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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 7 actorsExploits 1 CVE

DarkGate

DarkGate is a Windows malware family commonly referred to as DarkGate. The provided content describes it as a loader and stealer with additional remote-access capabilities including HVNC and HAnyDesk support. Reported behavior includes APC-based execution and injection tradecraft: DarkGate has been observed using APC self-injection by queuing an APC to itself and invoking NtTestAlert for immediate execution, and modern reporting also associates it with Early Bird APC-style loader behavior. During initial installation, DarkGate drops several files into a hidden directory named after the victim machine. It starts a thread that captures clipboard data and logs it to a predefined log file, searches for stored credentials associated with cryptocurrency wallets, and notifies or uses its command-and-control infrastructure when such credentials are identified. Some versions have used Nirsoft Network Password Recovery/NetPass to steal stored RDP credentials. DarkGate also queries system locale information during execution; later versions call GetSystemDefaultLCID to determine whether the malware is running in Russian-speaking countries. It can terminate processes associated with several security software products, and the content also notes DarkGate deleting system restore points via vssadmin.

Distribution and infection vectors in the content include phishing links to VBS or MSI payloads requiring user interaction, pirated or cracked software lures, fake software installers impersonating products such as Apple iTunes, Notion, and NVIDIA, AutoIT-script-based delivery chains, HTML/clipboard-based ClickFix or paste-and-run social engineering, and delivery by other malware or traffic/distribution clusters including TA571, TA577, UNC4393-linked phishing activity, SmokeLoader, Amadey, and Danabot affiliates. Proofpoint and Red Canary reporting in the content links DarkGate to ClickFix-style campaigns where victims are tricked into copying and executing malicious PowerShell commands. One cited campaign exploited CVE-2024-21412 in a DarkGate infection chain involving fake installers.

The malware is associated in the content with multiple financially motivated ecosystems and actors. TA571 and TA577 are both described as distributing DarkGate. Mandiant reporting cited in the content states that after the QAKBOT takedown, UNC4393, the primary active user of BASTA ransomware, began leveraging phishing clusters delivering DARKGATE for initial access. Trellix reporting on leaked Black Basta chats states that Black Basta used or rented DarkGate, and one excerpt says Black Basta had rented the DarkGate loader and HVNC from the actor 'Rastafareye'. The content also links a DarkGate infection chain documented by researcher 0xToxin in August 2023 to infrastructure using the hostname WIN-LIVFRVQFMKO. Overall, the content supports DarkGate as a multifunctional crimeware loader/stealer used in phishing- and social-engineering-driven intrusion chains, often as an initial access or payload-delivery component in broader eCrime operations.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2024-21412Microsoft Windows Internet Shortcut Files SmartScreen BypassExploited in the wild

CISA noted that the vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2024-21412 during attacks... CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. | “CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more. Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is supposed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malicious websites. However, as the name implies, these flaws bypass these security features, which leads to end users being infected with malware.”

via the record mediatherecord.media
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

7 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA577

More recently, they have delivered Pikabot and DarkGate malware.

via medium intel opsmedium.com
RastaFarEye

It appears that Black Basta had rented the DarkGate loader and HVNC from threat actor ‘Rastafareye’.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
TA571

In addition, TA571 has been associated with the distribution of other malware families, including variants of IcedID, NetSupportRAT, DarkGate and others.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
UNC4393

In late 2023, several months after the QAKBOT infrastructure takedown by the FBI and the United States Justice Department, UNC4393 began leveraging other distribution clusters for initial access, specifically those delivering DARKGATE, again via phishing.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
BO Team

The attackers typically use targeted phishing emails with malicious files disguised as legitimate documents to gain initial access, and deploy backdoors such as BrockenDoor, as well as other malware including Remcos and DarkGate.

via the record mediatherecord.media
Storm-1607

These emails contained HTML attachments that attempted to install DarkGate, a commodity loader that is capable of keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, establishing C2 communications, and downloading additional malicious payloads, among others.

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1592Gather Victim Host InformationEvidence1

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence6

TA577, are a Russia-based threat group that have been reported to deliver payloads including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike in ongoing phishing campaigns since 2020. More recently, they have delivered Pikabot and DarkGate malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

TA571 email lure. In this campaign, emails contained an HTML attachment that displayed a page resembling Microsoft Word.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

We’ve been observing an initial access technique that tricks users into copying, pasting, and executing malicious PowerShell code... users are presented with the typical Verify You Are Human prompt... Clicking the button silently copies an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and presents the user with “Verification Steps” instructing them to: Press Windows Button + R... Press CTRL + V... Press Enter. | One technique we’ve recently seen lead to LummaC2 involves tricking users into copying a PowerShell script from a pop-up message, pasting it into the Windows Run dialogue box, and executing malicious PowerShell code.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

the malicious PowerShell/CMD script is copied to the clipboard via browser-side JavaScript

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

On August 2023, the security researcher 0xToxin documented an infection chain leveraging AutoIT scripts to deliver the DarkGate malware

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Bumblebee’s injection module ( dij command for DLL Injection) dynamically resolves NtQueueApcThread at runtime and uses it to inject a payload DLL... While the static import of NtQueueApcThread is flagged by multiple scanners, a runtime GetProcAddress lookup on ntdll.dll is invisible to import-table analysis.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

On Tuesday, the agency added CVE-2024-29988 to the list. The vulnerability was unveiled by Microsoft as part of the Patch Tuesday releases in April and affects Microsoft SmartScreen ... He added that the bug is popular among attackers that use a file download as part of their attack techniques for gaining initial access because they “want to find ways to bypass the security features such as SmartScreen.”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

DarkHydrus has sent malware that required users to hit the enable button in Microsoft Excel to allow an .iqy file to be downloaded... TA505 has used lures to get users to enable content in malicious attachments and execute malicious files contained in archives.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

в архивах находились... а также LNK-файл... Если пользователь решит его открыть, то выполнится прописанная в нем команда

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Attackers spawn a process suspended, queue an APC into its main thread before the AV/EDR’s user-mode hooks have loaded, then resume. The payload runs before the security product begins. | Hence APC injection was formed as a technique, they’d find a process with a thread in an alertable wait and get a handle to it, call VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory to plant shellcode and then call QueueUserAPC pointed at the shellcode, the thread would eventually wake up and execute the shellcode.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder. | Examples include malware copied to '%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup', creation of '.lnk' shortcuts in Startup, and scripts or batch files placed in Startup folders. | Examples include: 'APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key'; 'APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence'; 'FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.'

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

в архивах находились... а также LNK-файл... Если пользователь решит его открыть, то выполнится прописанная в нем команда

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The content contains many examples of base64, XOR, RC4, AES, Rijndael, custom ciphers, rolling XOR, and multi-layer obfuscation used to hide payloads, strings, scripts, and C2 data.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

CVE-2024-21412 was used as part of a DarkGate campaign that leveraged fake software installers impersonating Apple’s iTunes, Notion, NVIDIA and more.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Attackers spawn a process suspended, queue an APC into its main thread before the AV/EDR’s user-mode hooks have loaded, then resume. The payload runs before the security product begins. | Hence APC injection was formed as a technique, they’d find a process with a thread in an alertable wait and get a handle to it, call VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory to plant shellcode and then call QueueUserAPC pointed at the shellcode, the thread would eventually wake up and execute the shellcode.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

An encoded PowerShell command then leverages Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to download and execute a malicious payload from a remote resource... Detection opportunity: mshta.exe utility making external network connections.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

DarkGate searches for stored credentials associated with cryptocurrency wallets... StrelaStealer attempts to identify and collect mail login data from Thunderbird and Outlook... Valak can download a module to search for and build a report of harvested credential data.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.

Collection

3 techniques
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

во вредоносном архиве лежал только один исполняемый файл... в архивах находились карточка предприятия... PDF... а также LNK-файл

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

downloading a remote PowerShell script and execute it in-memory. The second PowerShell script was essentially used to download yet another PowerShell script.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

83 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
49 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
24 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
10 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app4 months ago
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IOC matching83

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution7

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.