TA571
TA571 is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor and high-volume spam distributor that operates spam botnets and has been associated with the 404TDS traffic distribution system. Proofpoint has tracked TA571 since 2019 distributing and installing malware for cybercriminal customers, and prior reporting indicates the actor operates as an FIA (financially motivated initial access) group. TA571 has been described as an initial access broker/group whose infections can lead to ransomware. Observed malware distributed by TA571 includes Ursnif, ZLoader, DanaBot, IcedID including the Forked variant, Rhadamanthys, DarkGate, NetSupport RAT, Matanbuchus, and malware associated with TA866/Asylum Ambuscade. Reporting also notes delivery of AsyncRAT and other malware via 404TDS. TA571 commonly uses high-volume malspam, thread hijacking, HTML attachments, malicious URLs, password-protected ZIP archives, legitimate file hosting services, compromised or spoofed infrastructure, and gated delivery chains with IP and geo-fencing. The actor has also used OneDrive links in PDF attachments and VBS, JavaScript, MSI, HTA, and PowerShell-based infection chains. TA571 was an early observed user of the ClickFix social-engineering technique. Proofpoint first observed TA571 using ClickFix on 1 March 2024 in a campaign of more than 100,000 messages targeting thousands of organizations globally. In these campaigns, HTML attachments impersonated Microsoft Word or OneDrive content and tricked users into copying and executing base64-encoded PowerShell commands, leading to payloads such as DarkGate, Matanbuchus, and NetSupport RAT. TA571 also used root-certificate-themed lures similar to ClearFake. Proofpoint coined the term ClickFix based on activity by TA571 and ClearFake. TA571 has also been linked to major malware delivery campaigns. In October 2023, Proofpoint observed TA571 delivering Forked IcedID in thread-hijacking campaigns using 404TDS URLs, password-protected ZIP files, and regsvr32 execution. In January 2024, Proofpoint attributed spam distribution in a TA866-related campaign to TA571, where invoice-themed emails with PDF attachments and OneDrive-hosted JavaScript led to WasabiSeed and Screenshotter. Proofpoint first tracked Rhadamanthys in December 2022 in a campaign attributed to TA571, with post-exploitation attributed to TA866. TA571 is affiliated in reporting with infrastructure and services around 404TDS; one report states Vacant Viper is known to affiliate with TA571 and that 404TDS delivered IcedID and other malware. Proofpoint observed TA571 activity decrease or disappear from email campaign data since mid-2024.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Tradecraft
15 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Observables
40 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as a threat actor associated (in related reporting) with ClearFake-style social engineering used to deliver PowerShell-based malware via fake CAPTCHA/ClickFix lures.
Priority cybercriminal threat actor that distributed Rhadamanthys in campaigns beginning in December 2022 and has used both exclusive and broadly available malware.
TA571 is involved in phishing campaigns using fake Google Meet pages to deliver malware such as AsyncRAT, StealC, and Rhadamanthys, targeting both Windows and macOS users.
Cybercriminal group observed distributing DanaBot in email campaigns between 2018 and 2020.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.