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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
«Программа-агент RedCurl.FSABIN, которая предоставляет злоумышленнику удаленный контроль над зараженной машиной, практически идентична загрузчику RedCurl.Downloader.»
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
To achieve persistence in the compromised system, a task named ChromeDefaultBrowser_Agent_[computer name in base64] is created in the Windows Task Scheduler.
The backdoor uses Windows API to gather information on the number of processors, memory size, storage capacity, as well as information on the amount of time that passed since the launch of the operating system before the malware sample being launched.
16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Remote-control agent installed by RedCurl.Extractor. It shares substantial code and anti-analysis capabilities with RedCurl.Downloader. The agent sends Base64-encoded computer and user names to C2, retrieves an encrypted BAT payload from one server and decryption-key material from another, then decrypts, saves, and executes the script. The ordering of its C2 requests is significant. The report places it within RedCurl's commercial-espionage operations rather than ransomware activity.
Backdoor used in a Red Wolf/RedCurl campaign. It is downloaded after initial execution, stores itself under a masqueraded filename, creates a scheduled task for persistence, performs anti-VM/environment checks, collects host information, sends system details to C2, then downloads and executes an additional DLL payload.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.