeaverTail or OtterCookie infection.

The content also describes evolving tradecraft. Some BeaverTail variants use obfuscation such as shuffled Base64 fragments, junk-byte prepending, and XOR encryption. A native C++/Qt variant has been reported, and BeaverTail has also been referenced as part of multi-stage delivery frameworks and blockchain- or dead-drop-adjacent DPRK developer-targeting operations. A campaign marker global['!']='9-0264-2' is explicitly tied in the content to prior Famous Chollima operations and linked to BeaverTail payloads.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the malware names BeaverTail/BearVerTail, common disguise filenames such as tailwind.config.js, use of p2.zip and .npl second-stage artifacts, communication over ports 1224/1244, uploads to /uploads, and the campaign marker global['!']='9-0264-2'. The content also notes BeaverTail infections observed in Mexico in 2025.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

10 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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WageMole

This will eventually to either Ottercookie / Beavertail malware. Running the entire repository ultimately leads to an infection.

via medium meeswicky1100medium.com
Lazarus

Palo Alto Unit 42 : DEV#POPPER , with malware families BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret.

via github gist webgist.github.com
Contagious Interview

Instructional videos have also been found with what it looks like non-native English text, detailing how to set up a Beavertail malware command-and-control server and how to crack cryptocurrency wallet passwords.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
CL-STA-0240

The campaign used the JavaScript infostealer BeaverTail, the cross-platform Python backdoor InvisibleFerret, and most recently OtterCookie, a new backdoor identified in December 2024.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
North Korean threat actors

Once run locally on the machine, the package referenced in the supposed project acts as a stealer (i.e., BeaverTail) to harvest browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, macOS Keychain, keystrokes, clipboard content, and screenshots. The malware is designed to download additional payloads, including a cross-platform Python backdoor codenamed InvisibleFerret.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
TraderTraitor

The campaign targeted Web3 and decentralised finance (DeFi) developers globally via AI-generated fake job offers delivered through LinkedIn, using three interoperating malware families BeaverTail, OtterCookie, and InvisibleFerret in a phased infection chain that begins with a malicious coding assessment and culminates in full credential exfiltration and wallet drainage.

via falconfeeds blogfalconfeeds.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

chai-as-init 패키지는 인기 패키지인 chai 및 chai-as-promised 패키지명을 모방한 타이포스쿼팅 (Typosquatting)기법을 사용

Initial Access

6 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

With the unique fingerprint, we identified 77 malicious GitHub repositories... Running the entire repository ultimately leads to an infection.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

유명 테스트 프레임워크인 Chai.js의 플러그인으로 위장한 악성 npm 패키지(chai-as-init)가 v1.4.5 ~ v1.4.7까지 총 3개 버전으로 배포

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK # T1195.002 — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Tehdit aktörü önceden sömürmüş olduğu JSON Storage servislerini iş görüşmesi adı altında kişiye iletiyor... Hedef kitle : Yazılımcılar, Yazılım Geliştiriciler, İş aramak için görüşmeler yapan DevOps, DevSecops ekipleri.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

After 2–3 friendly exchanges, the recruiter sends "please review the codebase before our technical interview." Calendly link, often on a fresh subdomain.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

Foreign IT professionals are contacted as part of a common social engineering tactic that involves enticing software developers with fake job interviews. In this scheme, developers apply for positions advertised on platforms like LinkedIn and other recruitment sites.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This will eventually to either Ottercookie / Beavertail malware. Running the entire repository ultimately leads to an infection.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

InvisibleFerret is modular Python malware... Finally, the next stage is downloaded from the C&C server ... and executed using the downloaded Python environment.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence4

İlk aşamada malware, BearVerTail adında bir JavaScript dosyasını run ediyor ve Payload yerleşimi başlıyor.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Candidates are asked to perform a coding test or review a project, which requires them to download files from repositories like GitHub. These files contain malicious code.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence7

Running the entire repository ultimately leads to an infection.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Dosyalar içerisinde base64 ile encode edilmiş malware tarzında bir payload var... TsunamiKit, base64 ile encode edilmiş bir url yükü taşıyor

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

In the JavaScript version, the IP address and port are obfuscated using base64 encoding, split into three parts, and swapped around... Other strings are also encoded with base64

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The attackers often use a clever trick to hide their malicious code: they place it in an otherwise benign component of the project... where they append it as a single line behind a long comment. This way, it is moved off-screen and stays hidden

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

If they are found, any .ldb and .log files from the extensions’ directories are collected and exfiltrated. Apart from these files, the malware also targets a file containing the Solana keys stored in the user’s home directory in .config/solana/id.json

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The JavaScript-based malware is designed to scan for and exfiltrate sensitive data, with a particular focus on cryptocurrency wallets, browser extension data, and credentials.

T1555.001KeychainEvidence1

BeaverTail then looks for saved login information in /Library/Keychains/login.keychain (for macOS) or /.local/share/keyrings/ (for Linux).

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

환경변수와 함께 즉시 탈취하는 정보에는 다음과 같은 고위험 자격증명이 포함됩니다... AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN

Discovery

1 technique
T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

The collected data along with the computer hostname and current timestamp is uploaded to the /uploads API endpoint on the C&C server.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Both BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret exfiltrate data from the local system.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The only functionality not executed by the operator is the initial fingerprinting, which is done automatically.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Instructional videos have also been found... detailing how to set up a Beavertail malware command-and-control server... Another cluster of Beavertail command-and-control (C&C) servers has been administered through VPN, proxies and RDP sessions from the same Russian IP ranges as well.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

safe Json Storage servisleri olarak görülen “JsonSilo, JsonKeeper, Npoint” gibi alanları kullanarak meşru bir trafik gibi görünerek saldırıyı devam ettirdikleri... Aslında burada HTTP trafiği izlenerek olay çözümlenmekte

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

Zscaler... described a two-part infection chain in which the initial reconnaissance took place over HTTP traffic and FTP was used for data exfiltration... Shortly after the reconnaissance traffic, we observed likely exfiltration FTP traffic between the same IP addresses.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK # T1102.001 — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The user also added a download link to hxxp://65.108.20[.]73/BattleTank[.]exe , which is no longer live and was later updated to hxxp://65.108.20[.]73[:]3000/BattleTank[.]exe .

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

Most C&C communication we observed was done over ports 1224 or 1244 ... and 1245 ... for backdoor C&C communication over TCP sockets.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

axios.post로 공격자 서버(hxxp://144.172.89[.]180:8086/upload)에 전송

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

They primarily steal cryptocurrency for financial gain... aiming to steal cryptocurrency wallets and login information from browsers and password managers.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

314 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
150 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
89 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
75 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
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IOC matching314

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution10

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.