LiteManager
LiteManager is a legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) / remote access tool that has been abused by threat actors to obtain remote access on victim systems. In the provided reporting, it is specifically associated with UAC-0050 (also known as the DaVinci Group and labeled “Mercenary Akula” by BlueVoyant), a Russia-aligned cluster that has historically targeted Ukraine-based entities, especially accountants and financial officers. UAC-0050 has previously dropped legitimate remote access software such as LiteManager in attacks targeting Ukraine, alongside other malware including RemcosRAT and, in separate reporting, use of other RMM tools such as Remote Manipulator System (RMS). The broader context notes that legitimate RMM tools are attractive to cybercriminals because signed, legitimate installers may appear less suspicious to users and can provide persistent, stealthy access while potentially evading some traditional antivirus detections. Threat actors can abuse such tools for data gathering, financial theft, lateral movement, persistence, and staging follow-on malware. No LiteManager-specific infection chain, targeted industries beyond UAC-0050’s Ukraine-focused victimology, or LiteManager-specific indicators of compromise were directly provided in the content.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
This was the first time Proofpoint observed UAC-0050 deliver NetSupport, as it has historically used other malware including Remcos and Lumma Stealer, but it has previously used RMMs including Litemanager and Remote Manipulator System (RMS).
"...the threat actor known to drop legitimate remote access software like LiteManager..."
Techniques & procedures
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
IOCs tracked for this family
83 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Legitimate remote access/administration software used by the actor for remote control and persistence on victim systems.
A remote management tool previously used by UAC-0050 as part of its intrusion activity.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.