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Researchers exposed an active LegionLoader malware campaign, also tracked as Satacom, CurlyGate, and RobotDropper, that uses drive-by-download lures and short-lived redirect pages to push password-protected archives from file-sharing services such as Mega. The archives contain MSI installers that unpack and sideload a malicious obs.dll, which decrypts shellcode and a second-stage executable before using process hollowing into explorer.exe to continue execution. Analysis found heavy use of .monster domains, hard-coded command-and-control infrastructure, and tooling intended to download additional payloads, although some observed C2 servers were inactive during review.
The activity aligns with earlier Satacom operations that abused malicious or compromised websites and fake download buttons to distribute malware disguised as free or cracked software. In prior campaigns, the loader fetched follow-on payloads through DNS TXT lookups and PowerShell, then installed a fake Chromium-based "Google Drive" extension that targeted cryptocurrency users by stealing wallet data, manipulating transactions, bypassing 2FA, and suppressing transaction emails across Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo. The newer findings indicate the operators continue to rely on staged delivery, stealthy execution, and flexible payload retrieval, while defenders have been provided with hashes, URLs, file paths, registry artifacts, and YARA rules to detect the campaign.
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6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On January 31, 2025, researchers detected 25 unique campaign URLs within a 12-hour period, indicating rapid infrastructure churn in the LegionLoader operation.
TEHTRIS says the observed LegionLoader campaign appears to have started on December 19, 2024, using drive-by-download lures and redirect pages to deliver malware.
Securelist states that the Satacom downloader, also known as LegionLoader, emerged in 2019 as a malware family.
Securelist reported on a Satacom campaign that used fake software downloads and process hollowing to install a malicious Chromium-based extension that targeted cryptocurrency users.
TEHTRIS published an analysis describing the active LegionLoader campaign, its delivery chain, malware stages, and associated indicators including hashes, URLs, artifacts, and YARA rules.
Securelist reported that telemetry in Q1 2023 showed the highest infection frequencies in Brazil, Algeria, Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Egypt, and Mexico.
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Researchers reported that **DBatLoader**—also tracked as **ModiLoader** and **NatsoLoader**—has been used in multiple malware delivery campaigns that start with social engineering and end with remote-access trojans such as **Remcos RAT** and **Warzone RAT**. In one observed intrusion, a purchase-order themed malspam message carried an ISO attachment containing a Windows executable disguised with an Excel icon; after execution, the loader retrieved a **4.3 MB** base64 text file from **OneDrive**, decoded additional components on the host, and led to **TLSv1.3** command-and-control traffic with `146.70.158[.]105` over TCP `9138`, consistent with Remcos activity. Another sample abused **Discord** attachment URLs to fetch a second Delphi-based stage and ultimately deploy Warzone RAT, which communicated over TCP `1990`. Technical analyses describe DBatLoader as a **Delphi-based loader** that uses multilayer obfuscation, image steganography, and in-memory decoding before dropping batch scripts, DLLs, and executables into `C:\Users\Public\Libraries`. It establishes persistence through `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`, malicious shortcuts, and copied binaries, while some variants also abuse a **Mock Trusted Directories UAC bypass** and a relative-path DLL hijack involving `easinvoker.exe` and `netutils.dll` to gain elevated execution without a UAC prompt. Researchers said the malware commonly pulls later-stage payloads from public cloud services including **OneDrive**, **Google Drive**, and **Discord**, and has been seen distributing **Formbook**, **Netwire RAT**, **Remcos RAT**, and **Warzone RAT** against business users, including targets in Europe.
Aug 15, 2026
Breakglass Intelligence identified several active malware delivery operations using signed installers, compromised websites, and live command-and-control infrastructure to distribute loaders, stealers, and remote access tools. One campaign used the newly registered domain `maybedontbanplease[.]com` as CastleLoader C2 on 3NT Solutions LLP infrastructure, with a large NSIS installer embedding Python 3.14, AES-encrypted payloads, and in-memory shellcode execution via `pythonw.exe`; the installer was signed with an EV certificate issued to the likely fictitious entity **SERPENTINE SOLAR LIMITED**. The activity was attributed with medium-high confidence to **GrayBravo** and linked to delivery of **LummaC2, StealC, RedLine, Rhadamanthys, DeerStealer, NetSupport RAT,** and **SectopRAT**, with targeting that included U.S. government, critical infrastructure, IT, and logistics organizations. A separate operation distributed a trojanized `MSTeamsSetup.exe` that installed a weaponized **RustDesk** client and communicated with `mon.systemautoupdater[.]com` on EvoXT infrastructure, while presenting a TLS certificate for `calipology[.]com`, tying the activity to the **GeorgeGinx/Striker** operator. In another live campaign, attackers used the compromised Syrian web development site `allsydevs[.]com` to host an obfuscated .NET loader masquerading as a WordPress image and connected victims to `172[.]93[.]167[.]12:4263` over HTTPS using a self-signed certificate with the fake common name **Mesh Data**; at least six related samples were linked to the same C2, with lure names suggesting targeting of Middle Eastern construction and export firms. Together, the investigations show financially motivated actors expanding malware distribution through fraudulent code-signing, trojanized business software, and hijacked web infrastructure.
Jun 29, 2026
Multiple Windows-focused malware campaigns were reported leveraging *trusted distribution and execution paths* rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities. One campaign attributed to **Larva-25012** disguised proxyware as legitimate *Notepad++* installers distributed via fake cracked-software portals and deceptive ads, primarily impacting South Korea. The payloads were hosted on GitHub and delivered as MSI/ZIP packages containing legitimate components plus malicious DLLs, using **DLL side-loading** and process injection into **Windows Explorer** to deploy proxyware (e.g., **Infatica** and **DigitalPulse**) for **proxyjacking**—monetizing victims’ internet bandwidth by reselling access through their networks. A separate multi-stage Windows malware operation used business-themed lures and weaponized archives containing **LNK** shortcuts to run hidden **PowerShell** with execution-policy bypass, pulling an obfuscated loader from GitHub and using legitimate services (e.g., **Dropbox**) to blend into normal traffic. Fortinet-reported tradecraft included persistence, decoy document generation, and beaconing via the **Telegram Bot API**, followed by defense evasion through abuse of **Defendnot** to disable Microsoft Defender before dropping follow-on payloads such as ransomware, banking trojans, and surveillance tooling. Additional reporting highlighted a broader trend of attackers abusing legitimate infrastructure and admin tooling (including **RMM** software after credential theft) to establish persistent access, while generic “common threats” content provided no incident-specific intelligence.
Jun 29, 2026