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Mallory
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 17 actorsExploits 1 CVE

IcedID

Also known asBokBot

IcedID, also known as BokBot, is a prevalent banking trojan and loader/downloader malware family associated in the provided content with the Lunar Spider threat actor. It has been distributed by multiple threat actors and spam operations, including TA551, TA577, TA571, and TA2101, and has also been used in campaigns linked to Black Basta and infrastructure overlaps involving TA866 and ALPHV. The content describes delivery via phishing and malspam, including Microsoft Word and Excel documents with malicious macros, HTML smuggling, OneNote-themed research references, and ISO and LNK files that execute a malicious DLL. One cited campaign delivered IcedID through USPS-themed phishing emails heavily targeting the healthcare sector in the United States.

Behaviorally, the content states that IcedID can execute through malicious Office macros and ISO/LNK-delivered DLLs, use HTTPS for command-and-control communications, query LDAP, and use built-in net commands to identify additional users on the network to infect. In malware-analysis context, IcedID is described as using an unpacking flow in which VirtualProtect is called before VirtualAlloc, with shellcode-related execution characteristics including the byte sequence E8 00 00 00 00. It copies data with rep movsb and applies xor and ror operations plus additional in-memory copying to produce a clean PE second-stage downloader module. A fixed DLL naming convention was also noted, including loader_64_dll.dll.

The content further places IcedID in the broader dropper/loader ecosystem alongside malware such as Pikabot, SmokeLoader, Trickbot, Bumblebee, and SystemBC. Operation Endgame and related law-enforcement actions are described as having targeted IcedID infrastructure and servers. Additional references note that Proofpoint assessed Latrodectus was written by the same developers as IcedID based on code similarities. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include the alias BokBot, the DLL name loader_64_dll.dll, and one C2-linked IP overlap reference: 109[.]236[.]80[.]191.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2023-21716Microsoft Word RTF Heap Corruption Remote Code Execution

Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...

via splunk researchresearch.splunk.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

17 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA551

TA551, also known as Shathak or Gold Cabin, is an attacker group that is responsible for spreading a wide variety of malware families including IcedID, Valak, Ursnif and, more recently, BazarLoader.

via bin rebin.re
Lunar Spider

IcedID aka Bokbot is also one of the most prevalent banking trojans in the last years. It is known to be associated with Lunar Spider threat actors.

via medium elis531989elis531989.medium.com
TA577

TA577, are a Russia-based threat group that have been reported to deliver payloads including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike in ongoing phishing campaigns since 2020.

via medium intel opsmedium.com
TA571

In addition, TA571 has been associated with the distribution of other malware families, including variants of IcedID, NetSupportRAT, DarkGate and others.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
TA579

Proofpoint has tracked a new malware loader called Bumblebee used by multiple crimeware threat actors previously observed delivering BazaLoader and IcedID.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
TA578

Proofpoint has tracked a new malware loader called Bumblebee used by multiple crimeware threat actors previously observed delivering BazaLoader and IcedID.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

This attack – known as ‘malvertising’ – is often aimed at users looking to download popular software applications.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

As well as conning search engines to try and get their malicious sites near the top of search results, they can also pay for the privilege: buying paid ads so that their sites are guaranteed to appear prominently. This attack – known as ‘malvertising’ – is often aimed at users looking to download popular software applications.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence5

The basic flow is as follows: An attacker sends a phishing email containing a .one file attachment.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

Proofpoint researchers observed hundreds of emails attempting to deliver malicious Microsoft Word attachments with German lures impersonating the Bundeszentralamt fur Steuern... The lure states that a 2019 tax refund is due... and that the recipient should submit a refund request using an attached Microsoft Word document form.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The actor initiated their campaigns impersonating the Bundeszentralamt fur Steuern, the German Federal Ministry of Finance, with lookalike domains, verbiage, and stolen branding in the emails.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The Microsoft Word attachment, when opened, executes a Microsoft Office macro that, in turn, executes a PowerShell script, which downloads and installs the Maze ransomware payload onto the victim’s system.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The Microsoft Word attachment, when opened, executes a Microsoft Office macro that, in turn, executes a PowerShell script...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a user searches for a related term and clicks through to the malicious site, the attackers check the Referer header to confirm the user has come from a search engine, and then entice them into downloading malware disguised as a legitimate software application.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

By inspecting the “ lpAddress ” argument in VirtualProtect we’ll notice that it appears to deal with shellcode execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Then, we observe that the memory section is filled with obfuscated data... additional string fractures such as: “This program cannot run in DOS mode” and the word “PE”, will be revealed.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

In malware, we often see threat actors that tend to obfuscate or encrypt their code in order to slow down the analysis of security researchers... many authors tend to use open-source packers but also craft their own custom packers.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Other campaigns have impersonated brands like Adobe, Gimp, Slack, Tor, and Thunderbird, in order to infect users with AuroraStealer, RedLine, Vidar, FormBook, and more.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Of particular note is the use of stolen branding as well as the use of lookalike .icu domains used for the sender email address in order to craft effective lures.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

By inspecting the “ lpAddress ” argument in VirtualProtect we’ll notice that it appears to deal with shellcode execution.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

At first glance, it seems this loop has characteristics we expect from traditional decryption\encryption routines, such as shr (shift right), xor , and rol (rotate left) opcodes... The loop changes the first bytes of the obfuscated content to “M8Z”, which starts to resemble the classic “MZ” string.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Based on the signature identifier ‘Trojan:Win64/IcedID.EI!MTB’ and loader’s execution using rundll32.exe with function scab /k accompanied by arguments such as besogon728 or pechene634 or haval462, it can be inferred that the Anubis botnet is in fact IcedID malware.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

BoomBox has the ability to execute an LDAP query to enumerate the distinguished name, SAM account name, and display name for all domain users. IceApple Active Directory Querier module can perform authenticated requests against an Active Directory server. Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

AdFind can enumerate domain users. APT41 used built-in net commands to enumerate domain administrator users. BloodHound can collect information about domain users, including identification of domain admin accounts.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialEvidence1

A “pass-the-cookie” attack is a type of attack where an attacker can bypass authentication controls by compromising browser cookies... “Pass-the-cookie” is like pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket attacks in Active Directory.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

We reported on this previously, noting that some criminals were turning to other filetypes instead, like archive and container formats – and, more recently, OneNote files.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

As SocGholish, StealC, and Amadey are typically used as droppers or loaders during attacks, they are used to establish access as part of a link in a larger attack chain.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Other

1 technique
T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

TA551 is a threat actor tracked by Proofpoint since 2016. This actor frequently leverages thread hijacking to distribute malicious Office documents via email.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

109 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
68 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
28 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
13 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching109

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution17

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.