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UAC-0050 is a Russia-aligned threat actor primarily focused on Ukraine and assessed to operate as a mercenary-style cluster linked by Ukrainian authorities to Russian law-enforcement structures. The group is also associated with the DaVinci Group branding and has conducted information and psychological operations under the Fire Cells Group name. Reporting describes UAC-0050 as combining cyber-espionage, financial theft, and influence-oriented activity, with campaigns ranging from credential and information collection to fraudulent payment operations and threatening hoax messaging. UAC-0050 has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian government entities, defense-related organizations, energy-sector organizations, accountants, financial staff, journalists, NGOs involved in the war, and other Ukrainian enterprises. Activity has also extended to foreign organizations and institutions connected to Ukraine, including a European financial institution involved in reconstruction initiatives, as well as entities in countries such as Poland, France, Germany, and Switzerland in the context of threatening or influence-themed operations. The actor is known for phishing and spam campaigns using Ukrainian-language and legal, tax, banking, courier, and security-service impersonation themes. Delivery chains have included encrypted or weaponized PDF lures, compressed archives, LNK files, VBS and JavaScript downloaders, HTA execution via mshta, and ClickFix-style social engineering. UAC-0050 has used both commodity malware and legitimate remote administration software, including Remcos, NetSupport Manager, LiteManager, Remote Utilities, Remote Manipulator System, Quasar RAT, Venom RAT, sLoad, LummaStealer, MeduzaStealer, Xeno RAT, SectopRAT, MarsStealer, and DarkTrack RAT. Multiple campaigns show reliance on remote monitoring and management tools for stealthy access, persistence, and follow-on theft or espionage. Observed tradecraft includes spoofing, initial access via phishing, persistence through startup shortcuts and autorun mechanisms, keylogging, browser data theft, exfiltration, and post-compromise use of remote access tools to conduct fraudulent banking transactions. CERT-UA linked the group to repeated theft attempts against Ukrainian companies and entrepreneurs through unauthorized access to accountants’ systems and abuse of remote banking workflows, with stolen funds often converted to cryptocurrency. The actor has also demonstrated defense-evasion techniques such as obfuscation, staged loaders, encrypted PDFs, pipe-based in-memory execution, and selective payload delivery. Infrastructure used by UAC-0050 has overlapped with abusive and bulletproof hosting ecosystems associated with Russian or pro-Russian operations. The group has been observed using networks and providers also leveraged by other criminal and state-linked activity, supporting resilient command-and-control, payload hosting, and spam operations. Overall, UAC-0050 is best characterized as a Russia-aligned mercenary intrusion set conducting mixed-motivation operations, with dominant emphasis on espionage against Ukrainian targets while also engaging in financially motivated theft and psychological operations.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
18 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
13 additional families tracked in Mallory.
144 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Russia-aligned/associated mercenary cybercrime activity conducting spear-phishing and social engineering to deploy remote access tooling for intelligence collection and/or financial theft; historically focused on Ukrainian entities (notably accountants/financial officers) with apparent expansion to Western European institutions supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts.
Ukraine-focused phishing using compromised email accounts and tax-authority lures to deliver an archive that installs a remote IT/support tool for unauthorized access.
Cluster associated with phishing in Ukraine using compromised email accounts and delivery of a remote IT/support tool for unauthorized access.
Targets Ukraine using email campaigns with encrypted PDF attachments that contain URLs; those URLs typically download a compressed JavaScript file which, when executed, installs the NetSupport RAT payload. Uses encrypted PDFs to hinder content extraction while retaining a consistent PDF object structure that can be fingerprinted for clustering/attribution.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.