Attackers are impersonating Booking.com pages in an ongoing ClickFix phishing campaign targeting the hospitality sector, tricking users into opening the Windows Run dialog and pasting attacker-supplied PowerShell that installs remote-access malware. Recent waves used Booking.com-branded lures such as secure-extranet[.]com, redirectors including jskeowgo[.]com, and additional phishing subdomains aimed at hotel staff, with some activity specifically targeting Italian-speaking users. Researchers observed multiple payload paths: one chain deployed NetSupport RAT through a large PowerShell stage that unpacked 14 base64-encoded components and then opened the legitimate Booking.com site to preserve the pretext, while another used staged loaders, ZIP delivery, and DLL sideloading via a legitimate psl.exe binary to install zgRAT and PureHVNC.
The malware provided full remote-control capability, including shell access, file transfer, keylogging, screen capture, and webcam or audio access, and established persistence through mechanisms such as Startup-folder shortcuts and HKCU\Run keys like SystemUpdate_<VID>. Infrastructure linked to the activity included freshly registered domains obtained in batches through Chinese and Hong Kong registrars, rotating download servers, telemetry endpoints that tracked installation progress per victim, and command-and-control systems hosted across providers in Frankfurt, Russia-linked environments, and a likely bulletproof-hosting setup tied to a newly created autonomous system. Investigators also found OPSEC clues including an exposed RDP certificate leaking the hostname WIN-FLJTJKL01VM, a PDB path referencing C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\HTCTL32\, and malware signed with a stolen *.dodo.com wildcard certificate, supporting clustering of the campaign as a financially motivated cybercrime operation using commodity RAT tooling.

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8 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Researchers found the campaign's domains had been registered within the prior seven days through Chinese and Hong Kong registrars, with sequential registry IDs suggesting batch procurement. They also identified OPSEC artifacts including an RDP certificate on 5.188.87.49 exposing hostname WIN-FLJTJKL01VM and a PDB path referencing C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\HTCTL32\.
A new wave of Booking.com-themed phishing used a fake CAPTCHA ClickFix lure at secure-extranet.com to trick victims into manually running a PowerShell command. The infection chain redirected through jskeowgo.com and delivered a 9.4 MB PowerShell payload that installed 14 base64-encoded NetSupport Manager RAT components while opening the legitimate Booking.com site as cover.
Analysis of the NetSupport RAT campaign linked two Windows Server 2022 hosts named "SMTP" on the 172.94.9.0/24 subnet in M247 Frankfurt, while the download domain later rotated to a Russian-hosted server at 77.105.133.95. Per-victim tracking IDs indicated the operator was monitoring installation start and completion across multiple victims.
An active ClickFix/FakeCaptcha campaign was observed delivering NetSupport RAT v14.10 through either a malicious MSI installer or a PowerShell dropper that fetched a ZIP bundle from applicationhost17.com. The malware installed under %APPDATA%, created persistence with an HKCU Run key, and communicated with a live C2 over HTTP POST requests.
Breakglass Intelligence reported that the hospitality-focused campaign used 14 phishing subdomains, staging and telemetry domains, and a primary C2 at asmweosiqsaaw.com on AS208885. The report assessed the operation as a financially motivated CIS-linked cybercrime campaign rather than a nation-state activity.
The Booking.com-themed malware operation used payloads signed with a stolen *.dodo.com certificate that appeared to have CA:TRUE capabilities, enabling abuse in the delivery chain. This technical detail was identified as part of the campaign's infrastructure and tradecraft.
During the campaign active since December 2025, operators used staged PowerShell loaders, victim fingerprinting, ZIP delivery, and DLL sideloading through a legitimate psl.exe binary loading a trojanized libpsl-5.dll. The infection chain ultimately deployed zgRAT and PureHVNC for remote access, screen control, and credential theft.
A three-wave phishing and malware campaign impersonating Booking.com verification pages began targeting hospitality organizations, especially Italian-speaking users. Victims were tricked with ClickFix-style prompts into executing PowerShell that led to malware delivery.
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