GreenSpot is a long-running espionage-focused advanced persistent threat cluster assessed to be associated with Taiwan and known for sustained targeting of organizations in China. Reported victimology centers on Chinese government departments and aviation-, military-, and research-related institutions. Activity has been linked across campaigns from at least the early 2010s, with possible related operations dating back to around 2007 from the same source direction. GreenSpot has relied heavily on spearphishing for initial access, typically using malicious attachments delivered as exploit documents or trojanized executables. The actor repeatedly used older or n-day vulnerabilities rather than exclusive zero-days, including CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-4114, and later CVE-2017-8759. A notable tradecraft feature was early use of MHT-formatted CVE-2012-0158 exploit documents to reduce antivirus detection. Malicious documents commonly displayed decoy content while dropping and executing payloads. The group has used multiple commodity and customized malware families, including Poison Ivy, Gh0st, HttpBots, and modified ZXShell variants. Its tooling has supported persistence, remote administration, command execution, file theft, credential collection, keylogging, and exfiltration. Customized ZXShell samples were reported to collect sensitive office documents, harvest saved email credentials, and gather host and network information, with some tasking tailored toward military- and aviation-related themes. In later observed chains, staged loaders downloaded encrypted shellcode and launched Poison Ivy, showing continued adaptation of delivery mechanisms while retaining familiar malware. GreenSpot’s operational pattern emphasizes practical and repeatable tradecraft: reuse and modification of public RATs, packing and customization to evade detection, shared infrastructure across campaigns, and long-term targeting aligned with intelligence collection. The actor has been linked through overlapping command-and-control infrastructure, common passwords, similar loaders, and code similarities. Overall, GreenSpot is best characterized as a persistent cyber-espionage actor focused on stealing sensitive documents and information from Chinese state, defense-adjacent, and research targets.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
另一种是格式攻击文档,利用漏洞CVE-2012-0158来释放并执行可执行文件,同时打开欺骗收件人的“正常”文档文件。... CVE-2012-0158是一个文档格式溢出漏洞... 该组织则使用了MHT格式,这种格式同样可以触发漏洞,而且在当时一段时间内可以躲避多种杀毒软件的查杀。
我们有一定的分析证据表明,“绿斑”组织在2014年10月前曾使用CVE-2014-4114漏洞。这可能表示该组织与地下漏洞交易有相应的渠道联系。
安天2017年针对“绿斑”组织的一个新的前导攻击文档进行了分析,该文档利用最新的CVE-2017-8759漏洞下载恶意代码到目标主机执行。样本采用RTF格式而非之前的宏代码方式,在无须用户交互的情况下就可以直接下载并执行远程文件,攻击效果更好。
15 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as conducting phishing campaigns using fake 163.com login pages.
Long-running espionage-focused APT activity targeting Chinese government departments and aviation, military, and research-related institutions using spear-phishing emails, malicious Office/MHT documents, bundled executables, and multiple RAT families for persistence, remote control, and document theft.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.