Attackers exploited CVE-2025-59287, a critical Microsoft Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) vulnerability, to deploy the ShadowPad backdoor. The CVSS 9.8 insecure deserialization flaw allows unauthenticated remote code execution with SYSTEM privileges through crafted SOAP/XML requests. AhnLab documented attacks following publication of proof-of-concept code: attackers established PowerCat command shells, downloaded malware using curl.exe and certutil.exe, and executed ShadowPad through DLL sideloading involving ETDCtrlHelper.exe, ETDApix.dll, and the payload 0C137A80.tmp. The malware configuration supported persistence and process injection, with command-and-control communication to 163.61.102[.]245:443 over HTTP or HTTPS. ShadowPad is associated with multiple China-linked espionage groups, but AhnLab did not attribute these attacks to a specific actor.
Separate CrowdSec monitoring recorded 1,020 exploitation signals over 32 days, beginning December 18, 2025, averaging approximately 32 daily and peaking at 52. CrowdSec characterized this activity primarily as focused reconnaissance for vulnerable WSUS configurations, rather than evidence of confirmed ShadowPad infections. Compromise of an update-management server could potentially enable malicious update distribution to connected clients, increasing the risk of network-wide compromise. Defenders should apply Microsoft's October 23, 2025 out-of-band updates or later applicable fixes, restrict WSUS exposure and access, and investigate unexpected shell execution, suspicious downloads, the documented sideloading files, and connections to the reported command-and-control endpoint.

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8 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The CrowdSec Network first detected attempts targeting the WSUS vulnerability. The activity involved crafted SOAP/XML requests against WSUS API endpoints.
Attackers exploited CVE-2025-59287 to download encoded ShadowPad components from 149.28.78[.]189:42306 using curl.exe and decode them with certutil.exe. The deployment used ETDCtrlHelper.exe to sideload ETDApix.dll, with 0C137A80.tmp supplying the backdoor payload and configuration.
The campaign was identified in November 2025, with ASEC documenting DLL sideloading, persistence settings, process-injection targets, and a configured command-and-control endpoint at 163.61.102[.]245:443. ASEC did not attribute the attack to a specific threat group.
AhnLab Smart Defense recorded a PowerShell command downloading PowerCat from GitHub and connecting to 154.17.26[.]41:8080. ASEC assessed that this execution gave the attacker access to the target server's CMD shell.
Microsoft released out-of-band updates KB5070881 and KB5070882 to address the WSUS vulnerability.
Proof-of-concept code for CVE-2025-59287 became public. SecPod reports that threat actors began weaponizing the exploit that day.
Microsoft disclosed CVE-2025-59287, an insecure deserialization vulnerability in Windows Server Update Services. It allows unauthenticated attackers to execute code with SYSTEM privileges on vulnerable servers.
CrowdSec reported 1,020 exploitation signals over a 32-day observation period and identified 130 IP addresses attempting exploitation, more than 70% of which were labeled malicious. It characterized most activity as focused reconnaissance for vulnerable WSUS configurations and observed a gradual week-over-week decline.
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